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ABSTRACT  
   
The Arab Spring revolutions of 2010-11 raised important questions about how 
social-movement actors use new communication technologies, such as social media, for 
communication and organizing during episodes of contentious politics. This dissertation 
examines how organizers of and participants in Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution used 
communication technologies such as Facebook, blogs, news websites, email, television, 
radio, newspapers, telephones, and interpersonal communication. The dissertation 
approaches the topic through the communication paradigm of framing, which the author 
uses to tie together theories of social movements, neo-patrimonialism, and revolution. 
The author traveled to Tunisia and conducted 44 interviews with organizers and 
participants about their uses of communication media, the frames they constructed and 
deployed, their framing strategies, their organizing activities, and their experiences of the 
revolution. The most common frames were those of the regime’s corruption, economic 
issues, and the security forces’ brutality. Interviewees deployed a hybrid network of 
media to disseminate these frames; Facebook represented a single node in the network, 
though many interviewees used it more than any other node. To explain the framing 
process and the resonance of the frames deployed by revolutionaries, the dissertation 
creates the concept of the alternative narrative, which describes how revolutionaries used 
a hybrid network to successfully construct an alternative to the narrative constructed by 
the regime. The dissertation also creates the concept of authoritarian weakening, to 
explain how citizens can potentially weaken neo-patrimonial regimes under conditions 
concerning corruption, poverty, and the introduction of civil society and of new 
communication technologies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will introduce the events of the Arab Spring, the media coverage 
of the Arab Spring, my research into the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia, and the 
methodology of my research. In the following section, I present the historical context of 
the Middle East and North Africa, in order to situate the specific events of the Arab 
Spring revolution in Tunisia, which comprise the broader object of my research. 
 
1.2 Context of the Arab Spring 
At the turn of the millennium, the United Nations, through the U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP), convened a group of 45 Arab scholars to produce the Arab Human 
Development Report, an analysis of the political, economic, and social conditions of the 
Arab world. The first of the three reports (2002) noted that revolutions and transitions in 
the 1980s and 1990s in Europe, Asia, and South America had brought more democratic 
regimes and greater freedoms and human rights to millions, but this phenomenon had left 
the Middle East and North Africa untouched. The Arab world ranked last among seven 
world regions in indicators ranking freedom, the power of the citizens’ voices, and the 
accountability of the state (UNDP, 2002). Though many Arab states had formally 
enshrined democracy and human rights in their constitutions and legal codes, 
implementation was sometimes deliberately disregarded (UNDP, 2002). The report’s 
authors labeled this a freedom deficit, and they wrote that this deficit was undermining 
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human development (UNDP, 2002). The third and last Arab Human Development Report 
(2009) provided a detailed description of the ongoing deficits of freedom and human 
rights, as well as the abuses of state power that prevailed in much of the Arab world at 
the time:  
Such fears [of random, violent death and destruction] also permeate more 
fortunate Arab societies which, although free from armed conflicts or occupying 
forces, suffer under the dead hand of authoritarian power. In many Arab 
countries, the ordinary person enters a police station at his or her peril, knowing 
he or she is liable to be hauled away on the merest suspicion of crime or public 
agitation. Dissenting citizens risk being thrown in prison for exercising their civic 
duty to speak out against state repression. Gripped by dread of actual or potential 
harm from fellow Arabs and foreign powers alike, torn by conflicts and hobbled 
by unjust laws, too many Arabs live out an existential nightmare of insecurity that 
numbs hope, shrivels initiative and drains the public sphere of the motivation for 
co-operative and peaceful change. (UNDP, 2009, p. 36) 
The following year, a man who sold fruit from a cart in a rural town in inland Tunisia 
immolated himself front of a local government building to protest his treatment by local 
officials of the state. The suicide of Mohammed Bouazizi ignited nationwide 
demonstrations that in less than a month led to the fall of the 23-year regime of President 
Zine Abedine Ben Ali and sparked revolutions and popular uprisings throughout the Arab 
world.  
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1.2.2 The Arab Spring in Tunisia 
The portrait of deprivation and oppression in the previous section introduces the 
long-standing grievances that laid the foundations for millions of citizens in the Middle 
East and North Africa to rise against their authoritarian rulers in 2010 and 2011. This 
section recounts the events of the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia, to orient readers 
who might not be familiar with the details of these events, and this section introduces 
some of the important places, people, and themes that will be prominent throughout this 
dissertation.  
The revolution in Tunisia—and the Arab Spring—began on December 17, 2010, 
when Bouazizi, 26, immolated himself in Sidi Bouzid, a town of roughly 40,000 in 
Tunisia’s rural interior (Ahmed, 2016; Angrist, 2013; Brooks, 2013; Lim, 2013; 
interviews during dissertation research). Local officials had confiscated his scales that 
morning, on the pretext that he did not possess the necessary permits, and then they had 
not been willing to meet with him about the situation (Ryan, 2011a). A few dozen locals 
protested that day in Sidi Bouzid, but demonstrations remained almost entirely confined 
to Sidi Bouzid and towns in the county for the following week (Ayeb, 2011). On 
December 24, police killed two protesters in the small town of Menzel Bouziane, about 
30 miles from Sidi Bouzid, and the protests began to swell in the interior towns of Thala 
and Kasserine (Lim, 2013).  
Shortly thereafter, the first demonstrations were also held in the coastal cities of 
Sfax, Tunisia’s second-largest city, and Sousse (Ayeb, 2011). Trade unions also became 
involved then, organizing the first demonstration in Tunis, which was attended by 
roughly 1,000 people expressing solidarity with Sidi Bouzid and calling for jobs (Lim, 
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2013). Ben Ali gave a televised speech on December 28, in which he railed against the 
protesters as extremists and promised a crackdown, but demonstrations continued to grow 
(Randeree, 2011). On January 4, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) declared its 
support for the demonstrations, and the National Order of Lawyers called for its members 
to go on strike (Lim, 2013). 
Protests turned violent in the interior towns of Thala and Kasserine in early 
January (Appendix A). Police assaulted several demonstrators in Thala on January 3, and 
on January 8 police killed at least 10 demonstrators in Thala and Kasserine (Ayeb, 2011; 
Lim, 2013). The following evening Ben Ali gave his second televised speech during the 
crisis, in which he vowed that he would extinguish the uprising by any means necessary 
(Ayeb, 2011). Protests grew in various areas of Tunis (Ryan, 2011b). On January 12, tens 
of thousands participated in a demonstration in downtown Tunis; Ben Ali deployed the 
army in Tunis and issued an order to suppress the demonstrations (Brooks, 2013). The 
army chief of staff refused to carry out the order, however, and the army withdrew from 
the streets the following day, a decisive factor in the revolution’s success (Bellin, 2012; 
Brooks, 2013). On the evening of January 13, Ben Ali made his third and final speech; he 
was conciliatory, promising not to run for re-election and offering reforms (Lim, 2013). 
His supporters staged their own rally in downtown Tunis after the speech, an interview 
subject said. The next day, January 14, saw the largest demonstration yet, as protesters 
filled the main square in downtown Tunis, demanding the fall of the regime in front of 
the Interior Ministry (Ryan, 2011a). Ben Ali fled the country that evening.  
In the months following Ben Ali’s fall, dozens more protests occurred; there were 
protests against members of Ben Ali’s party remaining in the provisional government, but 
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there were also demonstrations by Islamists supporting the adoption of Islamic law, 
against the film Persepolis, and against the banning of the veil in universities, as well as 
protests by secularists against the Islamists (Shadid, 2012). However, Ben Ali’s ouster on 
January 14, 2011, effectively marks the revolution, because even though various 
demonstrations have been held in the years since that date, they have not shared a 
common goal, nor have any large demonstrations demanded the fall of the regime. In the 
following section, I will describe the uprisings in other Middle Eastern and North African 
countries; even though my research concerns only Tunisia, the events in these countries 
will bring into sharper focus the key factors that caused these rebellions and affected their 
outcomes, and this data adds meaningful context to the events in Tunisia.   
 
1.2.3 The Arab Spring Outside Tunisia 
Egypt. After the revolution in Tunisia, protests spread to nearly all Arab states. 
The next ruler to fall was Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power 
since 1981. The popular uprising began on January 25, 2011, on National Police Day. 
Police brutality had for decades galvanized opposition groups; the Facebook page “We 
Are All Khaled Said” was started in 2010 after the Alexandria resident died on June 6 
from what witnesses said was a beating by police (Levinson, Coker, & Solomon, 2011). 
Political parties from across the spectrum, including the Muslim Brotherhood, announced 
they would participate in the January 25 demonstrations (Afify, 2011), and the 
revolutionaries included significant numbers of Islamists, secularists, nationalists, and 
feminists (Korotayev, 2011). As citizens continued to demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square and throughout the country, Mubarak repeatedly offered concessions in televised 
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speeches (Nepstad, 2011). Violent clashes erupted between his supporters and the rebels 
in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but the military refused Mubarak’s order to put 
down the rebellion (Nepstad, 2011). Since the fall of the British-supported monarchy in 
1952, the military had been a central pillar of the state structure—Mubarak and the three 
previous presidents in Egypt’s postcolonial history had served in the armed forces—and, 
without the military’s support, Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, after 17 days of 
protests (Nepstad, 2011). 
 Yemen. On January 15, 2011, the day after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Yemeni activist 
Tawakkol Karman organized a small demonstration in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, to express 
support for the Tunisian revolution (Filkins, 2011). The next evening, she and more 
demonstrators marched to the Tunisian Embassy and called for the resignation of Yemeni 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had held power since 1978 (Filkins, 2011). Saleh’s 
decades in power had been marked by rampant corruption, suppression of human rights, 
and unrelenting economic hardship—half of Yemen’s children were malnourished at that 
time of the uprising (Filkins, 2011). In early March Saleh promised concessions, but the 
demonstrations continued. The turning point came when security forces killed 52 
protesters on March 18 (Barany, 2011). The killings galvanized the opposition and split 
the armed forces (Barany, 2011). Yemeni society is largely tribal, and the armed forces 
disintegrated along tribal lines (Barany, 2011). Saleh had installed many members of his 
family and extended tribe in positions of military leadership, and these units largely 
remained loyal to him, though one crucial defector was a general from Saleh’s tribe who 
had previously been a staunch ally (Barany, 2011). Unlike in Tunisia, where the military 
sided with the demonstrators, the leaders of the Yemeni armed forces depended on the 
  7 
Saleh regime for power and not the state, so they were willing to continue to fight against 
the protesters to support the regime (Ahmed, 2016). However, other units defected to the 
opposition, some did not take sides, and many simply deserted (Gause, 2011). The 
association of the group of states in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
worked for months to ease Saleh from power. Saleh fled to Saudi Arabia in June after an 
assassination attempt badly injured his leg, but he did not formally cede power until 
November 23 (Barany, 2011). Karman, along with Liberian President Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf and Liberian activist Leymah Gbowee, was awarded the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize. 
Despite the formal transfer of power, the deep cleavages among Yemen’s many tribes 
plunged the country into anarchy and civil war. The U.N. estimates that some 9,000 
people have died since the fighting worsened in March 2015 (Youssef & Al-Batati, 
2016). 
 Libya. On February 17, 2011, protesters in the city of Benghazi in eastern Libya 
rebelled against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the oil-rich country 
since 1969 (Sawani, 2012). As in many Arab nations, Libya under Gaddafi was an 
authoritarian regime marked by a stunted civil society and weak and thoroughly corrupt 
state institutions (Bhardwaj, 2012). The course of Libya’s revolution was significantly 
shaped by the external factor of NATO intervention. On March 17, the U.N. Security 
Council approved a NATO-led mission, which comprised 1) a campaign of missile 
strikes to destroy the regime’s air force and air defenses, 2) bombing of regime ground 
troops who were massing outside cities in eastern Libya in order to put down the 
uprising, and 3) weapons and training for rebels (Bhardwaj, 2012; Bumiller & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011). As in Yemen, tribal and regional identity remained central in Libyan 
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society, and the military splintered along these lines (Barany, 2011). Gaddafi had named 
his relatives the commanders of elite and paramilitary forces, which he relied on during 
the civil war of 2011 (Barany, 2011). Military units in the east of the country defected 
almost in their entirety to the rebels; many units in other regions simply deserted (Barany, 
2011). After months of civil war through the spring and summer of 2011, Gaddafi was 
ousted from Tripoli in August and killed in the street in his hometown of Sirte on October 
20 (Fahim, Shadid, & Gladstone, 2011). Tribal and religious cleavages have continued to 
plague Libya. Civil war erupted again in 2014, with combatants including a government 
in the country’s eastern province, an Islamist-led rival government in Tripoli and its 
foreign patrons, an Islamic State franchise, and tribal militias in other regions (Wehrey & 
Lacher, 2014). President Obama has called the “worst mistake” of his presidency the 
failure to plan for what would come after the fall of Gaddafi (Dowd, 2016).  
 Bahrain. Protests began on February 14, 2011 in Bahrain, a tiny island monarchy 
tucked between Saudi Arabia and Qatar just off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia 
(Nepstad, 2013). The country’s ruler, King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa, soon quashed the 
rebellion with the aid of foreign troops, but Bahrain deserves mention here because of the 
course of its unrest. In Tunisia and Egypt, the military sided with the protesters, while in 
Yemen and Libya, the armed forces largely split along tribal lines. In Bahrain, however, 
the military fully backed the regime and suppressed the protesters (Barany, 2011). The 
island’s citizens are roughly 70-percent Shiite, but the ruling family and much of the 
country’s elite are Sunnis (Nepstad, 2013). As such, the regime has kept the military 
largely Sunni, recruiting Sunnis from abroad to fill out perhaps as much as 50 percent of 
its ranks and using the military as a force to protect the privileges of the Sunni elites (al-
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Shehabi, 2011). On February 17, three days after the protests began, Khalifa ordered the 
military to attack the demonstrators, and the military obeyed, killing four protesters 
(Nepstad, 2013). This sparked larger protests, with perhaps up to 200,000 Bahrainis 
participating, or roughly 25 percent of the country’s adult population (Humphreys, 2011). 
The crackdown also led the protesters to change their demands from political reform and 
sectarian issues to a call for the end of the regime (Gelvin, 2012). To quell the uprising, 
the regime requested the assistance of foreign troops, and 1,000 troops from Saudi Arabia 
and 500 police officers from the United Arab Emirates arrived in Bahrain on March 14 to 
snuff out the protests (Barany, 2011). Some activists have continued to call for reforms 
and for regime change, but they have yet to find support among the armed forces or the 
ruling family (Gelvin, 2012). As possible evidence of the influence of external state 
actors in shaping the events of the Arab Spring, it bears mention that the U.S. Fifth Fleet 
is based in Bahrain, and U.S. officials did not express backing for the protesters—as 
officials had in Tunisia Egypt, and Libya—but rather urged demonstrators and the 
government to engage in dialogue (Bronner, 2011). 
 Syria. Much the same as in the other states where protests followed the revolution 
in Tunisia, citizens in Syria took to the streets in the early months of 2011. The unrest in 
Syria began when families in the small town of Deraa demonstrated in March 2011 for 
the release of a few teenagers who had been arrested and tortured after anti-regime 
graffiti was written on a school wall, but security forces opened fire on the protesters 
(Fahim & Saad, 2013). The regime promised concessions, but the regime cracked down 
hard on the protests. The military deployed tanks and shelled some cities where protests 
took place (Ghattas, 2011), and more than 500 civilians were killed in March and April 
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(Shadid, 2011). The top ranks of the armed forces largely remained loyal to the regime, 
because Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his father, who had preceded him in office, 
had stocked up to 90 percent of the ranks of the military’s officers with their co-
religionists from the Alawite sect of Islam (McLauchlin, 2010), an offshoot of the Shiite 
branch, even though Alawites make up only about 10 to 15 percent of Syria’s population 
(Barany, 2011; Nepstad, 2013). Roughly 75 percent of the country’s population—and a 
majority of the military’s conscripts—are Sunnis, and many of those troops defected to 
the rebels or deserted (Nepstad, 2013; Van Dam, 2011). Foreign actors have also 
significantly shaped the ongoing violent stalemate, which has claimed some 400,000 
lives (Fisher, 2016). Wood, Kathman, and Gent (2012) argue that the flow of money, 
arms, and fighters from foreign actors backing various groups in a multi-sided conflict 
explains the seemingly intractable nature of the Syrian civil war: Powerful foreign 
backers—whether the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, or 
Hezbollah—can match any escalation or gains made by a rival faction, their resources 
will not be exhausted by this conflict, and they have little incentive to end such a war. 
 Other states. In addition to the six countries above, protests of varying size in the 
wake of Tunisia’s revolution were recorded in another dozen majority-Arab countries 
(Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) and among the Arab inhabitants of Iran’s Khuzestan 
province (Ajbaili, 2011; Blight, Pulham, & Torpey, 2012; Dekhnstan, 2011; Nepstad, 
2013). Popular unrest in these countries, however, has not led to regime change, civil 
war, or foreign intervention.  
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1.3 Media Coverage of the Arab Spring 
 In this section, I shift the focus from the events of the Arab Spring to the 
relationship between these events and communication media. I examine the media 
conditions in Tunisia before the Arab Spring, followed by an account of how news media 
covered the Arab Spring. I then discuss internet usage in Tunisia before the Arab Spring, 
followed by a discussion of the popular media heuristic about the significance of social 
media during the Arab Spring. These broad categories—communication media, the 
internet in particular, and the uses of social media—are the topics of my research, which I 
introduce in the fourth part of this chapter. 
 
1.3.1 Media Landscape in Tunisia Before the Arab Spring 
 As was typical in authoritarian Arab states before 2010, traditional media outlets 
in Tunisia were almost entirely under the strict control of the regime (el- Issawi, 2012; 
Kuebler, 2011). At the outset of the revolution, nearly all print media were either owned 
by the state, the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally party, or private owners who 
were part of the regime’s coterie of patronage (El-Issawi, 2012). Editors of print media 
were given directives from the Information Ministry dictating political coverage (El-
Issawi, 2012). The state operated two broadcast television networks, and the two 
nationwide private networks—also close to the regime—were prohibited from 
broadcasting political news (El-Issawi, 2012). In radio, the conditions were identical: two 
state-owned broadcast stations and private stations forbidden from reporting political 
news (El-Issawi, 2012).  
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 Four opposition weekly newsmagazines did exist, but they faced even greater 
political and economic pressures from the state (El-Issawi, 2012; Freedom House, 2011). 
The editor of one opposition weekly said that government pressure on the weekly’s 
printer led to production delays on a September 2010 issue that was particularly critical 
of the regime (Freedom House, 2011). The government could revoke the professional 
license of any journalist to punish critical coverage, and the state determined the 
distribution of advertising revenue as a way to control the economic viability of print 
publications (El-Issawi, 2012). Freedom House (2011) reported that the regime often 
persecuted Tunisian journalists through harassment, assault, surveillance, arrest, and 
forced exile. The government regularly detained and interrogated journalists (Freedom 
House, 2011). In January 2010, a television journalist was sentenced to four years in 
prison for merely reporting on protests led by miners in the rural, interior town of Gafsa 
in 2008 (Freedom House, 2011). Given these conditions, domestic coverage of the 
uprising in traditional media effectively reproduced the regime’s framing of events, 
repeating Ben Ali’s defining of protesters as extremists and terrorists, and the protests as 
riots (Lim, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 Arab Spring Coverage by Al-Jazeera and Other Satellite Television Networks  
In chapters 3, 4, and 5, I explore how interview subjects used Al-Jazeera and 
other television networks. In this section, I explain why Al-Jazeera was the first and most 
influential traditional-media outlet to cover the uprisings in Tunisia and elsewhere, and 
this communication medium was a central node in the hybrid network of communication 
technologies constructed by the interview subjects in this dissertation (Alterman, 2011; 
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Howard & Hussain, 2011; Lynch, 2015; Ryan, 2011a; Wulf, Misaki, Atam, Randall, & 
Rohde, 2013; Zayed, 2011). Ironically, the Tunisian government had expelled the Qatar-
based satellite channel’s journalists from Tunisia before the Arab Spring, because Al-
Jazeera had aired reports critical of the regime, so Al-Jazeera did not have any 
correspondents in the country when the revolution began (Zayed, 2011). On Dec. 17, 
when Mohammed Bouazazi killed himself in Sidi Bouzid, Al-Jazeera’s new-media staff 
found the video of the ensuing protest that Bouazizi’s cousin Ali Bouazizi had uploaded 
to Facebook (Ryan, 2011a). Ali Bouazizi had long been an opposition activist with 
connections among opposition journalists; he conducted an interview that evening with 
Al-Jazeera, in which he gave his version of the day’s events, he and his cousin Lassad 
said in their interview with me. His framing of his cousin’s suicide was an important 
moment, which I will examine in chapter 3.  
Al-Jazeera continued to cover the unrest in Tunisia from that first day; before any 
other traditional media outlet, it included footage from Tunisia in its news bulletins and 
gave updates on the uprising on its website, blogs, and social media (Zayed, 2011). A 
Tunisian born-anchor working at the studio in Qatar arranged for Tunisian freelance 
journalist Lotfi Hajji to work for the network without any attribution, because of the 
domestic ban (Worth & Kirkpatrick, 2011). His local contacts sent progressively more 
videos to his Facebook page, which he would curate and pass on to the network (Worth 
& Kirkpatrick, 2011). In January 2011 the channel abandoned its program schedule and 
followed the uprisings 24 hours per day (Lim, 2013). To be sure, other satellite networks, 
including Western networks such as BBC and CNN, also covered the protests before the 
fall of Ben Ali, but these channels—even Al-Jazeera’s main Arabic-language competitor, 
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Al-Arabiya—were lagging behind the scope of Al-Jazeera’s coverage (Ryan, 2011a; 
Worth & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Zayed, 2011).  
Equally significant was Al-Jazeera’s framing of the protests in Tunisia as a 
revolution (Alterman, 2011). Though the station did not label the uprising a revolution 
until January 11, it framed the protests as a revolutionary uprising, legitimizing the 
protesters’ grievances as justified rebellion against a despotic regime (Alterman, 2011; 
Ryan, 2011a). Since its inception in 1996, Al-Jazeera has worked to construct a pan-Arab 
public sphere; after decades of the state-controlled propaganda in the region’s television 
news, Al-Jazeera was ground-breaking in its willingness to discuss controversial topics 
and criticize long-ruling tyrants who had been portrayed in national media as nearly 
infallible (Lynch, 2011a; Lynch, 2011b; Lynch, 2015). A linchpin of Al-Jazeera’s agenda 
was to recast Arab identity into a unified, pan-Arab citizenry possessed of abundant, 
legitimate grievances against the region’s similarly authoritarian regimes (Lynch, 2011b). 
For years, the channel had fueled protest movements, broadcasting their messages—
which would have been suppressed in local media—and protecting protesters from a 
measure of repression (Lynch, 2011a). Early in Tunisia’s uprising, for example, Al-
Jazeera broadcast reports comparing Tunisia’s economic woes to those plaguing the 
broader region, framing the reports to emphasize pan-Arab problems of unemployment 
and high prices, as well as authoritarian mismanagement of the economy (Zayed, 2011). 
These reports framed a region-wide narrative of oppressed nations on the verge of revolt 
(Lynch, 2015). It should be added here that media coverage of the region’s ensuing 
turmoil generally hewed to this paradigm: Domestic media, controlled by or close to the 
state, remained silent about local unrest, but Al-Jazeera and foreign media provided 
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significant coverage, with Al-Jazeera the most influential source (Alterman, 2011; 
Howard & Hussain, 2011; Lynch, 2015).  
Al-Jazeera’s uses of digital and social media also merit mention. Partly because 
its journalists had been expelled from many Arab countries, the station relied extensively 
on phone videos and social-media feeds of citizen journalists for material from the 
uprisings in Tunisia and elsewhere (Bossio, 2013; Howard & Hussain, 2011; Zayed, 
2011). Zayed (2011) found that Al-Jazeera used mobile footage for 60 percent of its 
material from Tunisia. Bossio (2013) found that Al-Jazeera used twice as many social-
media sources as BBC or CNN in covering the revolution in Egypt. This consistent usage 
of content provided by protesters and locals also led many viewers—both supporters and 
opponents of the protesters—to perceive Al-Jazeera as firmly on the side of the protesters 
(Zayed, 2011). Al-Jazeera was also able to use this content again to fatten its own internet 
and social-media coverage of the rebellions (Howard & Hussain, 2011).  
 
1.3.3 Internet Usage in Tunisia Before and During the Arab Spring 
 In 1991, Tunisia became the first Arab country to connect to the internet, but by 
the time the revolution erupted in December 2010, the Tunisian government was 
practicing thorough censorship of internet content, surveillance of internet users, and 
harassment of bloggers and internet activists (Ben Gharbia, 2010; Freedom House, 2011; 
El-Issawi, 2012; Kuebler, 2011; Lim, 2013). Despite pervasive censorship and 
surveillance, Tunisian political activists used the internet extensively in the years 
preceding the revolution (Kuebler, 2011; Lim, 2013). Activists established the online 
think tank Takriz in 1998, and other activists founded websites in the next few years 
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(Lim, 2013). In 2004 a group of activists established the independent blog Nawaat, which 
provided a forum for the activist community and remained an important news source 
throughout the revolution (Lim, 2013). The case of activist and journalist Siham 
Bensedrine is emblematic of the relationship between the regime and activists: The 
government rejected his application to publish a newspaper, so he started an online news 
site; the government blocked the site and opened a criminal investigation of his work 
(Freedom House, 2011; Kuebler, 2011). As with opposition journalists in traditional 
media, online journalists and activists were subject to police surveillance, intimidation, 
arrest, and prison sentences (Freedom House, 2011; Kuebler, 2011; Lim, 2013). The 
development of the online public sphere in Tunisia mirrored the divide in the country’s 
geographical development: The internet in Tunisia remained an elite space, in that digital 
activists worked almost exclusively in urban areas and focused on abstract questions of 
human rights, democracy, and censorship (Kuebler, 2011; Lim, 2013). 
 By 2010 the government’s internet agency was blocking at least 30 websites 
pertaining to politics, news, and human rights (Freedom House, 2011). The agency 
blocked the website of the opposition communist party—which operated legally—as well 
as the sites of its online weekly and an affiliated blog (Kuebler, 2011). Internet cafés 
were under police surveillance, and customers had to provide their names and personal 
information before going online (Freedom House, 2011). Given these conditions, 
websites that offered discussion fora typically demanded that users not discuss domestic 
politics; bloggers deleted others’ comments that might arouse the censors’ wrath 
(Kuebler, 2011). In sum, many internet users feared government reprisal for their actions 
online—these forms of censorship and self-censorship were symptomatic of the country’s 
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shriveled public sphere (Kuebler, 2011). To evade regime surveillance, many internet 
users became skilled with the use of proxies, and they would take advantage of these 
capabilities once the revolution erupted (Kuebler, 2011). 
  In the months preceding the revolution, internet censorship worsened: The 
government blocked an online forum for democratic debates before it had been officially 
launched; in October the government also blocked the website of the Tunisian 
Observatory for Union Rights just hours after it launched (Freedom House, 2011). 
Government censors moved beyond blocking political websites to regularly blocking 
social-media sites such as Facebook and YouTube, as well as photo-sharing and music-
sharing sites, arts and culture sites, and even cooking websites (Ben Gharbia, 2011; 
Freedom House, 2011; Kuebler, 2011). Internet users bristled at the increased censorship; 
they started online petitions and founded Facebook groups to protest the new restrictions, 
and activists called for a demonstration on May 22, 2010 against internet censorship—the 
first attempt to move online protest to the streets (Ben Gharbia, 2011). The abortive 
demonstration exemplified the limited reach and power of online activism in Tunisia: 
While hundreds of sympathizers marched in front of Tunisia’s embassies and consulates 
in Paris, Brussels, Bonn, New York, and Montreal, the two main organizers of the 
demonstration were detained on May 21 and coerced by security forces into recording 
video messages calling off the rally (Ben Gharbia, 2010). A few dozen protesters showed 
up on the main square in Tunis (Ben Gharbia, 2010). Activist Sami Ben Gharbia (2010) 
wrote the following week that while the presence of even those few protesters should be 
an inspiration, online activism had yet to reach the offline mass of Tunisians.  
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 When the revolution began in December 2010, about 37 percent of Tunisians used 
the internet (Freedom House, 2011). Roughly 20 percent used Facebook, while Twitter 
was used by less than 1 percent (Pollock, 2011; Wulf et al., 2013). An urban-rural divide 
existed in internet access, as well: The 13 coastal provinces had 232 public internet 
access points, while the 11 interior provinces had only 27 such access points (Brisson & 
Kontinis, 2012). In this dissertation, I frequently examine how individuals used the 
internet during the revolution, so the following lines provide only a summary of internet-
related events during the revolution that had a nationwide or international reach. One 
internet event from November 2010 merits mention: On November 28, the activist blog 
Nawaat launched TuniLeaks, pages concerning Tunisia from the WikiLeaks release of 
U.S. diplomatic cables (Ben Mhenni, 2010). Diplomats described in the cables the 
pervasive corruption of the regime, particularly how Ben Ali’s wife Leila and her 
extended family gorged at the state’s trough (Wulf et al., 2013).  
Analogously to the protests simmering in the interior regions for the first two 
weeks after Bouazizi’s suicide before spreading nationwide, the cyber-conflict between 
activists and the government grew significantly with the beginning of 2011. On January 
1, the authorities disabled the secure https protocol nationwide and began phishing for the 
passwords of leading activists (Lewis, 2011; Ryan, 2011b). The regime then deleted the 
Facebook pages and email accounts of several activists (Lewis, 2011; Ryan, 2011b). On 
January 2, the hacktivist group Anonymous declared the start of Operation Tunisia, 
launching distributed denial of service attacks on at least eight government websites and 
helping develop software for activists to evade government detection (Howard & 
Hussain, 2011; Ryan, 2011b). The government responded on January 6 by arresting at 
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least six prominent bloggers and internet activists, including the rapper Hamada Ben 
Amor, known as El General, who had a week earlier released a widely shared protest 
song denouncing the president (Lewis, 2011; Ryan, 2011c).  
The urban-rural divide persisted in the ways that activists used the internet: 
Security forces attempted to brutally quash growing protests in the interior towns of 
Kasserine and Thala, also blocking the roads surrounding the towns, which had spotty 
internet service; protesters recorded videos on their cellphones of the clashes and of the 
dead and wounded, and they smuggled the data over the nearby border with Algeria, from 
which activists either uploaded the videos or delivered them to activists in Tunis for 
uploading (Lim, 2013; Pollock, 2011). The foregoing section introduces the dynamics of 
internet access and use in Tunisia, and in chapters 3 and 4, I examine in greater detail the 
interplay of regime censorship and social-movement actors’ uses of specific internet sites 
as part of a hybrid network for a variety of tasks related to the revolution.  
 
1.3.4 Narratives About Social Media and the Arab Spring 
 In this section, I discuss how many news media reduced the Arab Spring to a 
Facebook event; this sloppy heuristic gave rise to my first interest in questions of how 
revolutionaries used communication technologies during the Arab Spring, an interest that 
grew into this dissertation. As news coverage spread of the revolution and its prominent 
and dramatic online component, news outlets and other observers began to frame the 
narrative of the uprising as a Facebook revolution or social-media revolution. On the day 
that Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Wired magazine’s website published a story with the headline 
“Tweeting Tyrants Out of Tunisia: Global Internet at Its Best” and the lede: “Even 
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yesterday, it would have been too much to say that blogger, tweeters, Facebook users, 
Anonymous and Wikileaks had ‘brought down’ the Tunisian government, but with 
today’s news that the country’s president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali has fled the country, it 
becomes a more plausible claim to make” (Anderson, 2011). To Anderson’s credit, he 
avoids such hyperbole in the rest of the article and discusses how revolutionaries used 
social media for organizing and to disseminate information (Anderson, 2011), but the 
intimate conflation of revolution and social media became a regular trope in the mass 
media. This narrative of social media as a synonym for the Arab Spring uprisings gained 
such currency that when The New York Times covered the nascent civil war in Syria in 
late 2012, they framed the conflict with the heuristic, “If the uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt were Twitter Revolutions, then Syria is becoming the Skype Rebellion” (Chozick, 
2012). Even this year, Wired is still framing a story that analyzes politically the years 
following the Arab Spring under the headline, “Social Media Made the Arab Spring, But 
Couldn’t Save It” (Hempel, 2016). The article approaches the relationship between social 
media and the Arab Spring much more subtly than the headline indicates, but that 
headline heuristic abides. On the opposing side, so many rushed to debunk the claim that 
social media either caused or determined the outcomes of the revolutions that prolific 
journalism professor Jay Rosen (2011) published a blog post in February 2011, just after 
the fall of Mubarak in Egypt, defining these debunking articles as an established genre 
with set of standard practices. Moving beyond anecdotes, Bossio (2013) found that CNN 
and BBC repeatedly mentioned the use of social media during the uprisings—these 
networks mentioned social-media use twice as much as Al-Jazeera English, which was 
relying markedly on social media as sources for its reporting.  
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 In short, news media reports constructed a narrative that closely linked social 
media to the Arab Spring revolutions. This dissertation is not intended to debunk claims 
that social media caused or determined the revolutions; that can be done in a paragraph. 
Stepanova (2011), for example, points out that no correlation exists between internet 
and/or social-media penetration or usage rates and the countries that experienced revolts: 
For instance, Gulf states have by far the highest internet penetration rates among Arab 
countries, yet only Bahrain’s citizens rose in sustained protest—and their demonstrations 
were quickly snuffed out. At the other extreme, the majority of the adult population of 
Yemen is illiterate, and internet infrastructure is scarce, but Yemenis rebelled and ousted 
their longtime dictator. As for determining the outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings, 
Barany (2011) writes that the military’s response to demonstrations is the most reliable 
predictor of a revolution’s outcome during the Arab Spring, along with factors such as 
foreign intervention, the strength of the opposition forces, and the old regime’s resolve to 
persevere. Moreover, many scholars have argued compellingly for the central role of 
traditional media, especially Al-Jazeera, in communicating protesters’ grievances and 
actions to their fellow Arabs (see, e.g., Cottle, 2011; Khondker, 2011; Lynch, 2011b; 
Rinke & Röder, 2011; Russell, 2011).  
However important were the multiple uses of communication technologies such 
as social media, scholars have presented compelling arguments to explain the causes of 
the revolutions (e.g., decades of authoritarian misrule) and the factors that largely 
determined the revolutions’ outcomes (e.g., the reactions of the armed forces and the 
actions of external actors). Indeed, the citations I included at the beginning of this chapter 
from the UNDP reports condemning the miserable political and social conditions of many 
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Arab nations, as well as the preceding accounts of events, were intended to present a 
preponderance of evidence that social media—or any communication technology alone—
did not cause or determine the revolutions. This dissertation, then, does not pursue any 
misleading question about the relationship between media use and the causes of the 
revolution. On the contrary, this dissertation provides a rich, full account of the many 
ways that social-movement actors in Tunisia used a range of communication media 
during the revolution. In the following section, I will lay out the foundations and research 
questions of the dissertation. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This dissertation contributes new, important knowledge about how the organizers 
of and participants in Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution used communication media 
during the revolution. This dissertation provides a unique account of how these social-
movement actors used communication technologies, and it builds theory in multiple 
disciplines. I have rooted this dissertation in framing theory, for several reasons. The act 
of framing is inherently an act of communication, an act of making meaning. Yet, as 
Entman (1993) describes, framing is an area of scholarly research that bears on multiple 
disciplines; by calling on framing theory, I am helping to fulfill Entman’s (1993) call for 
communication to serve as a master theory or a locus where crucial theories, such as 
framing, can be brought together from various disciplines that might not otherwise know 
about or build on one another’s concepts. I am not aware of any research that conducted 
as many interviews with revolutionaries in Tunisia about how they used communication 
technologies, so this dissertation breaks new ground in exploring and explaining the 
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relationships among framing processes, new technologies such as social media, social 
movements, and revolution.  
The new knowledge created by this dissertation is significant also because the 
Arab Spring is one of the most important geopolitical events since the fall of communism 
almost 30 years ago. The importance of the data and findings here are enhanced by their 
provenance from the country where the Arab Spring began. Unlike other Arab Spring 
uprisings, the organizers and participants in Tunisia could not base their frames or 
framing strategies on any other rebellion, nor could they draw inspiration from any 
previous success. Instead, these individuals constructed the first frames of the Arab 
Spring, and this dissertation provides a unique account of how organizers and participants 
constructed and deployed these frames, as well as an account of the collective-action 
frames. In chapter 3, I will present and discuss the data and findings about how the 
social-movement actors constructed collective-action frames, about their techniques and 
strategies for constructing frames, and about the how they used communication 
technologies to disseminate these frames. In chapter 3, I will also present and discuss the 
data on whether and why mediated frames resonated with the interview subjects. In 
chapters 4 and 5, I will discuss how the interview data on neo-patrimonialism and 
revolution theory, respectively, overlap with framing processes and communication more 
broadly. 
The overarching research question of this dissertation is: How did organizers of 
and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia use social media and various 
websites, al Jazeera and other television stations, and telephones to construct and deploy 
mediated frames for collective action? This overarching research question, along with 
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overlapping elements from theories of neo-patrimonialism and revolution, suggest the 
following research sub-questions: 
 
R1: How did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia use 
media, particularly social media, Al-Jazeera and other television stations, and telephones? 
 
R2:  How did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia 
construct a shared protest identity and revolutionary ideology, and in what ways did they 
use these communication media in this process? 
 
R3: How did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia 
construct a collective action frames, and in what ways did they use these communication 
media in this process? 
 
R4: How did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia use 
these communication media—and what kinds of strategies did they employ—for framing 
processes such as frame alignment? 
 
R5: Were there any relationships between frame resonance and specific communication 
media? 
 
R6: In what ways did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in 
Tunisia exemplify the active roles of users in the social construction of technology? 
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R7: What kinds of grievances did organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring 
revolution in Tunisia hold against the Ben Ali regime? 
 
 I will answer these questions in chapters 3, 4, and 5, as well as in the conclusion 
to the dissertation, chapter 6. In the following sections, I will describe the research 
methods that I employed to derive answers to these questions. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 In these sections on my research methods, I discuss the theoretical foundations of 
my methodological approach, and then I explain how I constructed the interview 
questionnaire, and I conclude with a discussion of data collection and analysis. 
 
1.5.1 The Social Construction of Technology  
 In this section, I will describe the theoretical underpinning of my qualitative and 
quantitative methods. I will also discuss this theory in chapter 2 as part of my discussion 
of how social-movement actors in Tunisia used communication technologies, but my 
focus in this section is how this theory informed my approach to developing the interview 
questionnaire. The major theoretical approach I employ draws on an abundance of 
previous studies in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), which is based on 
the theory of the social construction of technology. The social construction of technology 
posits that a technology does not arrive with fixed traits or predetermined effects or uses 
(Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003). In social practice, the social construction of technology 
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means that social groups make decisions about which technologies to pursue; they then 
make design decisions and decisions about the production, distribution, and deployment 
of technologies. Users then construct new sets of traits of technologies (Bijker & Pinch, 
2012). The field of STS has moved in recent years toward building more theory and 
methods allowing for the analysis of technology from the perspective of the user, in an 
approach called user studies. For example, How Users Matter (2003), by Oudshoorn and 
Pinch, details the application of this approach in a variety of areas of science and 
technology. They describe user studies as a shift in the field from considering users as 
passive recipients to active participants in the social construction of technology, noting 
that one way to study users is within the context of a social movement, as was done in 
this dissertation (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003).  
 One crucial element of this methodology is the concept of interpretive flexibility, 
which means that a technological artifact (e.g., a telephone, the television, the internet) 
does not have only one interpretation, reading, or meaning; instead, its traits are wholly 
dependent on how various social groups construct its uses and development (Bijker & 
Pinch, 2012). As such, this research followed methodological symmetry (Bijker & Pinch, 
2012), which is the principle that no single account of a technology’s use or uses is 
privileged as being truer than another account. In other words, there was no 
presupposition about the correct uses of communication media. To accomplish this, 
questions were largely open-ended, so as to allow interview subjects to construct the 
“thick description” (Geertz, 1973) necessary to provide an accurate, situated, and 
complete account of their uses of communication media (see Appendix B for the 
questionnaire).  
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 It should be noted that STS and user studies have been applied to the Arab Spring, 
though not in the way I do here, because the researchers did not interview the technology 
users. Comunello and Anzera (2012) lend support to my approach by criticizing some 
Arab Spring scholars for failing to appreciate the importance of the users of media 
technologies, who helped shape the technologies’ meanings and significance. The 
scholars critique those who frame the narrative as social media affecting the course of the 
revolutions, because this claim is based on an assumption of media impact or media 
effects in which a communication technology is an autonomous actor. These concepts of 
impact and effects derive from the theory of technological determinism, which assumes 
that technology, as an exogenous and autonomous actor, produces one-way effects on 
society (see, e.g., Heilbroner, 1967). This view fails to consider the ways in which 
technological and social factors interact, such as how a single technology can be used for 
many different purposes—even by one user—or how users can deploy many different 
technologies to accomplish the same process (Comunello & Anzera, 2012, 458). In 
developing the interview questionnaire, I approached interview subjects as co-
constructors of the communication technologies that they used. When I asked 
interviewees about each medium of communication, I asked whether they used the 
medium for a specific range of uses, and I asked them open-ended questions to elicit, as 
fully as possible, all the ways that they used these communication media. This section 
explained the theoretical assumptions of the interview questionnaire, and I will explain in 
the next section the purposes of the individual questions on the questionnaire.  
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1.5.2 The Interview Questionnaire 
 In creating the interview questionnaire, my goal was to develop questions that 
would interrogate the framing practices of the interviewees and interrogate the areas 
where framing practices overlap with the theoretical terrain of neo-patrimonialism and 
revolution theory. In the following chapter, I will explain this overlap in detail, but, in 
brief, the overlap with the former relates largely to the interview subjects’ grievances 
against the regime, while the latter broadly relates to the construction of a shared identity 
among all participants in the revolution as a mass of protesters with shared grievances. 
Considering that scholars have robustly built the field of framing in social movements 
since the 1980s (for a review of the field’s first 25 years, see Snow & Benford, 2005), I 
imagined that many sets of standardized questions would exist for interviews with social-
movement actors, but this was not the case. I contacted nearly a dozen scholars by 
email—including Robert Benford, who helped create the field—and they all replied that 
no such standardized questionnaire (or even standard questions) existed, nor had they 
themselves developed a questionnaire that they had used repeatedly. Ryan (2005) laments 
the field’s lack of research among social-movement actors, which might provide an 
explanation for the absence of such an interview questionnaire. In response to my emails, 
I received two questionnaires, and, using the scholarly literature in the field and these two 
sample questionnaires, I constructed a questionnaire that could serve as a standard for 
future interviews with social-movement actors. The central strength of this questionnaire 
is that it interrogates the framing process both from the perspective of the social-
movement actors who construct and deploy frames, as well as from the perspective of 
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these actors as the recipients of mediated frames who constructed meaning from the 
frames they encountered. 
The interview questionnaire consisted of five sections. The first section included 
questions about specific communication media and how interviewees used these media 
during the revolution; I asked whether and how frequently interviewees used each 
medium. I asked about social media, blogs, news websites, other websites related to the 
revolution, and email. As I did for all communication technologies, I followed up with 
specific questions about usage for any positive response, which allowed me to collect 
individual data about the uses of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and of various individual 
blogs and news websites. I asked about interviewees’ usages of television, radio, 
newspaper, telephone, and interpersonal communication related to the revolution, with 
follow-up questions for specific media outlets such as Al-Jazeera, France 24, etc. For 
social media, telephones, email, and face-to-face communication, I asked follow-up, 
open-ended questions about what the interviewees used these media for. From the initial 
answers, a set of categories emerged, and in later interviews I then asked closed-ended 
questions about these specific usages, if an interviewee used a particular technology. 
These usages included exchanging news, persuasion, encouragement, analysis, 
organizing tasks, and others. In the following chapter, I will explain how I called on 
theoretical frameworks from framing, neo-patrimonialism, and revolution theory, to 
formulate questions that would both deepen understanding of the revolutionaries’ work 
and the revolution itself, as well as allow me to build theory in each of these fields. 
The second section of the interview questionnaire included separate question for 
organizers and for participants. Organizers are defined as individuals who worked to set 
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dates, times, or places of protests; engaged in the systematic recruiting of other 
participants and/or organizing those other participants’ participation in protest events, 
whether online or in person; or held official positions in organizations that engaged in 
pro-revolution activities. Participants are defined as those who were physically present at 
public shows of support for the revolution, including demonstrations, marches, and sit-
ins, but who did not engage in the above activities, even if these individuals did use 
communication media to express their support for the revolution and encourage others’ 
participation. This delineation allowed for an examination both of how interviewees 
constructed frames and how participants constructed the meaning of frames, as well as 
how participants constructed and deployed their own frames. I asked both populations to 
describe all the frames that they constructed, their techniques for constructing frames, 
their framing strategies, as well as whether they varied their strategies for different 
audiences or different media. I asked participants how they found out about the protests 
that they attended, as well as whether and how their participation was influenced by what 
they had seen in various media.  
The third and fourth sections of the interview questionnaire included questions 
rooted in revolution theory and neo-patrimonialism, and I will explain in the following 
chapter how these questions are connected to framing and to communication more 
generally. The fifth, final section of the interview questionnaire included demographic 
questions about age, sex, education, class, and political affiliation and level of interest. 
I want to emphasize that these interviews were semi-structured, rather than 
following only the prescribed questions, and the uses of open-ended and follow-up 
questions is central to the contribution to research methods that this questionnaire 
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represents. By employing a semi-structured method, I could guide interview subjects into 
discussion of the research questions while allowing them the space to present their 
accounts of the ways in which they used various media technologies. The open space in 
the semi-structured interview provided the opportunity for a full accounting of media use, 
rather than collecting data only from a narrow and restricted set of queries. For example, 
in response to the closed-ended questions about framing, interviewees provided rich data 
about the range of frames and framing strategies that they deployed—and in response to 
my open-ended, follow-up questions on framing, the interviewees’ answers revealed that 
they were, in a larger sense, constructing their own narrative of the revolution, as an 
alternative to the narratives constructed and deployed by the regime-controlled news 
media and social media, as well as by other traditional news media. The concept of the 
alternative narrative is perhaps the most important theory that I build in this dissertation, 
and I would not have arrived at this insight without using a semi-structured, open-ended 
approach. 
 
1.5.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 I conducted the interviews in Tunisia from January 18 to February 17, 2016. I 
conducted interviews with 44 organizers and participants from throughout the country, 
including interview subjects who spent the revolution in Tunis, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, 
Gafsa, Sousse, and elsewhere. Of the 44 interviewees, 11 were women, nine were from 
the country’s poorer, rural interior, and they spanned a wide range of education levels and 
class backgrounds. Many had been political activists for years—and some for decades—
before the revolution, and others had been uninterested in politics until the revolution. 
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The semi-structured interviews were conducted in English, French, and Arabic, and a 
professional translator was employed for the interviews in Arabic and for some of the 
interviews in French. I translated some of the interviews in French. Three interviews 
were conducted by Skype; the rest were conducted in person. Interviews were recorded, 
though in rare instances some words were inaudible, or the recorder failed to record brief 
segments. I employed a transcription service to transcribe the interviews. 
 The interviewee population was a snowball sample. To find the interviewees, I 
called on some people whom I knew who had been active in Tunisia during the 
revolution. These contacts gave interviews and then put me in touch with other organizers 
and participants, and through this process I got in touch with all interviewees. During my 
time in Tunisia, demonstrations and unrest led the government to declare an evening 
curfew for about a week of my research. Despite the turmoil, I was able to travel to the 
interior of the country, where the revolution began. In Sidi Bouzid, I was able to find Ali 
and Lassad Bouazizi, who are cousins of Mohammed Bouazizi, longtime opposition 
activists, and organizers of the first protests of the revolution. After some haggling with 
my translator, also a longtime opposition activist and organizer during the revolution (and 
interview subject), the two Bouazizis agreed to an interview, which was the first 
interview that they had given in two years. They told me that they had been unhappy with 
the inaccurate representations of what they had said in previous interviews, and their 
accounts do upend many of the existing narratives of the revolution, as I recount largely 
in chapter 3. Throughout the dissertation, I use the names of these two organizers, as well 
as the names of other revolutionaries whose names have already been used by scholars, 
so that this dissertation can contribute to the historical record of this epochal event. These 
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individuals were typically prominent online activists, but some were public figures, such 
as the publisher Karim Ben Said and Sadok Ben Mhenni, who had been a political 
prisoner decades before the revolution and remained a prominent opposition activist. All 
but two interviewees gave consent to the use of their names in this dissertation. When 
referring to interviewees, I typically indicate whether the individual was an organizer or a 
participant, and I usually indicate where the interviewee resides, as a way to put these 
accounts into perspective. Using unfamiliar names in every instance of citing an 
interview would, in my opinion, potentially distract from the content of their interviews. I 
also use the first person throughout this dissertation—rather than referring to myself as 
“the researcher” or writing around my presence—as a way to maintain the consistency of 
the constructivist approach pervading this work. I am acknowledging that this interview 
sample, as well as the content of the interviews, and, most importantly, my conclusions 
from the data, are contingent upon my unique interventions and constrained by the limits 
of my perception and understanding. To be clear, I believe that other researchers would 
obtain similar data from an entirely different sample of organizers and participants, but it 
would be dishonest to the foundations of this dissertation, if I did not show readers my 
individual determinations about this data—and the content of this dissertation.  
 I undertook both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the interview data. For 
the quantitative analysis, I coded the interview transcripts according to a coding schema 
that I developed with Dr. Michael J. Rohrbaugh, a professor of clinical psychiatry and 
behavioral sciences at George Washington University and professor emeritus of 
psychology at the University of Arizona. I will present the interview data in chapters 3, 4, 
and 5, but here I want to briefly explain the coding methodology. Where possible, I 
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created simple binary categories that could be coded as a zero or a one and entered into 
an Excel spreadsheet for analysis by the SPSS software.  
For example, I used binary categories to code whether interviewees used a 
particular technology (telephone, email, etc.) or specific medium (Facebook, Twitter, Al-
Jazeera); whether they used a medium for a specific purpose (to exchange news, to 
persuade, to analyze, etc.); whether what they saw in the medium resonated with them 
(I’ll explain in greater detail in the following chapter); whether they constructed and 
deployed specific frames (corruption, economic issues, the crackdown on protesters, 
etc.); whether they identified with fellow protesters; whether they blamed the Ben Ali 
regime for the problems that led to the revolution; and for other questions, as well. For 
certain communication media, such as Facebook, telephones, Al-Jazeera, France 24, Al-
Arabiya, and Tunisian state television, I also created entries for the number of minutes for 
which each interviewee used that medium. For certain questions, I created a unipolar 
Likert scale ranging from one to five, with five indicating a relatively higher value. I used 
this scale to code answers to the question about the degree to which participants’ choice 
to join the protests was influenced by what they had seen in the media; the question about 
whether participating in the protests gave interviewees a feeling of agency; how 
interviewees viewed the revolution’s chances for success; and to code interviewees’ 
perceptions of the strength of the regime before the revolution. 
I then used SPSS to determine means and standard deviations, and I examined 
correlations between variables by calculating two-tailed significance and p values. Where 
relevant, I cite the results in chapters 3, 4, and 5. It bears mention that I alone coded all 
interview data, so the question of intercoder reliability remains open. However, my 
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findings rely as much on my qualitative analysis of the interviews, and the respective 
findings from the qualitative and quantitative data do not diverge. I must also 
acknowledge the years that had elapsed between the revolution of 2010-11 and my 
interviews in January and February of 2016. During the interviews, I cautioned 
interviewees about potentially faulty memories, so most interviewees freely admitted 
when they could not recall the information that would allow them to answer interview 
questions. However, most interviewees were able to provide detailed accounts of their 
relevant experiences during the revolution—many of them talked about how the 
revolution was a seminal moment in their lives, so many elements of their experiences 
remained in their memories. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed the events of the Arab Spring and the media coverage 
of those events, and I introduced my research and research methods. This introduction to 
the broad outlines of this dissertation lays the groundwork to present the relevant 
scholarly literature, which I will discuss in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is split into five sections, each one focused on a different field 
offering theories that this dissertation will call upon. The sections are presented in an 
order roughly corresponding to how often that field’s theories will be used to interrogate 
the collected interview data. The exception to this is the field of communication theory, 
which is presented last because this home field of the dissertation provides the site that 
ties together the concepts and the theories from the foregoing sections. 
 
2.1 Social Movements, Social Media 
2.1.1 Social-Movement Theory  
The primary theoretical pillar of this work is the study of framing in social 
movements, which derives from Goffman’s work on frame analysis and the construction 
of meaning (1974). Snow and Benford (1992), who adapted Goffman’s theory to the field 
of social movements, define a frame as an “interpretive schemata that simplifies and 
condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, 
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past 
environment” (p. 137). Individuals or groups construct frames for the experiences in their 
lives in order to identify and locate events within the contexts of their lives and of the 
social world around them (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). Put another way, the framing process 
is a process of constructing the meanings of words and events. Goffman’s work—and the 
study of framing in social movements—is rooted in the concept of the social construction 
of meaning; that is, “meanings do not automatically or naturally attach themselves to the 
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objects, events, or experiences I encounter, but often arise, instead, through interactively 
based interpretive processes” (Snow, 2004, p. 384). The concept of the social 
construction of meaning is central to this dissertation, because it underlies the relevant 
literature in the fields of communication media and of science and technology studies, 
which follow below. The social construction of meaning also undergirds the methodology 
of this research, so it is important to point out at the outset the significant overlap and fit 
in the foundations of this dissertation. This concept was also the basis for the interviews 
that I conducted in Tunisia; I asked organizers and participants in the Arab Spring 
revolution in Tunisia multiple questions about the meanings—the frames—that they both 
imputed to and derived from the events of the revolution, such as the frames that they 
constructed and deployed through various communication media, as well as the frames 
that they encountered in communication media. I also asked them about the meanings 
that they attached to the regime and to their own participation in the revolution. In this 
section, I will define framing, discuss collective action frames, master frames, resonance, 
and the process of framing—the construction of meaning in the building and in the 
decoding of mediated frames. 
 To continue defining terms, I shall adopt Tilly’s (2004) definition of a social 
movement as a series of contentious performances, displays, and campaigns by which 
ordinary people make collective claims on others. Social movements, such as the 
demonstrations and protests in Tunisia in 2010-11, can also be understood as networks of 
individuals connected through a shared interest or goal (Tilly, 2004). The network 
concept allows us to perceive a social movement as a core or cores of thickly connected 
nodes among movement leaders and organizers linked through thinner connections, or 
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weak ties, to potential participants (Granovetter, 1973). This schema provides a visual, 
partial account of the process of how grievances, shared among connected individuals, 
erupt into a mass movement (McAdam, 1986; Tarrow, 1998). A mass movement arises 
when individuals connected by the weak ties1 of association, such as work colleagues, 
neighbors, or members of a group such as a union or civic association, coalesce around a 
shared goal or shared identity based on a political belief (Granovetter, 1973). These 
linkages among the members and potential members of a social movement will be 
important for understanding both the framing process and how individuals use 
communication media in social movements, as I will discuss shortly. 
 Framing is one of the three major traditions in social-movement theory (Dolata & 
Schrape, 2016); the other two are resource-mobilization theory, which examines how the 
availability of new organizational resources shapes the rise of new social movements 
(e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973), and political-opportunity theory, which 
explores how movements bring about social change by exploiting new political 
opportunities (e.g., Jenkins, 1985; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994). Snow and Benford 
developed the framing approach (e.g., Snow & Benford, 1988, 1992; Snow, Rochford, 
Jr., Worden, & Benford, 1986) based on the premise that organizers of and participants in 
social movements are agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of 
meaning (Snow & Benford, 1988). They define framing as the signifying activity or 
meaning construction in social movements intended to mobilize adherents and potential 
adherents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 
1988, p. 198; Snow, Benford, McCammon, Hewitt, & Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 27). Coe 
                                                 
1 As opposed to the strong ties of family and friendship. 
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(2011) adds that the framing process does not occur only in such typical and traditional 
social-movement discourses, but also in the practices of interaction, communication, and 
negotiation between social movement actors and other individuals or groups (p. 508). 
This observation underlines a point vital to this dissertation: Social-movement actors in 
Tunisia’s revolution engaged in the production and deconstruction of frames not only 
while using social media or the internet more broadly, but also during any interpersonal 
communication—mediated or unmediated—related to these contentious political events. 
In other words, Coe is providing a definition of hybridity, using various communication 
technologies and face-to-face communication for the same ends. Hybridity will be a key 
concept in our discussion of social media and communication technologies in the 
following section, because of the hybrid network constructed and deployed by social-
movement actors in Tunisia. 
 The specific frames produced by this active, interactive, and contentious process 
of reality construction are called collective-action frames (Snow & Benford, 1988). The 
literature defines collective-action frames as emergent, action-oriented sets of beliefs and 
meanings that inspire and legitimate social-movement activities and campaigns (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, pp. 614-18; Snow & Benford, 1988, pp. 199-204; Snow & Benford 1992, 
p. 137). To be more concrete, these sets of meanings can provide motivation for 
individuals to act, diagnose the causes of grievances, attribute blame for grievances, and 
propose remedies and solutions for grievances (Benford & Snow, 2000). I will discuss 
motivation and mobilization in greater detail below, but here I should note that when the 
framing paradigm was first articulated, Gamson developed a somewhat different 
approach that focused primarily on frames of injustice as a necessary condition of 
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collective action (e.g., Gamson, 1995; Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982). Scholars, 
including Gamson, write today of injustice frames as one of the types of collective-action 
frames that social movements can offer to adherents and potential adherents (Gamson, 
1995); other types of frames include inequality frames, collective-identity frames, and 
agency frames (for reviews of types of collective-action frames, see Morrison & Isaac, 
2012, and Coley, 2015). In the paragraphs below on the framing process, I will discuss in 
greater detail the questions on the interview questionnaire that interrogate the 
construction and decoding of frames, but here I should note that organizers were asked to 
describe the frames that they worked to construct, as well as how those frames potentially 
differed for different audiences and in different media. Interview subjects were also 
asked, in the semi-structured discussion of their interactions with media during the 
revolution, to discuss the mediated frames they encountered. 
 Another analytical tool to examine collective-action frames is the concept of the 
master frame. As the name suggests, a master frame appeals to diverse social groups and 
enables them to coalesce around a central explanation or problem-solving schema (Snow 
& Benford, 1992, p. 140). Howard et al. (2011) analyzed the Arab Spring revolution in 
Tunisia and conclude that social-movement leaders had used digital technologies to 
create a “freedom meme” that mobilized masses of citizens around ideas of liberty and 
revolution (p. 3). Working in greater detail, Lim (2013) argues that Tunisian activists 
transformed the suicide of Mohammed Bouazizi into a master frame; when his cousin Ali 
lied that Mohammed had been a college graduate who could not find appropriate 
employment, Mohammed’s suicide was rendered a symbol of the fight for justice, 
freedom, and dignity. In other words, this was a paradigmatic injustice frame, but the 
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revolutionaries expanded the frame beyond the basic economic grievances of the rural, 
interior poor to produce a frame including freedom and dignity, as well. I might debate 
whether these three ideals constitute a single frame; in any case, Lim did not travel to 
Tunisia, and she conducted only two phone interviews with Tunisian activists, so this 
dissertation will provide far more empirical evidence about the collective-action frames 
or potential master frames that organizers and participants constructed. 
 Before discussing frame traits, I should briefly address other types of framing 
somewhat prominent in the literature, even though this dissertation will not use this 
typology. Benford and Snow (2000) created categories of diagnostic, motivational, and 
prognostic framing; they refer to these categories as framing tasks that, as their labels 
suggest, offer diagnoses of social problems, motivation for collective action, or prognosis 
for how to resolve grievances. However, these categories are not mutually exclusive; a 
call to mobilize in protest, for example, can be both an example of motivational framing 
and prognostic framing. Moreover, the term collective-action frame carries an implication 
of a call to action or mobilization. Because of the conceptual fuzziness of these frame 
types, this area of framing “tasks” does not seem as fruitful an avenue of inquiry to 
examine Tunisia’s Arab Spring as does looking at the processes of framing by organizers 
and participants, as well as the qualities of the frames that organizers sought to construct 
and that resonated with participants.  
Resonance is the term used in framing to describe the variable that measures how 
effective or potent a collective-action frame is for mobilization (Snow & Benford, 1988; 
Valocchi, 2005). Ferree (2003) goes so far as to conclude that “the cultural resonance of 
such framing strategies is often seen as a sine qua non of movement success” (p. 305). 
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The field is not unanimous in naming or firmly defining the attributes of a frame that 
allow it to resonate with those who encounter it. Surveying the state of the framing 
approach, Noakes and Johnston (2005) critique the fuzziness of Snow and Benford’s 
(1988) early attempts to tease out the components of resonance. Noakes and Johnston 
offer their own terminology intended to simplify and make more precise these attributes, 
and for the purposes of this dissertation I can usefully apply two major, overlapping 
concepts from the theories of Noakes and Johnston (2005) and of Snow and Benford 
(1988): credibility, or the fit an individual sees between a frame and the events addressed 
by the frame; and narrative fidelity (Snow and Benford call this cultural compatibility), or 
the fit an individual sees between the frame and the individual’s understanding of the 
individual’s culture, immediate environment, or larger worldview. This latter attribute is 
also discussed by scholars as the fit between frame and the dominant culture or a 
society’s prevailing values and principles, which brings us to an important point about the 
field of discourses in Tunisia in 2010. McCammon, Muse, Newman, and Terrell (2007) 
observe that within a single society it is highly likely that more than one hegemonic 
discourse holds sway (p. 733). As the later section on neo-patrimonialism will explain, 
the dominant discourse in Tunisia, advanced relentlessly and mercilessly by the Ben Ali 
regime, was regarded as illegitimate—and simply false—by many in the country on the 
eve of the revolution. Assuming, then, that there was more than one narrative of or 
discourse on the Tunisian situation at this time, it follows that multiple frames could 
resonate across different individuals and groups, depending on how they understood their 
environment. Because more than one discourse was available, there did not need to be 
one master frame. Without a preponderance of preliminary evidence, I should not assume 
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that there was one or necessarily hypothesize that one obtained. Similarly, while one 
hypothesis of this dissertation is that collective-action frames did resonate with the 
revolution’s participants, I cannot assume that frames resonated simply because people 
went into the streets. I will not claim that the framing done by organizers was the sole or 
even primary cause for more than a million Tunisians to occupy their streets and demand 
the fall of the regime. The interview questionnaire probed frame resonance by asking 
specifically whether and how the frames that subjects encountered in various media fit 
with either their understanding of events or their beliefs and values. Participants were 
also asked why they decided to take part in protests and how that decision was affected 
by what they had encountered in various media.  
The concept of resonance, moreover, is especially important in this research 
because it connects framing theory to the revolution-theory concept of protest identity, in 
that both concepts describe the frames that motivate revolutionary thought and action 
through a resonance with prominent cultural narratives. I will address revolution theory 
in a separate section below, but here I should note that Noakes and Johnston (2005) 
discuss how the grammar of a resonant frame typically draws on the cultural stock of 
phenomena that can be presented in a way that appeals to some form of shared identity. 
The interview questionnaire addressed this aspect of resonance by asking participants to 
expound on whatever shared identity they might have perceived with their fellow 
revolutionaries.  
Understanding frames and frame traits is only part of the necessary conceptual 
framework. More central to this dissertation are the processes of constructing and 
decoding frames. Snow et al. (1986) coined the term frame alignment to describe the 
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process of the strategic production of frames by organizers and activists to align their 
movement with what they perceive to be the values and goals of allies and potential 
adherents (p. 468). Frame alignment, then, is the process of trying to construct a frame 
with resonance. The process of frame alignment, as Coe (2011) notes, is always situated 
and contingent; social-movement actors tailor their framing to the political and cultural 
conditions emergent in their environment. Moreover, social-movement actors adjust their 
framing for different intended audiences—organizers can work to construct different 
frames that they think will align best with the worldviews of their presumed recipients 
(Coe, 2011). Similarly, actors from the same social movement can construct different 
frames for the same audience (Coe, 2011). However, as Ferree (2003) observes, social-
movement actors can also construct and diffuse frames without the strategic intent of 
mobilizing or winning over adherents, though such a framing process would not be frame 
alignment but just frame construction. The interview questionnaire dedicated several 
questions to asking organizers about how they constructed frames. Organizers were asked 
about their intent in framing, as well as what types of frames they wanted to construct, 
and whether they used different frames for different audiences or in using different 
communication technologies. It is important to note that participants also engaged in 
frame production when they communicated about the revolution and/or attempted to 
convince others to join; participants were asked about their processes of frame alignment, 
as well as whether they used different frames for different audiences or in different 
communication media.  
The interrogation of frame alignment reflects this dissertation’s roots in the social 
construction of meaning, because frame alignment is a process of meaning construction. 
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It is important to underscore the processes of encoding and decoding frames as central to 
this research. Writing some two decades after introducing the framing approach, Snow 
and Benford (2005) lamented the scholarly focus on frames (and framing contests 
between rival framings of issues) and revealed that they had wanted from the beginning 
to concentrate on the production of meaning, the signifying work—the processes of 
framing. As a process, they continue, framing is an interactional, situated process in 
which frames are socially constructed. Ellingson (1995) adds that the framing process is 
dialectical, in that social-movement actors can and do alter their framings in response to 
events as an issue or social movement develops. As illustrated in the interview questions 
cited above, this dissertation makes a meaningful contribution to the field of framing by 
investigating in detail the signifying work and meaning construction by social-movement 
actors and by those who encountered frames of the revolution. I do need to briefly 
address the challenge that the framing literature offers no term for the process of meaning 
construction by the latter group; to be sure, the concept of resonance is based on the 
reactions of those who encounter frames, but resonance refers as much to the quality or 
qualities of a frame as to the process of making meaning by individuals. I will simply 
refer to this process as meaning construction, signifying work, or decoding by frame 
recipients.  
To expand on the significance of this research for framing in social movements, I 
should point out Ryan’s (2005) condemnation that framing theory has long examined 
frames at the expense of the framing process (p. 118). Ryan writes that scholars “rarely” 
interact with the social-movement actors who create frames, the processes the actors 
employ, or the audiences who mobilize in contentious politics (p. 118). This dissertation 
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accomplishes all three of these much-needed tasks, and I should point out that Ryan 
echoes the urging of Snow and Benford to train our attention on the signifying process of 
framing. Ellingson (1995) argues that the field needs more research that examines how 
the framing process emerges within a contingent, situated environment—in other words, 
how framing strategies reflect the context of where and when they emerge, and how they 
change or remain constant during the course of collective action (p. 107), and this 
dissertation answers that call. Perhaps more importantly, this dissertation uses framing as 
a bridge to other disciplines and as a way to add to knowledge of other social phenomena, 
as Oliver and Johnston (2005) implored framing scholars to do. I use concepts from 
framing to contribute to theories of neo-patrimonialism and revolution, as I will discuss 
in the respective sections of the literature review. Moreover, Snow et al. (2014), in 
assessing the state of framing studies some 25 years after their landmark articles 
establishing the field, note how framing has been used in a variety of scholarly 
disciplines and suggest that researchers need to integrate work on social-movement 
framing with framing research from other fields (p. 38). This dissertation answers the call 
of Snow et al. by melding social-movement framing with the study of framing in 
communication, where framing has long been a core field of inquiry, as I will show in the 
section on communication literature below. 
 
2.1.2 Social Movements and Social Media 
  As I discussed in the introduction, much media coverage of the Arab Spring 
emphasized the use of social media by revolutionaries. The use of social media—and of 
many other digital technologies—by social-movement actors has become a focus of 
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inquiry throughout the three major paradigms of social-movement theory (Tudoroiu, 
2014). To put it simply, social media—the same as any other communication media—are 
sites where framing takes place. Communication technologies are sites for constructing 
and negotiating meaning, sites where framing contests are waged by actors in contentious 
politics. This begs questions about whether and how social media might differ from other 
media as framing sites; Tudoriou (2014) puts it charitably when he writes that the 
literature remains “fragmented” in its findings (p. 347). Many scholars limit their work to 
niches related to social media, leaving the field scattered in its analysis of this 
technology, and debate continues about the impacts of social media, the mechanisms 
through which social media have impact, and whether these impacts tend to be positive, 
negative, or somewhere in between (Tudoriou, 2014). One crucial conceptual tool that 
has been developed by multiple scholars (e.g., Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides, & Freelon, 
2012; Bellin, 2012; Fuchs, 2017; Lim, 2013; Lynch, 2011a; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012) is 
the hybrid network. A preponderance of evidence shows that media users are not 
encountering news about—and frames of—social movements solely on social media; 
traditional news media continue to play a significant role in the coverage of social 
movements. The term hybrid network encompasses offline as well as online encounters 
related to a social movement, such as when media users discuss a contentious issue, 
speak in person with social-movement actors, or when social-movement actors meet. The 
concept of the hybrid network reinforces the point that individuals encounter frames of 
social movements in a variety of environments. The work of framing, whether the 
construction of frames or the decoding of meaning, also takes place in a variety of 
environments. Later in this section, I will review research that examines the specific 
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hybrid networks at play during the Tunisian revolution. However, I first need to discuss 
the uses of social media and hybrid networks for constructing collective identity, 
nurturing information cascades by overcoming fear, fostering weak ties, reducing the 
costs of organizing, raising the costs of repression. 
One common finding in the literature is that social-movement actors use social 
media to create a collective identity among adherents and potential adherents (Breuer, 
Landman, & Farquhar, 2014; Brym, 2014; Garrett, 2006; Tufekci, 2017). Brym (2014), 
for example, concludes that in Egypt during the Arab Spring revolution, new 
communication technologies promoted the construction of collective through emphasis 
on the people’s shared grievances against the feckless regime. Writing about Tunisia’s 
Arab Spring revolution, Breuer et al. (2014) found that social-movement actors used 
social media to direct attention toward the regime’s atrocities in reacting to the protests, 
in an effort to form a national, collective identity that would support the uprising of a 
legitimately aggrieved population. Garrett (2006) explains that the promotion of a 
collective identity is crucial in social movements because organizers can more easily tap 
into a shared identity to mobilize adherents. It is important here to draw out further the 
connection between framing theory and the use of social media to craft a collective 
identity: The construction of collective identity is a perfect example of frame resonance. 
As Noakes and Johnston (2005) observe, social-movement actors draw from a shared 
cultural repertoire in working to fashion a frame that will resonate—in other words, one 
major way that a frame can resonate is by tapping into elements that will communicate a 
message about a collective identity. The process of frame alignment, then, can also at 
times be the process of constructing frames of a collective identity. If recipients report 
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that they felt a sense of shared identity when encountering mediated frames, then I can 
reasonably conclude that a frame has resonated. The interview questionnaire directly asks 
participants whether they felt a sense of shared identity with fellow protesters, and it also 
gives them the opportunity to discuss whether their understandings of mediated frames 
made them feel a sense of collective identity. One might well ask why social media 
should be any different than any other media platform in presenting frames that might 
construct collective identity; to be sure, images on satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera or 
on online news websites could also foster a sense of collective identity, a point that 
reinforces the hybrid nature of the media networks through which frames are 
disseminated and decoded. I should also note here the overlap between the construction 
of a collective identity of aggrieved citizens with authoritarian political theory and with 
revolution theory, both of which I discuss below. 
As social media can help with constructing collective identity, they also can help 
nurture the kind of information cascades that allow individuals to overcome fear and 
mobilize in protest. Granovetter (1978) decades ago laid out the dynamics of this kind of 
information cascade: An activist core signals a political position to sympathetic 
individuals who share the same position; realizing that such a view is commonly held, 
more individuals decide to publicly express that position, which leads to a greater 
likelihood of mobilization in protest. Social-movement research refers to a state of 
pluralistic ignorance (Tufekci, 2017, p. 26), when individuals in a society do not know 
that their opinion is widely shared. Social media help overcome pluralistic ignorance by 
allowing people to reveal their preferences in a semi-public setting and discover shared 
views speedily but without (yet) going into the street (Tufekci, 2017). Seeing a 
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previously taboo position expressed and supported on social media—or through any 
digital communication technology—might make others feel safer to declare their own 
support for such a position (Aday et al., 2010). Aday et al. (2010) and Bennett, Breunig, 
and Givens (2008) also find that social media amplify the speed of disseminating and 
receiving the kinds of information that can lead to mobilization. To be sure, this trait of 
amplified speed holds true for many of the ways in which individuals use social media, 
but it holds particular relevance for nurturing information cascades in this sense. The 
important, contingent circumstance in many Arab countries before the revolution was a 
commonly held fear of the regime as an omniscient, omnipotent force for repression; two 
months before Bouazizi’s suicide, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohammed ElBaradei, an 
Egyptian, said that an uprising in Egypt was inevitable and that its timing “only depends 
on when people will be able to throw off this culture of fear that the regime has created” 
(“Political Change Will Come in Egypt,” 2010). Writing after the revolution, Lynch 
(2011a) reports that revolution participants in Tunisia and Egypt spoke of breaking a wall 
of fear (p. 304). As I hypothesize later in this dissertation, organizers in Tunisia used 
social media and other communication technologies to urge recipients to overcome their 
fears of the regime—and of protesting against the regime—by creating frames of the 
regime as weak and of the rebels as strong and successful. I also argue that interview 
subjects felt empowered by their participation in the revolution; such a state would not 
only support the hypothesis that they overcame existing fears but would also support 
aspects of revolution theory that I discuss below. The revolutionaries’ experience of fear 
is also another aspect of a collective identity constructed and decoded through mediated 
frames, whether the identity of an aggrieved people oppressed by a superficially robust 
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regime or the identity of a populace suddenly realizing its power to overthrow an unjust 
regime.  
Scholars have long identified the formation of weak ties among individuals from 
different ages, classes, and geographic locations as crucial to mobilization and to social-
movement success, and the literature strongly suggests that social media and other new 
digital tools are effective at forming and nurturing weak ties. Granovetter (1973) 
influentially argues that weak ties among individuals (as opposed to the strong ties 
among family members and friends) are necessary for the wide exchange of information 
important in social movements, such as spreading event details for protests. Social-
movement theorists (see Dalton, 1996, and Hinnebusch, 2015a, for example) contend that 
building coalitions among individuals connected only by weak ties (i.e., coalitions that 
bring together individuals varying in age, class, and geographic location) is a necessary 
condition for mobilization and for the success of a social movement. McAdam and 
Paulsen (1993) find that as social networks among potential participants and activists 
become denser, the likelihood of mobilization increases. Tufekci (2017) explains one 
hybrid process through which users of new, digital communication technologies put their 
weak ties to use for the work of social movements; in her words, this is how social media 
“alters the architecture of connectivity across an entire society even when much of it is 
not yet connected” (p. 18). Users of social media, some of whom are linked only by weak 
ties, can communicate information relevant to a social movement in person or by 
telephone to other people, with whom these users might have strong or weak ties 
(Tufekci, 2017). Specifically, social-media users can provide information to weakly 
linked acquaintances to mobilize for social movements, Polletta et al. (2013) write. 
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During the Arab Spring, this bridging of social milieus, such as the linking of core 
activists to mass publics, might have been the “key role” played by social media, Aday et 
al. (2012, p. 5) surmise. Writing about evidence from Egypt’s revolution, Lim (2012) 
concludes that Facebook afforded the growth of the opposition movement by expanding 
connections beyond strong ties to individuals with weaker ties to the movement and to 
each other, as well as connecting members of various opposition groups. Breuer et al. 
(2014) used resource-mobilization theory to analyze the use of social media during 
Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, and their hypothesis is that social media enabled 
collaboration that bridged differing social groups and so helped a large cycle of protest to 
emerge.  
To be sure, a project mapping the social-media connections among individuals in 
Tunisia (or elsewhere) during the Arab Spring would constitute fascinating research that I 
would look to follow up on after this dissertation. The bridging of weak ties is inherent in 
the construction of collective identity and in an information cascade to overcome fear of 
the regime—both of which involve the framing process. For an identity to be considered 
collective in social movements, it must be shared across individuals beyond those with 
strong ties. In regard to information cascades, social media and other communication 
technologies can provide the underlying architecture for the public presentation of 
previously taboo views among weakly linked individuals. In other words, diverse, weakly 
linked social groups in Tunisia experienced both fear of the regime and the overcoming 
of that fear. To sum up this point, these uses of social media overlap: to create collective 
identity, to nurture information cascades to overcome fear, and to connect weakly tied 
individuals. 
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In analyzing the significance of social media for social movements, scholars 
frequently frame the use of social media as lowering the costs for social movements. 
Most pertinent to my investigation of framing, social media enable users to construct and 
disseminate frames largely for free. Aday et al. (2010) aver that social movements might 
find it more difficult to fashion a coherent message because so many actors are able to 
take part in constructing and disseminating frames. This dissertation will provide data 
about the unity—or lack thereof—of the frames constructed and deployed by social-
movement actors in Tunisia. The interview questionnaire gave interview subjects the 
opportunity to describe all the frames that they constructed and deployed. Another way 
that social media lower costs is by making it easier for social-movement actors to conduct 
some organizing tasks, such as deliberating about strategy. During Egypt’s Arab Spring, 
for example, Egyptian bloggers and activists used the blogosphere to deliberate among 
themselves (Lim, 2012), and I pursued similar data in the interviews for this dissertation. 
I queried subjects about whether they used social media to deliberate about the framing 
that they wished to create, as well as which other media they might have used to 
construct strategy. Many scholars have probed how social media can lower the costs of 
social movements’ logistics: Tufekci (2017) discusses how social media lower the costs 
of publishing and finding information on social movements; Lynch (2011a) finds that 
leaders of Tunisian and Egyptian opposition movements, in the months before the Arab 
Spring, used social media to consult with each other about how to organize protests; 
Bellin (2012) writes that Arab Spring revolutionaries used social media to coordinate and 
synchronize large-scale protests. 
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We could accept all these findings as true, and yet that would still not tell us 
whether any Tunisian decided to go into the streets because of what she or he had 
encountered on social media, nor would it tell us whether social media were the primary 
tools for organizing protests during the Arab Spring. Tunisians—and other Arabs—could 
also encounter frames on television, in newspapers, on news websites, and so on. As for 
the use of social media for organizing tasks, activists could also meet in person, and they 
could spread word of demonstrations in face-to-face conversations, phone calls, and text 
messages. In other words, social media are part of a hybrid network of communication 
technologies. Much current literature on the use of digital media in social movements has 
developed this theory of hybrid networks. In their analysis of Egypt’s Arab Spring, 
Tufekci and Wilson (2012) define the hybrid network as the complex intertwining of 
multiple online and offline spheres (p. 376). Specifically, they cite the interrelated use of 
the internet, satellite television stations, and cellphones, especially for taking photos and 
recording video (p. 377). Social media, they write, are “superimposed” on existing social 
ties among friends, families, and neighbors (p. 376). In terms of social-movement theory, 
to be clear, this dissertation is seeking new knowledge about how organizers and 
participants used communication technologies for framing—but this dissertation is also 
rooted in theory from science and technology studies, which I discuss in a later section 
and which is concerned with how users construct the uses of technologies. Here I discuss 
the social-movement literature on hybrid networks, inasmuch as these networks were 
used for framing and for other tasks of social movements within the remit of this 
research.  
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Writing about Tunisia’s Arab Spring, Lim (2013) hypothesizes that the hybrid 
network underlay the collective action of the revolution. To return to Tufekci and 
Wilson’s (2012) example from Egypt, revolutionaries there used their phones to take 
photos and record video that they would later share on online media. Framing, then, 
depended on raw material from one communication technology subsequently 
disseminated on another technology. Moreover, satellite television networks such as Al-
Jazeera broadcast these same frames, as the stations shared images and video from social 
media (Bellin, 2012); the television channels and social media referred to one another as 
sources (Aday et al., 2012). When the Egyptian government tried to block the internet, 
Al-Jazeera gave information about the times and places of demonstrations (Bellin, 2012). 
Organizers in Egypt also used hybrid networks for logistics: They used cellphones to 
coordinate protest logistics, blogs to deliberate strategy, and word of mouth to spread 
notice of planned demonstrations (Lim, 2012). About half of Tufekci and Wilson’s 
(2012) Egyptian survey respondents said they had first heard of the protests in face-to-
face conversations. In interviews, I asked after the use of the hybrid network. Subjects 
were asked about whether, how often, and how they used social media, blogs, news 
websites, phones, television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. Organizers were asked 
how they constructed frames for different media, and participants were asked how they 
heard of the first protest that they attended and how they found out about protests in 
general. The semi-structured interview also allowed them the opportunity to compare the 
mediated frames that they encountered in various media, as well as the subjects’ reactions 
to these frames. 
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Importantly, hybrid networks can also increase costs in one important respect: 
When security forces violently repressed demonstrations during the Arab Spring, videos 
of regime brutality recorded by cellphones and by traditional broadcast media were 
disseminated on television and on social media, which led to wider mobilization against 
regimes, international sanctions and support for the protesters, and defections in the 
security forces (Bellin, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2015a). In other words, the use of the hybrid 
network to document regime brutality increased the costs of state repression. My 
questionnaire explored this dynamic by asking subjects their impressions of the mediated 
frames they encountered, as well as asking why they decided to participate or organize, 
and asking for their views of the regime. 
This uncovering of the regime’s tactics was afforded by another trait of social 
media and of the hybrid network: They evaded the control of the states roiled by the Arab 
Spring, despite these states’ long history of authoritarianism (Garrett, 2006). Morozov 
(2011) has examined in detail how states are using new digital technologies to increase or 
otherwise augment surveillance, control, and repression, but during the Arab Spring 
communication technologies largely escaped the control of the authoritarian Arab state 
(Bellin, 2012). Satellite television networks broadcast from abroad, whether Al-Jazeera in 
Qatar or Western channels, and social-media users were usually anonymous (Bellin, 
2012). As I show in the following section, these authoritarian states had for years worked 
assiduously to stamp out dissent in communication media, so the semi-structured 
interviews pursued discussion about any uses of media by subjects to evade state 
surveillance and repression. 
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In conclusion, Aday et al.’s (2010) analysis of how social-movement actors in 
Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution used social media and other communication media is worth 
noting, because the scholars call for future qualitative research to collect data on the use 
of these technologies in social movements and during protests, especially data on how 
these media are used in practice. This goal of this dissertation is in part to help address 
that question. 
 
2.2 Neo-Patrimonialism 
In the decade preceding the Arab Spring, one of the central questions asked by 
scholars of politics in the Middle East was how to explain the apparently imperishable 
persistence of the region’s similarly authoritarian regimes (Valbjorn & Bank, 2010; for 
examples, see Bellin, 2004; Brownlee, 2002; Brumberg, 2003; Carothers, 2002; 
Cavatorta, 2010; Heydemann, 2007; Hinnebusch, 2006). This focus on Arab regimes 
with continually robust authoritarianism, nearly impervious to democratizing trends, 
represented a reaction to the pro-democracy obsessions of many political scientists in the 
1990s following the so-called third wave of democratization, symbolized by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 amid the collapse of Soviet satellite regimes in Europe. 
Fukuyama’s (1992) seminal The End of History outlined the case that, with communism 
vanquished in the Cold War, all contemporary nation-states must bend toward liberal 
democracy at some point in the not-too-distant future. Many Middle East researchers 
busied themselves in the 1990s seeking out the buds and shoots of the allegedly 
inevitable transitions to liberal democracy (Valbjorn, 2015; Valbjorn & Bank, 2010; 
Valbjorn & Volpi, 2014). By the turn of the century, however, it had become clear that 
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the region’s autocracies had only marginally, if at all, moved toward more democratic 
institutions in the political, economic, or social spheres.  
In 2002, Carothers called for an end to the ceaseless attempts to fit the ill-suited 
transition paradigm onto the apparently unperturbed despots of the developing world. He 
dismantled a half-dozen assumptions of the transition paradigm, illustrating how 
empirical data refuted notions of an abrupt flood of democratizing developments. Many 
scholars of the Middle East then turned to elucidating a model of contemporary Arab 
authoritarianism and the mechanisms by which it continued to flourish. The field did not 
produce a unified theory with a name and standard definition; scholars put forward 
models that differed slightly, sometimes only in which elements they accorded greater or 
lesser importance in keeping oppression strong, but the various models did cohere in 
basic ways, so that a clear theory can be teased out. I use the term neo-patrimonialism to 
denote this political framework. The term cropped up in the works of many of the most 
cited scholars of the region; Brownlee (2002, 2007, 2009) explicitly used the term 
throughout his writing to depict the Middle Eastern authoritarian state, and Hinnebusch, 
who (2006) rejected Brownlee’s arguments in other areas, agreed that neo-patrimonialism 
is more useful than other models to understand the region’s political landscape (2015a, p. 
213). 
 This theory was built on the foundations of Max Weber’s (1978) account of 
patrimonialism in relation to authority and domination. In contrast to the bureaucracies 
that he saw becoming entrenched in the West, Weber used the term patrimonialism to 
describe an alternative system of governance that orbits around the ruler, who controls 
nearly all of the loci of political and economic power. Weber’s model was reshaped in the 
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1960s to explain the political, economic, and social structures of many post-colonial 
nations; Roth (1968) defines this system as “personal rulership on the basis of loyalties 
that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualification, but are 
inextricably linked to material incentives and reward” dispensed by the potentate (p. 
196). The neo-patrimonial state is not constituted upon any specific ideology, but rather 
its main goal is maintaining the power of the ruler (Brownlee, 2002). The economy of the 
neo-patrimonial state is based on the looting of resources and institutions for the personal 
gain of the ruler and those close and loyal to him (Kamrava, 2010). As for social 
structures, the vast majority of the public in such a country is depoliticized and 
unorganized (Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  
 To define neo-patrimonialism as it obtained in Tunisia on the eve of the 
revolution, I will first call upon the theory of authoritarian persistence presented by Bellin 
(2004). After noting the “patrimonial logic” (p. 143) of the relationship between the state 
and the military, Bellin identified a robust and effective coercive apparatus—
encompassing the military and various security forces—as the primary trait of the 
political structure and the key to the success of the region’s autocrats. Brownlee (2002) 
also describes the use of unrestrained violence against political opponents by Arab 
dictators, but Bellin’s account importantly provides a bridge to the revolution theory of 
Skocpol (1979), which I examine in next part of this chapter. In other words, Bellin 
(2004) emphasized the role of the coercive forces in preventing the embers of mass 
disaffection from bursting into revolutionary flame—preventing a transition to 
democracy, to be sure, but also ensuring the continuing dominance of the authoritarian 
state. 
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 Brumberg (2002) labeled a number of contemporary Middle Eastern states as 
liberalized autocracies, with liberalization referring to the opening by the state to allow 
for a small measure of political contestation. Brumberg lumped Tunisia into the 
alternative category of total autocracy, where the state brooks no political contestation, 
but his model is helpful for understanding Tunisia in that it brings out one aspect of the 
newness of this form of patrimonialism: Arab states were not closed off from the world, 
but rather were enmeshed in globalized trends of economic liberalization and civil-
society movements. Brumberg (2011) later applied a model of (and the term) protection 
rackets to the neo-patrimonial states, in order to explain the mechanism by which regimes 
nurtured the allegiances of various social groups (ethnic, sectarian, etc.) and their 
cooperation in oppressing competing groups. In this account he blamed growingly 
pervasive security forces and the corruption of the elites for the uprisings of the Arab 
Spring, but he posited these factors as exogenous to his model of liberalized autocracy. 
Here is where neo-patrimonialism provides a fuller theory of political structure than 
liberalized autocracy: Robust security forces and elites corruptly gorging themselves on 
the fruits of the state are integral traits of neo-patrimonialism. These traits were not 
recent, exogenous developments but rather hallmarks of the system, as Bellin (2004) 
demonstrated with coercive forces. One could argue that neo-patrimonialism thus 
inevitably contains the seeds of its own destruction, but such philosophical meanderings 
are outside the scope of this work. Instead, I will build theory that elucidates how the 
attributes of neo-patrimonialism in Tunisia also created potential revolutionary energy. 
 Heydemann (2007) provided the most complete and detailed account of neo-
patrimonialism in his description of “authoritarian upgrading” (p. 1). He listed five major 
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traits that encompass the novelty of neo-patrimonialism and its contours before the Arab 
Spring: appropriating and containing civil societies; managing political contestation; 
capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; controlling new communications 
technologies; and diversifying international linkages. Heydemann described these 
regimes as reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing 
political, economic, and social conditions. The impetus for these five upgrades was 
external pressure from Western allies and international institutions such as the IMF. Yet 
Arab autocrats were adapting the mechanisms of democracy, such as regular elections 
and free markets, to maintain and sometimes enhance their power. Heydemann 
elaborated a process of authoritarian learning, as tyrants throughout the developing world 
adopted tactics for upgrading that had succeeded in other authoritarian states. 
Heydemann’s model explained how these countries made superficial structural moves 
that corresponded to the symptoms of democratization even as the domination of the ruler 
over the political, economic, and social interstices of power remained seemingly 
undiminished. 
 To sum up, my model of neo-patrimonialism will include all of the traits in the 
foregoing paragraphs. This term fits better than authoritarian upgrading or liberalized 
autocracy because it recognizes the foundational dynamic of a personalized autocracy in 
which the ruler controls the doling out of parcels of political, economic, and social 
power. It is important to point out that choosing this term also means rejecting an 
approach that would label this political form a purely Arab authoritarianism, as well as 
rejecting Weber’s term sultanism (1978) or the contemporary term neo-sultanism 
(Chehabi & Linz, 2008; Stepan & Linz, 2013), inasmuch as these terms imply an Arab 
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exceptionalism or even a whiff of Orientalism (Said, 1978). The traits and techniques of 
authoritarian rule are not limited to the Arab world, but rather are easily applicable to 
states worldwide: Repressive coercive forces, as well as a kleptocracy founded on 
resource-extraction rentierism, bedevil many nations outside the Middle East and North 
Africa. Moreover, approaching the political framework through the lens of a more 
generally applicable neo-patrimonialism will also allow me to generalize my findings for 
a wider range of analogous conditions.  
One possible objection to the use of neo-patrimonialism is that the revolutions and 
uprisings of the Arab Spring betray the inadequacy of the model, which was elucidated to 
explain the persistence and stability of such regimes. This criticism, however, incorrectly 
assumes that neo-patrimonialism, in accounting for the continuing strength of Arab 
autocrats such as Ben Ali, implies that they are impervious to change or challenge. On 
the contrary, scholars have repeatedly emphasized that neo-patrimonial states can 
develop serious weaknesses, typically through the worsening economic conditions 
brought on by kleptocratic rule, high levels of corruption, fecklessness of the ruling elite, 
and overdependence on security forces (see, e.g., Lust-Okar, 2005; Ulfelder, 2005). 
Further, Heydemann (2007) and Brumberg (2002) based their models on the changing 
nature of the neo-patrimonial political structure in the face of globalization and the end of 
the Cold War. The model of neo-patrimonialism, in the end, provides a parsimonious 
explanation of the causes of the Arab Spring: Grievances of pervasive repression and 
economic exclusion were left to fester as a small but growing number of citizens gained 
experience in a marginal civil society that allowed them to mobilize (partly through the 
use of new technologies) cross-class coalitions; when the military did not protect the 
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regime—either because it had splintered along sectarian lines or chosen to abandon the 
ruler because the military had achieved enough institutionalization independent of the 
ruler—it created the political opportunity for the people to overthrow their despots, 
regardless of how long the autocrat had ruled (Hinnebusch, 2015a).  
 In the chapters that follow, I will look to employ the concept of neo-
patrimonialism in analyzing the interview subjects’ discussions of their grievances 
against the regime, and specifically in their discourses on the security forces, the 
economy, the relative level of politicization of the citizenry, and their uses of 
communication technologies. Because the interview subjects were organizers of and 
participants in the revolution, I will not approach neo-patrimonialism through an 
investigation of governance practices and behaviors, but rather through the lens of the 
individual perceptions and frames of the interview subjects. In other words, this 
dissertation will not examine structural features such as diversifying international 
linkages or IMF involvement as an impulse to changing practices of governance. The 
interview questionnaire sought evidence partly through the two questions that explicitly 
asked interview subjects how they viewed the regime and whom they blamed for 
Tunisia’s problems at the time of the revolution. More data was collected through the 
question asking interview subjects which impressions of the regime and of the opposition 
they tried to convey through various forms of communication. Subjects also expressed 
their perceptions of the regime in their answers to the question about why they decided to 
participate in the revolution or join civil-society groups. Interview subjects also described 
the contours of their grievances in the open, semi-structured parts of the interviews. I 
should note that citizen grievances against a government or regime are certainly not 
  64 
unique to neo-patrimonial states; grievances are a necessary condition to demonstrate the 
presence of a neo-patrimonial regime, but it is the specifics of the grievances and the 
dynamics of civil society that support or refute the model. 
 For example, the theory of neo-patrimonialism explores in detail the military and 
security forces in such a regime, but I will not seek evidence concerning the level of 
institutionalization of the military or the mechanisms of patrimonial allegiance in the 
dyad of the autocrat and the Tunisian security forces2. Instead, I will look for evidence 
among the interview subjects’ perceptions of the robustness of the coercive forces 
(Bellin, 2004). Beyond Bellin’s focus on this trait, an active and occasionally excessive 
coercive apparatus is also part of Brumberg’s liberalized autocracy (2002) and 
Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading (2007), in that the security apparatus was a main 
tool for managing the extremely modest degree of political contestation allowed in the 
neo-patrimonial framework. One marker of the activity of the coercive forces is citizens’ 
fear; evidence of a robust security apparatus would be fear of repression in a variety of 
forms, such as fears of surveillance of internet use, telephone communication, 
interpersonal communication, and public or private gatherings. In such a political 
structure, citizens would also fear being active in civil society or expressing opposition to 
the regime, or perhaps even in discussing political issues. Moreover, citizens would also 
likely have experienced repression at the hands of the state, whether in their encounters 
with the coercive forces or in the encounters of their families, friends, or acquaintances. 
                                                 
2 Hinnebusch (2015b) argued that Tunisian military’s relatively high level of institutionalization and 
relatively secondary status to security forces in terms of domestic repression made the military less 
patrimonial and more susceptible to abandoning the ruler in a revolt, an argument that supports the model 
of neo-patrimonialism, but that debate falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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Brumberg’s (2002) insight on the state’s tolerance of some political contestation would 
mean that I would expect to find some interview subjects who were able to participate in 
such tolerated forms—in Tunisia, concretely, unions and professional organizations—
while encountering oppression when engaging in disfavored forms of political 
contestation. To interrogate this aspect of neo-patrimonialism, interview subjects were 
asked why they became involved in the opposition, whether as organizers or participants; 
they were also explicitly asked whether they used communication technologies to express 
fear.  
 The political economy of the neo-patrimonial state is based on an absolute ruler 
maintaining a loyal ruling clique by opening largely for them alone the spigots of the 
state’s economic resources. A rentier political economy is the “special feature” of Middle 
Eastern countries, wrote Hinnebusch (2006, p. 379), though he primarily meant the rents 
from oil revenues. Tunisia has relatively little oil, but it fit the dynamic of a state-
controlled economy, haltingly liberalizing in the post-Cold War era, in which the ruler 
focused foremost on state economic resources and foreign benefactors while ignoring 
public opinion and accountability to the citizenry (Ghalioun, 2004). Hallmarks of such a 
neo-patrimonial state are the corruption and cronyism of the ruling caste in the practices 
of governance, economic liberalization, and privatization, as well as the concomitant 
economic exclusion of broad swaths of the citizenry, manifested in high unemployment 
rates, frequent underemployment, and a felt dearth of economic prospects. In Tunisia, 
Ben Ali’s wife Leila Traboulsi and her extended family were particularly gluttonous in 
their appetite for the state’s bounties (Wulf et al., 2013). The major political attribute of 
this model is extremely limited political contestation, put into practice partly through 
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transparently sham elections, which undercuts perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
autocrat’s lengthy tenure. In answers to the interview questions about how subjects 
viewed the regime, how they attempted to frame it for others, and why they decided to 
get involved in the rebellion, support for this dynamic of the neo-patrimonial model 
would be grievances about corruption, the nepotistic kleptocracy of the Traboulsi clan, 
and wealth concentration among the ruling clique more generally. I would also expect to 
hear grievances about elections and Ben Ali’s legitimacy, and I expect that interviewees 
would have faced problems finding a job and would voice grievances about their 
economic prospects and exclusion from the country’s economic gains.  
 Civil societies in neo-patrimonial states are typically emaciated. Bellin (2004) 
explained this as a result of fear of active coercive forces. Brumberg (2011) posited it as a 
result of the regime co-opting certain groups, which then become dependent on the state 
for their wellbeing and thus unlikely to partake in potentially oppositional civil-society 
initiatives. Heydemann (2007) described the feeble civil society as an intentional 
outcome of the state’s careful, if heavy-handed, management of a low level of political 
contestation to adapt to the circumstances of a globalizing world in which the model of 
liberal-democracy was at a zenith. In other words, civil-society institutions exist through 
a paucity of formal structures such as unions, professional associations, even political 
parties and NGOs, but activists are likely to have as much experience in being persecuted 
as in activism. If this model were accurate, I would expect to find that many interview 
subjects in the category of participants had not had any civil-society experience before 
the uprising. However, the population of organizers was never intended to be 
representative; if many of the organizers had experience as activists, this would not 
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necessarily refute neo-patrimonialism as a theory. The theory would predict that activists 
would have had experience in a narrow range of civil-society practices sanctioned by the 
regime, and it would predict that activists from outside the approved bounds would 
probably have suffered repression. The generally depoliticized nature of neo-patrimonial 
society should mean that interview subjects with little civil-society experience would 
respond to the questions about their ideology by largely not having an articulated political 
worldview, beyond a set of grievances against the regime, however detailed that might 
be. I would also expect interview subjects to discuss a fear of being politically active, in 
response to the question about why they got involved in the demonstrations.  
 Heydemann’s (2007) elaboration of the neo-patrimonial model postulated that 
such regimes would, at the beginning of the 21st century, expend significant effort to 
control new communication technologies. As I noted in the Introduction, the Ben Ali 
regime had for years asphyxiated the internet in Tunisia, conducting surveillance, 
persecuting, and hacking the websites of journalists, activists, and opponents. However, 
during the rebellion Tunisia’s revolutionaries continually used communication 
technologies such as the internet and cell phones. For the model of neo-patrimonialism, 
the key point is whether the state tried to control these technologies; that it failed in this 
one field does not mean that the model loses its power to explain or predict. It predicts 
that neo-patrimonial regimes would move aggressively to stamp out unbridled use of 
communication technologies, and success in doing so partly explains the longevity of 
such regimes. At the same time, this dissertation is not arguing that Ben Ali’s failure to 
control communication technologies brought about the fall of the regime or was even one 
of the causes of his regime’s demise; apportioning the relative importance of various 
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causal factors is not the goal here, but rather casting light on how revolutionaries used 
communication technologies. What I would expect, to find support for the theory, is that 
interview subjects more active in the revolution would report incidents of surveillance, 
harassment, and hacking of their use of communication technologies. Interview subjects 
might express fear of using communication technologies because of pervasive state 
control. I do know that the revolutionaries did almost fully control their uses of 
communication technologies, but I might also expect that they would report having to 
take measures to elude state control, such as masking their identities or using proxy 
servers to hide their locations. 
 
2.3 Revolution Theory 
 Revolutions like those of the Arab Spring have long been an item of scholarly 
interest. Tracing its beginnings to the early 20th century, the field of revolution theory is 
considered to have gone through four generations of scholarship (Beck, 2017). This 
dissertation will contribute to theory-building in the fourth generation of revolution 
theory by adding to the scholarship on the field’s concept of protest identity; the 
interview questionnaire interrogates this concept by asking subjects how they deployed 
and understood mediated frames during Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution. This section 
begins with a review of the field’s evolution, then defines key terms used in today’s 
scholarly literature, and concludes with an examination of the variable of protest identity, 
which is central to this research and serves as a bridge among this field, neo-
patrimonialism, and social-movement studies. 
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 Scholars in the early 20th century worked to establish revolution studies as an 
academic discipline that would allow for the study of revolutions across all cases (Beck, 
2017). These first researchers, however, largely confined their analyses to European 
revolutions embodying the fall of an ancien regime (Beck, 2017), and their work was 
descriptive, lacking a theoretical structure that could explain the phenomenon of 
revolution (Goldstone, 1993). This approach also focused primarily on the dynamics of 
the state in revolution. The second generation of revolution theory grew out of research in 
the 1960s that investigated the revolutionary populace (Beck, 2017). Huntington (1968), 
Gurr (1970), Smelser (1963), and Johnson (1966) explored topics ranging from mass 
grievances to individual decisions to participate in revolution, delving into psychology 
and the discontents of modernization. The third generation, epitomized in the work of 
Skocpol (1979), was given the label of social-structural theory (Goldstone, 1993, 2001). 
The state again was the primary unit of analysis, this time approached as an autonomous 
actor and arena for revolutionary action (Skocpol, 1979). The state was studied as a 
structure that could suffer strains from outside states, from autonomous political elites 
who could become disenchanted with the state and battle it, and from other structural 
weaknesses that would allow the peasantry space to organize and to construct a collective 
framework for mobilization. Tilly (1976, 1978) and Moore (1966) were among the first 
to study revolutionary populaces as social movements, though their work analyzed 
mobilization mostly through questions of organization and tactics. This state-centered 
theory would dominate the field for roughly two decades, but its flaws were revealed by 
the 1979 revolution in Iran, as well as the wave of revolutions in 1989 in Soviet satellite 
states—these uprisings did not include a peasantry up in arms or an autonomous elite that 
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had broken its allegiance to the state (Beck, 2017; Goldstone, 1993, 2001). The structural 
theory of the third generation lost currency amid the cultural turn in the social sciences, 
as it lacked the tools to address questions of agency (Goldstone, 1993). To be sure, the 
fourth—and current—generation of revolution theory still analyzes the state, elites, and 
broad swathes of national populations, but the field now focuses on the processes of 
revolution with presumptions that revolutions are contingent and emergent, and that 
individual revolutionary actors possess agency (Goldstone, 2001; Gurr, 1970, 2000). 
These assumptions also undergird this dissertation, and I will return shortly to this critical 
idea of revolution as process. 
 Beck (2017) describes the field today as “vibrant, but disjointed” (p. 168), and he 
laments that too often scholars limit their explorations of new events to niche sub-topics 
rather than as instantiations of a broad, generalizable paradigm. Though debates remain 
unresolved on questions such as predicting outcomes and judging regime stability, there 
is a strong consensus that robust sets of factors consistently occur across the universe of 
revolutions: State structures are under external strain; regimes are brittle, even if in 
relative terms; certain types of regimes are more brittle and at risk of revolutions; and 
successful revolutions involve large coalitions of social groups and elites as challengers 
(Beck, 2017). In the article that laid out the tenets of the fourth generation, Goldstone 
(2001) defined revolution as “an effort to transform the political institutions and the 
justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass 
mobilization” (p. 142).  
 One of the main innovations of fourth-generation revolution theory is its emphasis 
on the process of revolution, an approach that leads back to the concept of the 
  71 
construction of collective identity, which unites revolution theory with social-movement 
theory and the theory of neo-patrimonialism. Tilly (1995) critiques third-generation 
revolution theory for its efforts to organize the field around invariant models of 
revolution, in which uniform phenomena would be invariably repeated. Instead, he argues 
for an ontology of revolution in which processes and outcomes depend on time, place, 
and path. For instance, a consistent feature of revolutions is that mass mobilizations of 
cross-class coalitions coalesce around a shared identity of protest—but the traits of that 
shared identity, as well as the mechanisms through which diverse social groups coalesce, 
are contingent and emergent. Reflecting Tilly’s concerns, Goldstone (2001) 
acknowledges that scholars are paying far more attention to the processes of revolution 
and that structural conditions may prepare the ground for revolution, but the shape of the 
contestation is often determined only during the course of events (p. 152). It is significant 
for this dissertation that Goldstone (2001), in laying out the tenets of the fourth 
generation, recognizes the overlap between revolution theory and social-movement 
theory in the importance of emergent, contingent processes. Goldstone explicitly praises 
analysts of social movement for their studies of mobilization and ideology, and he extols 
the usefulness of these analysts’ work (p. 142).  
 One process that represents a crucial condition for a revolution is a coalition 
among opposition groups that bridges class and other divides to mobilize against a 
regime (Beck, 2017; Goldstone, 2001, 2011a, 2011b). Scholars in the third generation 
already included cross-class coalitions as a primary mechanism of revolution success 
(see, e.g., Dix, 1984; Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989). In fourth-generation revolution theory, 
Goldstone (2011a) writes that virtually all successful revolutions were forged by cross-
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class coalitions (p. 457). The chances for success rise with a cross-class coalition because 
states have fewer potential allies and usually see their legitimacy weakened when taking 
action against a broad coalition of social groups. Moreover, elites are more likely to 
desert a state if protesters represent a wide spectrum of society (Goldstone, 2011a). Such 
a broad-based coalition is difficult to achieve because it requires bridging the disparate 
interests of groups otherwise separated by ethnicity, religion, geography, or socio-
economic status (Goldstone, 2011b). Countless uprisings have failed because they 
remained the revolt of one group, rather than of a coalition (Goldstone, 2011b). 
Goldstone (2011a) has analyzed Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, and he finds that 
cross-class coalitions indeed coalesced there (and in Egypt and Libya); specifically, he 
writes that workers, students, lawyers, Islamists, labor unions, and residents of both rural 
towns and major cities mobilized together (p. 458).  
The foregoing begs the question, how do would-be revolutionaries form cross-
class coalitions, when various social groups have different political interests? One answer 
put forth by scholars in the field is the construction of protest identities, a concept that 
this dissertation uses to tie this field to theories of neo-patrimonialism and of social 
movements. Goldstone (2001) defines revolutionary protest identity as “a sense of being 
part of a group with shared and justified grievances, with the ability to remedy those 
grievances by collective action” (p. 153). He writes that the construction of protest 
identities is “critical” (p. 153) and social-movement actors’ adoption of a shared protest 
identity is “the common denominator for successful activism” (p. 153). Protest identities, 
Goldstone (2001) continues, have three sources: The identity of the protest group helps to 
justify and validate the individual’s grievances; adopting the identity gives a sense of 
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empowerment, autonomy, and efficacy to members; and the regime can also help 
construct protest identity, if the regime labels protesters as state enemies or acts against 
protesters. I should note that the first two sources reflect the move away from the state-
centered structural theory of the third generation and toward a belief in agency; put 
another way, social-movement actors can work to construct mediated frames to form 
these two types of identities, and they can also emphasize their standing as an out-group, 
should the state label them as enemies or move against them. The interview questionnaire 
investigates all three sources of protest identity, and the questionnaire interrogates 
whether protesters felt any such sense of protest identity. Subjects were asked whether 
and why they joined any formal opposition groups, as well as how they felt as a member. 
They were asked how well they identified with fellow protesters and opposition groups. 
Subjects were also asked whether they felt a sense of empowerment or agency, whether 
they thought the regime had labeled them as enemies, and, if so, how such a label made 
them feel. 
 A clear overlap exists between protest identity and framing in social-movement 
studies. Not only is collective protest identity a frame that social-movement actors can 
attempt to construct, but the frame trait of resonance is a clear measurement of frame 
alignment and the success of forming protest identity in the context of a revolution. In his 
work on fourth-generation revolution theory, Goldstone (2001, 2014) uses the 
terminology of framing and cites the work of the progenitors of the field. He (2014) 
refers to protest identity as a “persuasive shared narrative of resistance” (p. 18) and 
argues that effective narratives—and revolutionary mobilization— are built on 
grievances against the injustices of the regime (p. 18). Goldstone (2001) cites multiple 
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works by Gamson, who first articulated the concept of injustice frames, to recognize that 
structural conditions are not enough to create this perception of injustice. Referring to 
multiple works by Snow and Benford, who began the study of framing in social 
movements, Goldstone (2001) appears to accept fully the position that protest identities 
are largely constructed strategically by social-movement actors, when he acknowledges 
that “creating protest identities … is a considerable project” (p. 153). This congruity with 
framing theory is also apparent in Goldstone’s discussion of revolutionary ideology 
(2001, 2014).  
Revolutionary ideology is a broad concept that encompasses revolutionary 
ideologies ranging from religion to Marxism to anti-colonial nationalism and beyond 
(Beck, 2017; Goldstone, 1980, 2001, 2014). The dissertation does not explicitly engage 
with ideologies on this abstract level, but it is useful to review the topic because it is in 
some ways indistinguishable from protest identity, especially in that fourth-generation 
revolution theory approaches revolutionary ideology as a thing constructed with 
conscious attention and with difficulty by social-movement actors to mobilize adherents 
(Goldstone, 2001). Goldstone (2001) writes pointedly that social-movement actors will 
successfully construct an ideology if it mobilizes by “resonating with existing cultural 
guideposts” (p. 156), a criterion that is identical with the criterion of narrative fidelity as I 
defined it in the earlier discussion of frame resonance. Goldstone (2001) adds that a 
successful ideology also provides a sense of inevitability about the revolution’s success 
and persuades people that the regime is unjust and weak. In probing frame resonance, the 
interview questionnaire also asks subjects about the fit between the frames they 
encountered and their values and ideologies; subjects were also asked about their 
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perceptions of their chances for success and of the Ben Ali regime. Subjects were asked 
specifically whether they viewed the regime as unjust or weak, and why they felt as they 
did.  
The approach of this dissertation toward revolution theory is also based on the 
findings of revolution scholars who have examined Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution. 
Goldstone (2011a) concludes that cross-class coalitions did coalesce in Tunisia around a 
protest identity based on a shared enmity toward Ben Ali and shared grievances, which 
included grievances against his regime’s corruption, the regime’s lack of political 
accountability, and repression by regime security forces. This analysis demonstrates the 
overlap between revolution theory and neo-patrimonialism, as the latter predicts that 
these specific grievances would arise. The interview questionnaire investigates these 
claims with open-ended questions about how subjects viewed the regime and whom they 
blamed for the issues that led to the revolution. Hale (2012) also finds evidence of a 
shared protest identity among the Arab states that experienced revolutions in 2010-11, 
and he attributes some credit for the construction of this transnational identity to Al-
Jazeera, in addition to the work done by activists in national contexts. This conclusion 
also supports the concept of hybrid network discussed in the earlier section on 
communication technologies, even though the present research on Tunisia is not 
concerned with these transnational aspects. Finally, Hinnebusch (2015) concludes that 
one reason why the revolution erupted in 2010 and not before was that only in 2010 did 
social-movement actors in Tunisia possess the necessary experience and skills to succeed 
in the tasks necessary for revolution, such as the construction of a shared protest identity 
that would resonate among their fellow citizens. By interrogating the strategic intentions 
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and the specific approaches of social-movement actors in Tunisia, the interviews 
conducted for this dissertation will provide support for such a contention. 
 
2.4 Science and Technology Studies 
 The field of science and technology studies (STS) provides theoretical and 
methodological scaffolding for this dissertation. The field was born at a conference in 
1986 around the thinking of Wiebe Bijker, Trevor Pinch, Michel Callon, Gerard de Vries, 
and Bruno Latour; Thomas Hughes also attended this conference, but his earlier work in 
the philosophy of technology places him as more of a bridge between the ontological 
position of the field and that of technological determinism, the theory against which these 
thinkers rebelled (Bijker & Pinch, 2012). To briefly sketch out the gulf between the two 
ideas, technological determinism posits that technology determines or drives social 
change and thus the course of history; it casts technology as an autonomous, exogenous 
agent, developing and driving social change independently of human control (Bimber, 
1990). Or, as McLuhan (1964) colorfully puts it, in technological determinism, humans 
are but “the sex organs of the machine world” (p. 46). This section of the literature 
review will define the opposing position—the social construction of technology—and 
then discuss how technology is socially constructed, the technological frame, how users 
co-construct technology, how scholars have analyzed the Arab Spring from this 
perspective, and how this approach fits with social-movement theory and with 
communication theory. 
Bijker and Pinch (2012) wrote that even in 1986 they viewed their theory as a 
reaction to and rebuttal of technological determinism. Bijker was an engineer, and those 
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in the field often came from backgrounds in the physical sciences. They adopted a 
methodology derived from the sociology of knowledge, or sociology of science of 
knowledge, which was typified by Geertz’s (1973) method of thick description. 
Crucially, they chose to approach technology using the tools of the social sciences—they 
wanted to focus on the technological artefact as the unit of analysis but in so doing 
approach it as an object of sociological inquiry, in terms of its social relations with all of 
the various actors and groups who came into contact with it (Bijker & Pinch, 2012). They 
wanted to eliminate the border between the social and the technical (Bijker & Pinch, 
2012). Nye (1997) defined the theory thusly: “Technologies are social constructions. 
Machines are not like meteors that come unbidden from outside and have an ‘impact’” (p. 
1067). Social groups or individuals make decisions about which technologies to pursue; 
they then make crucial design decisions and decisions about the production and 
distribution or deployment of the technology (Bimber, 1990). In other words, 
nontechnical factors shape technology—technology does not shape social relations. 
Technology can be shaped by economic concerns (e.g., what a corporation decides to 
emphasize), political concerns (e.g., struggles between various groups, such as private 
individuals or public regulators, over the development or deployment of a technology), or 
environmental concerns (e.g., protests or research about environmental concerns). On a 
macro level, this theory posits that technology does not drive social change—human 
actors do. Technology, though the object of inquiry, does not have agency (Bimber, 
1990). Though the connection might be clear, I should note that the assumptions of 
constructivism underlying this theory are the same ontological and epistemological 
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positions that underlie the theories of social movements and revolution reviewed in the 
foregoing sections.  
As a side note, the social construction of technology, in its earliest and strictest 
form, came under criticism for ignoring the political aspects of technology and the 
possibility that a technological artefact could, as an actor or actant, also in some way 
shape social relations (see, e.g., Hughes, 1993; Kranzberg, 1986; Latour, 1995). Bijker 
and Pinch (2012) admit that their theory had been forced to broaden its approaches 
because of the evidence presented in this critique. Bijker and Pinch (2012) advocate 
adopting a more political approach, not in the sense of evaluating technologies as good or 
bad, but rather in terms of discussing the relationship between technologies and power. 
The evidence presented in this dissertation could potentially be wielded in these ongoing 
debates about the relative degrees of agency and autonomy among users and artefacts, but 
this debate is not my focus in calling on this theory. 
One central proposition in this theory is that a technology does not arrive with 
fixed traits or predetermined impact or uses (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003). This concept is 
called interpretive flexibility, which means that a technological artifact (e.g., telephone, 
television) does not have only one interpretation, reading, meaning, or use; instead, its 
traits are wholly dependent on how various social groups construct its uses and 
development (Bijker & Pinch, 2012). In more abstract terms, the ontology of this theory 
is that history and social change are entirely contingent and do not follow any 
generalizable script (Misa, 1994). Every technology is situated in a contingent “context of 
use,” which encompasses not only social groups but also the web of other artefacts within 
which technologies are always embedded (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003, p. 2). For this 
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dissertation, this point is reflected in the context of Tunisia at the time of the revolution: 
This context allows me to hypothesize that the context of neo-patrimonialism was 
important for how digital communication technologies were deployed. Moreover, this 
concept of a web of technological artefacts mirrors the concept of hybrid networks 
posited in accounts of the use of communication technologies in social-movement theory. 
The theory of framing is also important for social construction of technology: 
Bijker (1995) uses the theory to describe how designers and users typically share a frame 
associated with a particular technology. Zuckerman (2013) and Tufekci (2017) analyze 
social media in terms of how the technology is commonly framed. Zuckerman (2013) 
analyzes the uses of social media by social movements in light of the technology’s 
framing as a platform for sharing cat photos and videos. Tufekci (2017) discusses the 
frame of social media more generally as a platform for people to connect based on shared 
interests and viewpoints. The adoption of framing by scholars in this field amounts 
largely to a curiosity offering a further measure of validation for framing theory. 
Though technologies may arrive with certain frames, it is users who co-construct 
the meanings and uses of technologies, and this idea is the most significant aspect of this 
theory for this dissertation. Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003) edited a volume, How Users 
Matter, comprised of articles analyzing how users co-construct technologies and laying 
out a research program for user studies as a sub-field in science and technology studies. 
In their introduction to the volume, Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003) describe a shift in the 
field from considering users as passive recipients to active participants in the social 
construction of technology. In this approach, users are active, socially situated subjects 
who co-construct the meanings of technologies. Users do not merely submit to the 
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dictates of technology or even to the conscious intentions of designers, but rather groups 
of users can construct uses of technology radically different than the uses intended by 
those who developed or produced an artefact (Mackay & Gillespie, 1992). As an 
example, Mackay and Gillespie (1992) note that Chinese inventors developed gunpowder 
to be used in fireworks (p. 701). Users can also modify the uses of technologies that have 
been in use for much time and seem to have stable, fixed sets of traits (Oudshoorn & 
Pinch, 2003). In the same way that an artefact does not have only one single, 
predetermined use, artefacts also do not have limitless uses—users of a technology are 
constrained by the contingent circumstances of their social situations (Mackay & 
Gillespie, 1992). In one of the earliest applications of user studies to digital 
communication technologies, Mackay and Gillespie (1992) conclude that computers are a 
technology relatively more open to having its meanings defined by the users, because the 
computer enables a diversity of uses (p. 707). This conception of users provides the 
theoretical underpinning for this dissertation’s position that communication technologies 
can be used, in addition to any other uses, for the framing processes (construction of 
collective action frame, frame alignment, decoding) and the construction of revolutionary 
identity discussed in earlier sections. In asking interview subjects how they used various 
communication technologies to deploy or decode mediated frames, I am depending on an 
assumption that these technologies can be used for to accomplish these tasks in social 
movements and revolution theory. This view of users as co-constructing the uses and 
meanings of technologies provides the theoretical justification for asking such questions 
and for framing the questions in this way. I can find support for this position in 
Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003), who mention social movements as one way to define a 
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social group of users and emphasize that questions about how users co-construct 
technologies is important for social movements (pp. 2, 6). 
Conceptions of users underlie much of the scholarship on the Arab Spring cited in 
the above sections on social movements and revolution, even if scholars do not address 
these theoretical foundations for their approaches. In one of the few articles to use these 
terms to discuss scholarship on the use of social media during the Arab Spring, 
Comunello and Anzera (2012) roundly criticize researchers for approaching the topic 
from the perspective of technological determinism. They critique how approaching the 
Arab Spring with questions about how the impact of social media presumes that the 
technology was an autonomous actor, rather than understanding that individuals 
throughout the Arab world deployed a variety of communication technologies for diverse 
uses (p. 458). Comunello and Anzera (2012) also repeatedly point out the importance of 
understanding social media as part of a hybrid network of various media environments 
and of online and offline social practices. 
As a bridge to the following section on communication theory, I will conclude 
this section by reviewing the literature discussing the congruent fit between the social 
construction of technology and media studies. Badouard et al. (2016) find that media 
studies overlap with science and technology studies conceptually and empirically, and 
they aver that both fields benefit from this cross-fertilization. Wajcman and Jones (2012) 
write that “the most interesting work” is being done by scholars at the intersections of 
media/communications studies and science and technology studies (p. 674; for examples 
of work they promote, see Boczkowski and Lievrouw, 2008; Haraway, 1997; Lerman, 
Oldenziel, & Mohun, 2003; Plant, 1998). This fertile theoretical ground for such valuable 
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interplay emerges from the shared roots of the two disciplines in the cultural turn in the 
social sciences; communication and technology can both be read as texts, and both are 
polysemic (Mackay & Gillespie, 1992). There are multiple possible readings of a text or 
technology, though both are usually given a preferred reading, or technological frame, by 
their producers, and the realm of possible readings is constrained by the social situation 
of the recipient or user of the text (Mackay & Gillespie, 1992). Users produce meaning in 
both paradigms, and by using both theories this dissertation will interrogate how Tunisian 
users constructed meanings on two levels: How the users of social media, cellphones, 
satellite-television networks, etc., co-constructed the meanings of these communication 
technologies; and how these users constructed (and decoded) mediated frames through 
their production (and consumption) of content in these media. 
 
2.5 Communication Theory 
 In this final section, I shall examine the history of framing theory in 
communication, fissures within the field, the contemporary definitions of framing, review 
the literature, show how framing theory in communication overlaps with framing theory 
in the other fields, and show how communication theory provides a disciplinary home for 
the theories of framing discussed in previous sections. 
 Framing theory in communication descends from Goffman’s Frame Analysis 
(1974), in which he defines frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals 
“to locate, perceive, identify, and label” phenomena in their lived experience and in the 
outside world (p. 21). Snow and Benford (1988, 1992) base the study of framing in social 
movements on this foundation, as I discussed in the first section of this chapter. I should 
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note that Goffman cites Bateson (1954) several times while articulating this definition; 
Bateson also used the term frame: “… definitions of a situation are built up in accordance 
with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our 
subjective involvement in them; frame is the word … to refer to such of these basic 
elements” (pp. 10–11). These origins of the term frame do not yet denote frames in 
communication texts but rather frames in thought. This process of framing Bateson and 
Goffman describe also describes the process of constructing meaning—in other words, 
the epistemological foundation of framing theory in communication is the same as that of 
constructivism, which underlies this entire dissertation. 
 Before turning to contemporary definitions of framing, I must address the notion 
carried by framing theory as being a “fractured” field (Entman, 1993). Entman (1993) 
hurled the accusation in a landmark article that he titled “Framing: Towards Clarification 
of a Fractured Paradigm”—as of February 2018, ProQuest reports that the article has 
been cited more than 3,000 times. Entman writes that, “[d]espite its omnipresence across 
the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing 
theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves 
manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking” (p. 51). His complaint echoes 
throughout the literature: Scheufele (1999) charges that research on framing has been 
characterized by theoretical and empirical vagueness. To unpack this claim, framing 
theory, even some 20 years ago, was in widespread use, as Entman’s mention of its 
omnipresence implies. Writing 16 years later, Entman, Matthes, and Pellicano (2009) call 
framing theory “a victim of its own success” (p. 175), because the sheer volume of 
research rooted in framing has deprived the field of a single, accepted definition of frame.  
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In regard to a general statement of how frames influence thinking, this conception 
reveals a philosophy of mind that is not shared within the communication discipline, 
much less within the broader social sciences. Entman seems to be lamenting that social 
science is not at a point in its understanding of thought to sketch out a definitive account 
of the human thought process that would be valid across all times and places. Conceiving 
of “how frames influence thinking” in terms of a unified paradigm ignores the 
constructivist epistemology that an individual’s thoughts and opinions are inevitably 
determined by the contingent circumstances of every individual. To be specific, 
constructivism holds that an individual will construct the meaning of a frame in a 
communication text based largely on that individual’s sex, race, ethnicity, class, 
education, family background, location, etc. Constructivism, in McQuail’s (1994) 
account of the history of communication research, became in the 1980s the leading 
characteristic of the fourth stage of media studies, and McQuail mentions framing as an 
integral part of the field’s research agenda (p. 331). In other words, Entman’s desire for 
such an account can also be read as an admission that he is working in another paradigm 
than that of constructivism. 
 In that 2009 article (Entman, Matthes, & Pellicaro, 2009) and in his own later 
work (e.g., Entman, 2010), Entman has sketched out an account of the framing process in 
political communication, a process that he terms hierarchical cascading network 
activation. Working in the paradigm of media effects, the account is a five-level schema 
of how framing in political communication interacts over time with—or cascades 
through—culture, media and elite framing, communication texts, and, finally, public 
opinion. In a section titled “Clarifying Frames and Framing,” Entman et al. (2009) decry 
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the lack of consensus on the definition of frame, and then the scholars state that the 
framing literature generally follows one of two definitions of frames and framing. One 
definition is Entman’s, which I shall examine below; the other is from Gamson and 
Modigliani (1987), cited in the earlier section on framing theory in social movements as 
pioneers in the field of framing, and is identical to the definitions of frames in thought by 
Goffman and Bateson cited above. The authors then present definitions of framing in the 
context of social movements and of journalism, as well as a typology of various branches 
of literature of frame analysis. Given these clear demarcations, one might compellingly 
argue that framing theory seems to have grown out of its phase of conceptual fracture or 
vagueness—if such a phase existed—into an age of standardized definitions and of a 
diversity of paradigms with a robust research agenda. 
 Indeed, other scholars of framing theory in communication disagree with 
Entman’s premise of fracture. Reese (2001) argues that the usefulness of the research 
program of framing theory lies in its theoretical diversity. In a passage that merits being 
quoted in full, Reese (2007) writes that framing in the communication field is a rich, 
diverse research program that benefits the field through the confrontation of paradigms 
that it enables:  
Framing’s value, however, does not hinge on its potential as a unified research 
domain but, as I have suggested before, as a provocative model that bridges parts 
of the field that need to be in touch with each other: quantitative and qualitative, 
empirical and interpretive, psychological and sociological, and academic and 
professional. If the most interesting happens at the edges of disciplines—and in 
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the center of policy debates—then framing certainly has the potential to bring 
disciplinary perspectives together in interesting ways. (p. 148)  
D’Angelo (2002) and Carragee and Roefs (2004) conclude that the field is 
comprised of three paradigms—cognitive, constructionist, and critical—and D’Angelo 
(2002) writes that this diversity of approaches has led to a comprehensive understanding 
of framing. Carragee and Roefs (2004) describe the intersections of the paradigms as 
valuable cross-fertilization. D’Angelo (2002) asserts that there cannot be a single, unified 
paradigm of framing theory, nor should there be, in light of the benefits from the cross-
pollination of different methodologies and theories.  
 Returning to the question of defining frames and framing, Gitlin (1980) builds on 
Goffman’s work on frames of thought to offer an early definition of media framing, 
calling frames in communication texts “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, 
and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organize the discourse, whether verbal or visual” (p. 7). In his critique of 
framing’s alleged fracture, Entman (1993) puts forward a definition of framing in 
communication texts: framing  
“is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and /or treatment recommendation for 
the item described.” (p. 52, italics in original).  
Entman’s (1993) definition is often cited in framing studies as a standard, though 
debates continue about the specific traits of a frame (for reviews of the literature, see 
Borah, 2011; de Vreese, 2012; Scheufele, 2004). Here I should clarify the different 
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emphases in definitions of frame and framing among the cognitive, constructivist, and 
critical paradigms. Entman is defining framing in mediated texts, while the cognitive 
paradigm frequently focuses more on framing in interpersonal communication, or what I 
have been referring to as frames in thought (e.g., Kahneman & Twersky, 1984). Reese 
(2001) provides a contemporary definition of frames in thought that also captures 
constructivist notions of meaning-making: frames are “organizing principles that are 
socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure 
the social world” (p. 11). To be sure, work in all three paradigms—with this dissertation 
serving as an example of the constructivist paradigm—can make use of both frames in 
thought and frames in communication texts. Even in his partly quantitative work on 
media effects, Entman (2007, 2010) calls upon both types of frames with the definitions 
that I will use here.   
 The ubiquity of studies using frame analysis renders any comprehensive literature 
review nearly impossible, but this dissertation will make use of some of the commonly 
used categories of frames. In his review of an issue of American Behavioral Scientist 
devoted to studies of frames, de Vreese (2012) uses the typologies of 
substantive/procedural frames and generic/issue-specific frames. Regarding the former 
pair, procedural frames focus on strategy, particularly the strategy of parties or 
politicians. Substantive frames emphasize issues, principles, concepts, and advocacy, 
among others. The questions in the interview questionnaire probe substantive frames; for 
example, I will examine the data for frames of the regime (e.g., corruption 
strength/weakness, just/unjust), repression by the security forces, economic deprivation, 
or shared protest identity, which would be examples of substantive frames and of 
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injustice frames that would also provide evidence for theories of social-movement theory, 
neo-patrimonialism, and revolution elucidated in earlier section. Scholars also make 
important distinctions between issue-specific and generic frames (see also de Vreese, 
2002). Issue-specific frames are frames that can only be used for specific topics or events, 
whereas generic frames transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to 
different topics, as well as at various times and in different cultural contexts. The 
examples of frames mentioned above of potential frames in these data are also generic 
frames, and this category underlines their importance as frames that would provide 
evidence for theories concerning social movements, authoritarian regimes, and 
revolutions beyond the specific case of Tunisia’s Arab Spring. Providing further 
justification for this dissertation, Borah (2011) observes that a propensity among scholars 
to identify unique, issue-specific frames in their research is hindering the development of 
framing theory, so he advocates for the continued development of generic frames 
appearing across multiple studies. The data collected here will be able to help build 
theory by contributing evidence to the existence of generic frames.    
 Framing theory in communication shares more with framing theory in social-
movement theory. I should preface this point, however, by noting Scheufele’s (2004) 
critique that framing theory in the discipline of communication often reduces the study of 
framing to framing in the news media and ignores valuable insights on framing from the 
field of social movements. To their credit, Entman, Matthes, and Pellicano (2009), in 
reviewing significant framing literature, discuss the work of Snow and Benford, who 
introduced the use of framing theory in social-movement studies. As further evidence for 
the argument for overlap, Benford and Snow (2000) call the study of framing in media 
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texts perhaps “the most well-studied topic” (p. 626) in the field of framing theory in 
social-movement studies. One important conceptual overlap is resonance, discussed at 
length in the earlier section on social-movement theory. Entman (2010) writes that two 
elements differentiate framing from other communication: “its diachronic nature and its 
cultural resonance” (p. 393). In my discussion of resonance in framing theory in social 
movements, I noted that Ferree (2003) calls the cultural resonance of framing a sine qua 
non of movement success (p. 305). In expressing the same idea, Entman (2010) writes 
that to gain success, frames must call to the mind of the recipient congruent phenomena 
in that individual’s prior knowledge, understanding, and feelings about the world (p. 
393). This definition of resonance is identical to the criteria of narrative fidelity and 
credibility that I will use to assess that resonance of frames in the data collected. By 
diachronic nature, Entman (2010) means that the meaning of a frame encountered at one 
time will be constructed in light of meanings constructed prior to encountering the frame 
(p. 393). Moreover, Entman, Matthes, and Pellicano (2009) discuss the “cultural stock” 
(p. 176), commonly found in the minds of a society’s individuals, with which frames 
must successfully fit in order to resonate. This conception of appealing to a shared 
cultural stock through framing marks the terrain common to framing theory in 
communication, framing theory in social-movement studies, and the construction of a 
shared protest identity in revolution theory. 
 The literature on framing in communication theory resounds with laments about 
the significant lack of research in the process of framing (e.g., Borah, 2011; Carragee & 
Roefs, 2004; de Vreese, 2012). In a review of 347 articles on framing, Borah (2011) finds 
that only 2.3 percent of the articles studied the process of frame construction, whether by 
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journalists or by other social actors (p. 255). Borah (2011) and Carragee and Roefs 
(2004) advocate for scholars to expand their methodological approaches to include 
interviews with social-movements actors, in addition to the typical experimental settings 
with varied groups exposed to competing frames. This dissertation will contribute to 
scholarship in communication and media studies through the interrogation of frame 
construction and through a unique dataset of 44 interviews with actors in a social 
movement of some importance.  
 I conclude this literature review with communication theory not only because that 
is my home discipline, but also because framing theory in communication serves as a 
locus where theories of framing and concepts in framing from other disciplines can come 
together. As I noted earlier in this section, Reese (2007) extols the value of framing as 
such a bridge between approaches and methods that should be in useful truck with one 
another. Moreover, Entman (1993), in the article that established him as one of the 
leaders in the field, called on scholars to pursue research in framing that brings together 
the disparate uses of the theory, as part of a larger project of building the field of 
communication as a master discipline that builds coherent theory from among related 
concepts:   
We should identify our mission as bringing together insights and theories that 
would otherwise remain scattered in other disciplines. … By bringing ideas 
together in one location, communication can aspire to become a master discipline 
that synthesizes related concepts and theories and exposes them to the most 
rigorous, comprehensive statement and exploration. … such an enterprise would 
enhance the theoretical rigor of communication scholarship proper. … The idea of 
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“framing” offers a case study of just the kind of scattered conceptualization I have 
identified. … Analysis of this concept suggests how the discipline of 
communication might contribute something unique: synthesizing a key concept’s 
disparate uses, showing how they invariably involve communication, and 
constructing a coherent theory from them. (p. 51) 
In other words, in interrogating and revealing new connections among the varied uses of 
concepts in framing theory, this dissertation contributes both to building theory in 
communication and to helping fulfill what might be one of the most vital missions of the 
discipline. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the same division as in the preceding chapter, I will separate the 
findings and discussion on the framing process from the findings and discussion on the 
uses of social media and other communication technologies. The first part of this chapter 
begins with the findings on the collective-action frames constructed and deployed by 
social-movement actors, followed by several sections on the processes of constructing 
frames and constructing framing strategies, and this first part concludes with a discussion 
of frame resonance, or the process of making meaning from frames. The second part of 
the chapter begins with the delineation of the hybrid network of various communication 
technologies, the reception of Al-Jazeera, the uses of the hybrid network for information 
cascades and solving the problem of fear, and this part concludes with findings and 
discussion on how organizers and participants used the hybrid network for the organizing 
work of social movements. 
 
3.2.1 Collective-Action Frames 
 The most salient types of frames deployed by social-movement actors are 
collective-action frames; these frames are emergent, action-oriented sets of beliefs and 
meanings that inspire and legitimate social-movement activities and campaigns (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, pp. 614-18; Snow & Benford, 1988, pp. 199-204; Snow & Benford, 1992, 
p. 137). Not all frames deployed by social-movement actors are collective-action frames, 
but the frames deployed by the interview subjects of this dissertation were collective-
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action frames. Even though nearly all the interviewees said that the frames they 
constructed and deployed were intended to inspire and/or legitimate the uprising in 
Tunisia, it is impossible to show that all interviewees consciously intended to do so with 
every frame they created and shared. In much the same way, however, it is impossible to 
show that the frames that these social-movement actors deployed did not, in fact, inspire 
and legitimate the revolution among the individuals who encountered these frames. On 
the contrary, the frames and narratives deployed by social-movement actors during a 
brief period of mass rebellion that topples a longstanding dictator are, on their face, a 
clear and rich example of collective-action frames.  
  The quantitative and qualitative data show that organizers and participants 
typically deployed several different frames. Nearly three-quarters of organizers deployed 
a frame of the Ben Ali regime as corrupt, with 18 of 25 organizers (72 percent) saying 
they constructed and shared frames that portrayed the regime as corrupt. Five other 
frames were deployed by at least 40 percent of the organizers: 13 of 25 (52 percent) 
constructed frames about economic issues; 13 also constructed frames about dignity; 12 
(48 percent) deployed frames about the regime’s violent crackdown against the 
demonstrators; 11 (44 percent) framed Ben Ali as a dictator; and 10 (40 percent) 
constructed frames intended to inspire Tunisians to overcome their fear of the regime and 
revolt. In addition, seven (28 percent) organizers said that they constructed frames about 
the general repression by the regime’s security forces, and five (20 percent) deployed 
frames with the message that the citizens would succeed in the revolution if they 
persisted. These answers were given largely to the interview questionnaire’s question for 
organizers asking which impressions they were trying to convey. In addition to this direct 
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question, I always followed up mentions of other frames that the interviewees had 
encountered by asking them whether they, too, had deployed such frames. The interview 
questionnaire also included questions about how interview subjects viewed the regime, 
and I also followed up this question by asking whether and how the interviewees 
deployed frames to depict their views. After the first interviewees gave their answers, I 
then asked in all later interviews whether those subsequent interviewees had also 
deployed the frames mentioned by the initial interview subjects. As examples, the 
categories of the crackdown and Ben Ali as dictator emerged as the interviews 
progressed; frames of corruption, economic issues, dignity, and overcoming fear were 
present from the first interviews, and interviewees usually volunteered these topics 
without prompting.  
 These answers offer one clear conclusion: Almost all organizers used multiple 
frames. Of the 25 organizers who answered this question3, 20 organizers reported 
constructing multiple frames. Only three organizers said that they used only one frame; 
two organizers indicated that they did not deploy any specific frames. This quantitative 
data also points to the conclusion that there was no single “master frame” (Snow & 
Benford, 1992, p. 140) for Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, though such a finding would 
contradict the arguments of Howard et al. (2011) and Lim (2013). I will return in a 
separate section below to the problem of the master frame, but I will present in this 
section qualitative data supporting this finding of multiple frames. 
                                                 
3 Among the 44 interview subjects, there were 28 organizers and 16 participants. The number of responses 
to many of the questions is lower than the total number of organizers or participants, because either not all 
interviewees answered the question, or their answers were too ambiguous to code.  
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I also asked organizers how they tried to attract new participants to the 
demonstrations, and their answers conform to the finding that organizers tended to 
construct and deploy multiple frames. Twenty-four organizers answered this question, but 
four said that they did not try to lure new adherents, and one organizer indicated that he 
did not deploy any specific frames. Of the 19 organizers who reported using frames to 
lure potential adherents, 10 said they deployed multiple frames, and nine mentioned only 
one category of frame. Of the frames used by those nine who used only one frame, there 
was not a single type of frame that predominated. Of the 24 organizers who responded to 
the question, nine organizers used a corruption frame, nine deployed frames about the 
crackdown, five framed economic issues, five constructed frames about overcoming fear, 
and three framed Ben Ali as a dictator. Unlike the answers to the first, general question 
about frames, organizers did not mention a dignity frame in their responses to this 
question about attracting newcomers. 
 Participants were also asked how they attempted to construct and deploy frames 
of the revolution. Of the 14 participants who answered this question, two said that they 
did not deploy any specific frames. Seven participants said that they deployed multiple 
frames, and five mentioned using only a single frame. As with frames used by organizers, 
there was not a single type of frame that predominated among those five participants who 
used only a single frame; two participants said that they deployed frames of the 
crackdown, but the other three participants reported constructing three different frames. 
Of the 14 participants who responded to the question, seven said that they deployed 
frames of the crackdown, five framed the Ben Ali regime as corrupt, five constructed 
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frames about the security forces, three deployed frames about dignity, and three 
constructed frames about economic issues. 
The economic divide between the poorer, rural interior of Tunisia and the 
wealthier coastal towns has long been an important feature in the country (Angrist, 2013; 
Brisson & Kontinis, 2012; Brooks, 2013), and the quantitative data offer some potentially 
interesting associations between the organizers and participants from these two regions 
and the frames that they used. Of the 19 organizers from the coastal region, 15 said that 
they constructed and deployed frames of the regime’s corruption, while only three of six 
organizers from the interior used this frame (p = .183). However, the data on the frames 
that organizers used to attract new participants somewhat belie any hypothesis that social-
movement actors in the coastal region were more attuned to the regime’s corruption or 
devised a framing strategy to accentuate it. Before presenting the data, I want to underline 
that this second question, about luring new participants to the uprising, inherently reflects 
a strategic choice about framing; if organizers from the coast had perceived the 
corruption of the regime as a more salient and/or more powerful issue for other 
Tunisians, then they should have constructed and deployed frames about corruption to 
attract new participants. In answering the question about frames to attract newcomers, 
however, three of five organizers from the interior said they used frames of the regime’s 
corruption, while only six of 19 organizers from the coast said they used a corruption 
framing. Of the 39 interview subjects who answered the question about whether they felt 
the regime was corrupt, all 39 said yes. Considering the entirety of the data, I conclude 
that the greater use of a corruption frame by organizers from the coast is merely statistical 
noise from the relatively small size of the sample. 
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The qualitative data shed greater light on the differences between the framing 
processes in the rural and coastal regions. Interviewees from the interior and the coast 
often discussed the long-standing economic divide between the regions, and their 
discourses often revealed unambiguous differences of opinion on the relative importance 
of the country’s various ills and on the needed reforms. For example, when one organizer 
from Sidi Bouzid posted on Facebook excerpts from a video interview with another 
Tunisian activist, he chose the parts of the interview that addressed the poverty of the 
interior region and the regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrators in the interior towns 
where the rebellion had begun. He said that he and his fellow activists focused on 
constructing frames of three main topic areas: poverty and joblessness, the crackdown, 
and the corruption of the Traboulsi family. Another organizer, also from Sidi Bouzid, 
said that he had a similar strategy for framing, and he clearly differentiated his views on 
Tunisia’s most critical issues from what he perceived as the views of the coastal elites. 
During the revolution, he wrote a blog on which he discussed economic issues such as 
poverty. He said that the origin of the revolution lay in socioeconomic issues, not in 
personal freedoms. He said that he strongly disliked Lina Ben Mhenni, a Tunis native 
who covered the revolution from throughout the country on her well-known Facebook 
page. He appreciated the information that she provided, but he detested her politics, and 
he called her “bourgeois” for always talking about freedom. The cleavage between the 
regions and their frames was not always determined by place of residence. An organizer 
from Tunis who was an activist member of the Lawyers’ Syndicate laid out the heuristics 
for the dominant concerns of each of the two regions, and he deployed frames exclusively 
about the dynamics of the interior. He said that the basis of the revolt was the lack of 
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economic development and the marginalization of the people of the interior. He traveled 
to Sidi Bouzid multiple times during the revolution, and he constructed frames primarily 
about how the people of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine were oppressed and persecuted by the 
regime. He did not write about political rights, he said, because that was not the problem 
of the day. Freedom of expression was a cause of the elite, of cultivated people, he added. 
To draw out the distinction further, a participant from Tunis said that his framing strategy 
was to make the economic elites—people such as him and his friends—aware of the 
situation and to get them to participate. I find it extremely difficult to imagine a similar 
account from a participant in the interior. As another example of framing unique to Tunis, 
an organizer from Tunis said that she constructed frames urging for human rights, new 
elections, a new constitution, and solidarity with the people of the rural interior. “It 
wasn’t only about poverty,” she said of the revolution. I find interesting the conception of 
supporting the interior as a show of “solidarity,” because the mere use of term others 
rural Tunisians by underlining their dissimilar experiences. In any case, these examples 
show some stark differences of opinions on the primary sources of the revolution, even 
though these Tunisians were linked by their shared contempt for the regime and by their 
shared belief in the regime’s corruption. Although the differences are clear between some 
of the framing processes of revolutionaries in the interior and on the coast, most 
interview subjects said that they thought strategically about constructing frames in order 
to appeal to various groups of citizens—both in the interior and on the coast—so the 
quantitative data on framing do not reveal crisply elucidated frames unique either to 
social-movement actors in Tunis or in Sidi Bouzid. I will discuss strategic framing at 
length in a section below, but, as supporting evidence for this finding, I want to briefly 
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cite the strategies discussed by Ali and Lassad Bouazizi, cousins of Mohammed Bouazizi 
and longtime opposition activists in Sidi Bouzid. Ali Bouazizi went on Al-Jazeera on the 
evening of December 17, 2010, the day that Mohammed immolated himself, and he lied 
that Mohammed was selling fruit because he was a college graduate who could not find 
appropriate work. Ali told me that he lied because many college graduates in Sidi Bouzid 
could not find work and were frustrated and angry at the regime, so he thought that 
framing Mohammed’s suicide in this way might inspire them to demonstrate against the 
regime. Lassad said that his activist experiences had taught him that he needed to create a 
picture that could get into foreign media, specifically onto Al-Jazeera and France 24, and 
could influence the regime and influence foreign countries to put pressure on the regime. 
In the parlance of social-movement theory, he was looking from the first day of the 
uprising to construct frames that would have resonance far beyond Sidi Bouzid.  
Before digging further into the types of frames that social-movement actors 
deployed, I want to note briefly that the quantitative data on the types of collective-action 
frames correspond perfectly with the predictions of neo-patrimonial theory and revolution 
theory. A neo-patrimonial regime is built upon the kleptocratic expropriation of the 
nation’s economic assets by the ruling coterie, and opposition is ruthlessly extinguished 
by robust coercive forces of the military and various security forces. Organizers and 
participants most frequently constructed frames depicting corruption, economic issues, 
and the security forces and their crackdown on the protesters. The consistent salience of 
these frames in the work of organizers and participants forges a coherent protest identity 
of a mass of citizens bound together by their economic deprivation at the hands of a 
corrupt regime that perpetuates its injustices through repression by uniformed henchmen. 
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Such a shared protest identity is a necessary condition for the formation of a 
revolutionary population from various social groups, just as fourth-generation revolution 
theory would predict (Goldstone, 2001). Noting this overlap is not a mere detour to 
confirm the hypotheses of various theories; the significance lies in framing as the locus 
where these theories meet. In other words, framing is not just a process that social-
movement actors engage in, but rather this meaning-making from their experiences is 
where grievances are made tangible from the roster of social fields in which an 
authoritarian government operates, and this meaning-making is also where the weak ties 
among citizens become engorged by feelings of unity—a shared identity of protest. This 
hypothesis of the construction of meaning as the site of the overlap of theories from 
disparate social-science disciplines is one of the major contributions of this dissertation to 
building theory, and I will enlarge upon this point in each subsequent chapter and in the 
conclusion. 
In this part of this section, I want to dig more deeply into two specific types of 
frames. The first is the frequently deployed framing that aimed to help the citizens 
overcome their fears of opposing the regime. Forty percent of organizers said that they 
deployed frames to encourage Tunisians to overcome their fears of the regime. I will 
examine the citizens’ fears of the regime in greater depth in the section in this chapter 
regarding information cascades and pluralistic ignorance, but here I want to point out 
how this frame differs from the other frequently deployed frames. The frames more 
frequently deployed by organizers were frames of political and economic issues, but fear 
was a shared emotion—or an emotion believed to be shared—among the citizenry. To be 
sure, the deployment of a frame encouraging citizens to overcome their fears could 
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represent the result of strategic calculations among social-movement actors about how to 
increase the movement’s chances for success, and later in this chapter I will present 
qualitative data showing that this was sometimes a strategic choice. But the qualitative 
data also reveal that organizers and participants believed that fear of the regime was 
widespread and deeply ingrained—if fear was not, then such framing would have 
precious little chance of resonating, after all. The salience of this frame offers a 
meaningful contribution to scholarship on authoritarian regimes, which typically analyzes 
the acts and practices of the state and its institutions. The overwhelming presence of fear 
among Tunisians before the revolution and the importance that these interviewees 
accorded to it in maintaining the longevity of the regime constitute a potentially 
substantial phenomenon in the dynamics of authoritarian regimes, and a phenomenon 
deserving of further study and a more serious consideration as one of the most prominent 
and significant variables in the study of authoritarian regimes. 
The crackdown frame is interesting for a different reason: Organizers expressed 
diametrically opposing views about their perceived efficacy of this frame. On one side, 
the organizer who was the coordinator in the coastal city of Sousse for the union of 
students, commonly known by its French acronym UGET, said that a frame depicting the 
coercive forces’ violence “is the best material … for pushing people to go the street.” His 
reasoning was that Tunisian notions of masculinity would drive other young men into the 
streets to prove that they were tougher, more fearless, and more willing to sacrifice than 
those victims of regime violence in crackdown frames. An organizer from Tunis said that 
he and his fellow activists wanted to use the crackdown as one of their primary frames, 
because political arguments would likely fail to rouse a population that had been 
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depoliticized for decades under the asphyxiating rule of Ben Ali. On the other hand, an 
organizer who was one of the leaders of an activist group in Paris said that their strategy 
was to avoid talking about the crackdown and instead to ridicule the regime. They, too, 
wanted to get Tunisians to overcome their fears of the regime, so their strategy was to 
make the regime seem less fearsome, by avoiding portrayals of its brutality and instead 
framing the regime as ridiculous and out of touch. These accounts display the depth of 
the strategic thinking by the revolution’s organizers, the absence of a unified, dominant 
strategy or master frame, as well as a certain lack of coordination or hierarchy among the 
revolutionaries. The crackdown frame serves as a potent data point to introduce these 
findings, each of which I will discuss in sections below. 
I conclude this section by presenting some important caveats to the data and to the 
consideration of these frames. A crucial point is that we do not accept all these frames of 
corruption, economic deprivation, regime brutality, and so on, to be accurate 
representations of events. On the contrary, several organizers said that one key strategy in 
frame construction was to lie. For instance, the UGET official from Sousse said that he 
and his fellow activists inflated the numbers of those who had died in various 
crackdowns; they transformed some of the injured into the dead. They lied about Ben Ali 
or his family fleeing to escape justice. After Ben Ali’s speech on January 13, in which he 
attempted to calm the protests by saying that he would not run in the next presidential 
election, these organizers then lied that the government would arrest all of those who had 
been demonstrating, if the protests were to cease. As further evidence of the significance 
of the revolutionaries’ lies, Lim (2013) argues that the revolution was in some ways 
based on the foundational lie that Mohammed Bouazizi was a college graduate who could 
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not find a suitable job. Ali and Lassad Bouazizi told me that the lie was originally 
Lassad’s idea. He first told the activist Mohammed Ghazlani to use the lie, before 
Ghazlani gave an interview on France 24 on the afternoon of December 17. Lassad also 
told Ali that Ali should repeat the lie on Al-Jazeera that evening. Lassad said that he 
constructed this frame because there were many college graduates in Sidi Bouzid who 
could not find work and were frustrated and angry at the regime, and he thought that 
framing Mohammed’s suicide in this way might lead them to demonstrate against the 
regime. The common thread between these two lies—and the strategic lies and 
exaggerations of other organizers—is the goal of the inaccurate framing. They lied in an 
attempt to inspire Tunisian citizens to join the protests, which is the definition of a 
collective-action frame (Benford & Snow, 2000). Phrased another way, they lied in an 
attempt to construct a shared protest identity, as revolution theory would predict 
(Goldstone, 2001). I am not presenting these findings only as supporting evidence for 
these theories, but rather because this dissertation can contribute to building these 
theories by demonstrating that the category of the false or exaggerated frame (fake 
frames?) needs to be incorporated into these theories.  
Another caveat is that these frames are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
many frames of corruption also involve economic issues; one could argue that most 
corruption frames, which typically revolved around the gluttonous appetite for the state’s 
resources and finances among the family of Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Traboulsi, also 
involved economic issues. In the coding, I coded examples such as those above in the 
category of corruption, while I coded as economic frames those of joblessness, poverty, 
or the relative economic deprivation of the interior. Similarly, the frame category of 
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dignity is somewhat elastic. Interviewees used this term to describe their frames, so I 
coded their frames as such, but I cannot be sure that all those who constructed dignity 
frames and encountered this word understood this abstract concept in the same way. For 
example, dignity might have meant quite different things to residents of the interior and 
to residents of Tunis.  
One last caveat is that social-movement actors changed their framing during the 
course of the revolution, as relatively brief as it was. Some of the most violent and deadly 
crackdowns by the coercive forces took place in January, so the relative usages of 
different types of frames probably varied over time, and I was not able to code for these 
changes. Building on the work of Ellingson (1995) and others, I will discuss in the 
section on frame alignment the implication of this contingent, emergent framing for the 
study of social movements. This section of the dissertation introduced the types of frames 
that organizers and participants constructed, as well as the relative frequencies of the 
frames’ deployment and some caveats about the frames. The next sections will delve into 
the substantial questions of how and why the interview subjects constructed these frames.  
 
3.2.2 Frame Construction and Framing Strategies 
 In the following sections, I will present and discuss my findings on how 
organizers and participants constructed collective frames, in the literal sense of that 
question and in more figurative senses. These sections will answer research questions R3 
and R4, about how these individuals constructed frames and how they engaged in the 
process of frame alignment, which is the strategic production of frames to align a social 
movement with what social-movement actors believe to be potential adherents’ 
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understanding of the situation and the potential adherents’ values and ideology (Snow et 
al., 1986, p. 468). The first section will address the techniques and media that organizers 
and participants used to construct frames. The second section will explore how these 
individuals constructed frames as an alternative narrative. The third section will 
interrogate how the interviewees constructed framing strategies, and the fourth will 
examine how social-movement actors concocted different framing strategies for different 
media and for different audiences. The fifth section will investigate how the framing 
processes of those interview subjects changed during the revolution.   
 
3.2.2.1 Frame Construction  
 This section will begin to answer research question R3, which asks how 
organizers and participants constructed collective-action frames and asks in what ways 
they used various communication media in the framing process. This section will address 
both parts of the question in the literal sense, by presenting the quantitative data on the 
usage of various communication technologies, but also by presenting findings from the 
qualitative data on the interview subjects’ techniques for frame construction. 
As for the use of social media, here I will only present quantitative data on 
Facebook, because it was the most widely used type of social media. I will examine the 
differences between various social media in the section below on hybridity. The data 
show that organizers and participants used Facebook more than any other communication 
technology for frame construction and deployment, though they used other media, as 
well. Of the 44 interview subjects, 42 said that they used Facebook during the revolution. 
About 86 percent (32 of 37 interviewees who answered the question) said they published 
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posts during the revolution. About 77 percent (24 of 31 who answered) said they used 
Facebook to chat. The percentages were slightly lower for those who said that they used 
Facebook for specific framing tasks. Sixty percent (21 of 35) said that they used 
Facebook to give encouragement to the protesters. About 58 percent (21 of 36) said that 
they used Facebook to try to persuade potential adherents to join the protests. About 52 
percent (15 of 29) said they used Facebook to post about or discuss fear. In addition to 
social media, seven interviewees had their own blogs during the revolution (five were 
organizers, and two were participants).   
Facebook and other social media were not, however, the only communication 
technology used by social-movement actors to construct and deploy mediated frames. 
Eighty percent (33 of 41) of interview subjects used telephones to discuss the revolution. 
Of those 33, 12 (or 36 percent) said that they used the phone to give encouragement; nine 
(about 27 percent) said that they used the phone to try to persuade potential adherents; 
and seven (21 percent) said that they used the phone to talk about fear. I asked 
interviewees whether they met with others in person to discuss the revolution; 34 
interviewees responded to this question, and 30 (88 percent) said that they did. Of these 
30, seven (about 23 percent) said that they used face-to-face meetings to try to persuade 
potential adherents, and three additional interviewees (10 percent) said that they gave 
encouragement in face-to-face meetings. Roughly half of the interview subjects (17 of 
35) said that they used email during the revolution, and 10 of them (29 percent) said they 
used it for various framing tasks, though none specifically said that they used it for 
encouraging or persuading. These categories merit a bit of clarification: The meanings of 
categories such as persuade and encourage are clear. I also asked interview subjects 
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whether they used these technologies to exchange news or for analysis (and for non-
framing uses such as organizing tasks, etc.). Although I will present their answers in 
these other categories to discuss other areas of this dissertation, one could make a strong 
argument that, in any discussion of the revolution, these organizers and participants were 
engaged in the construction of meaning in the broadest sense of the concept, at least as it 
relates to imbuing the events of the revolution—and its causes and possible resolutions—
with meaning by expressing them in verbal or written form. In other words, the 
percentages of the interview subjects who used these communication technologies to 
construct and deploy frames of Tunisia’s revolution are likely somewhat higher than the 
percentages reported. In this section, I do not wish to burden the reader with any more 
quantitative data; the full range of questions and answers are available in the respective 
appendices. These likely higher percentages, however, do not change the conclusion that 
I draw from this data: Organizers and participants used a range of communication 
technologies, from interpersonal conversations to social media posts, to construct and 
deploy frames of the revolution. Among these communication technologies, Facebook 
was the most commonly used medium, with telephones and face-to-face communication 
used at slightly lower rates. Email and blogs were used relatively less, but they were still 
used at nontrivial rates.   
Regarding framing on Facebook, interviewees most frequently discussed the 
technique of constructing frames through visual imagery, whether photos or videos. Of 
25 interview subjects who said whether they uploaded videos to Facebook, 12 (or 48 
percent) said that they had. Even though I did not ask organizers a specific question about 
whether they strategically used visual imagery to construct frames, six volunteered that 
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they had. Lina Ben Mhenni, one of the best-known Facebook activists during the 
revolution, explained the predominance of this technique: “Of course, photos and videos 
are more effective. People don't take the time to read, here in Tunisia. They prefer to have 
video and photos. It’s easier,” she said. The UGET leader in Sousse said that he worked 
to post videos showing how tough the protesters were, because he thought that the most 
effective way to get young men in other towns and cities to join the protests was to prod 
them to prove their own toughness by outdoing the exploits of protesters elsewhere. Ali 
Bouazizi said that he focused so intently on constructing frames through video that he did 
not share any photos during the revolution. Interestingly, one organizer said that he did 
not post any content from the protests or any events related to the revolution; he wanted 
to construct frames depicting poverty and the country’s other economic and social ills—
and he did so exclusively through sharing photos and videos that had nothing to do with 
the events of the revolution. 
Even though it was not mentioned with significant frequency, I want to point out 
that some organizers said that they strategically chose to use humor as a framing 
technique. One organizer said he used humor because people were more likely to read it 
than to read dense political texts; moreover, he wanted to make the regime look foolish, 
to turn enemies into caricatures. Another organizer, whom I mentioned above while 
introducing the crackdown frame, said that she and her fellow activists used humor to 
make the regime seem ridiculous instead of fearsome. The participant Karim Ben Said, a 
book publisher in Tunis, described an episode involving the anonymous, well-known 
political cartoonist known as Z that Ben Said said was a “defining moment” of the 
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revolution4. The regime announced that it had arrested a woman who had on her 
computer some originals of Z’s cartoons. Then Z posted a drawing of a pink flamingo—
the symbol of Lake Tunis—raising its middle finger to Ben Ali and saying, “I am Z.” 
Thousands of people began posting selfies on Facebook with a piece of paper saying, “I 
am Z.” Though the humor value of a vulgar flamingo might not be especially lofty, this 
story illustrates both the uses of humor and visual imagery in the framing process and 
how Tunisians used Facebook to construct a counter-narrative to the framing deployed by 
the regime. The former point helps answer the research question about how organizers 
and participants constructed mediated frames and how they used communication media 
to do so, which this section has addressed with quantitative and qualitative data. The 
latter point leads into the next section, which will help answer research question R3 in a 
more figurative sense and will offer rich evidence for building theory. 
 
3.2.2.2 Constructing an Alternative Narrative: The Framing Contest 
 In this section, I will offer a partial answer to research question R3 about how 
organizers and participants constructed collective-action frames. I will present 
quantitative and qualitative data to support my argument, and then I will explain how this 
finding contributes to building theories of social movements and of social media. I found 
that organizers and participants constructed and deployed mediated frames to offer an 
alternative narrative to the narratives put forward by the regime and by other actors in 
traditional and new media. The scholarship on framing in social movements has 
developed the concept of a frame contest (see Snow & Benford, 2005, for a review of 
                                                 
4 Said later published a book of Z’s cartoons. 
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pertinent research), but this concept is built on a dynamic of factions competing for their 
framings to become the dominant frame in coverage by traditional media. Although I will 
examine how my findings add to this concept, as well, my main argument is that these 
findings break new ground for the study of framing in social movements as a whole. 
 One basis for my finding is that the regime’s framing had lost its legitimacy even 
before the revolution. I present more evidence to support this claim in the chapter on neo-
patrimonialism, in the section on regime control of the media. In short, the regime’s 
suffocating censorship of news media and of new communication technologies, together 
with the regime’s persecution of those who expressed opposing or dissenting views, had 
undercut the credibility of the content in nearly all of the country’s traditional news 
media, whether state-controlled or privately owned. The quantitative data on Tunisian 
state television add another layer of evidence to the data presented in chapter 4, as not a 
single interviewee said that what she or he saw on Tunisian state television fit with her or 
his understanding of the situation or with her or his values, beliefs, and ideology. On the 
contrary, nine interview subjects said that what they saw did not fit with their 
understandings of the situation, and eight of those nine said that what they saw did not fit 
with their values (the ninth did not respond to the question about values). I will return to 
this data in the section on frame resonance, but it is already apparent that no one 
perceived the regime’s framing of events as accurate or legitimate. 
 The qualitative data are particularly rich on this topic, because many organizers 
and participants clearly saw that this was what their framing represented. Ali and Lassad 
Bouazizi, for example, said that they had been using Facebook before the revolution to 
read opposition websites, but they realized that they could use it to create their own news 
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source. A participant from Tunis captured the idea that Facebook allowed social-
movement actors to break free from regime censorship: “Facebook had become, like, 
everybody’s TV station, because we didn’t have TV, so Facebook was our way of 
voicing our anger, expressing ourselves freely, without being censored. It was very 
powerful as a tool for us.” An organizer from Tunis discussed this same approach, though 
she included not only the contrast to regime media, but also described social-movement 
actors’ framing on Facebook as a news medium and argued for its resonance among 
Tunisian citizens:  
I always thought that people overstated the role of social media in a way, but we 
shouldn’t also think that social media didn’t play a role. It played a role. What 
role? It’s a medium of broadcasting, in a way. And it’s first-hand narratives, most 
of the time. People were hungry for information, so they would trust each other 
more than trust the newspapers. The trust with the media in general in the country 
was totally broken. 
Well-known online activist Lina Ben Mhenni summed up her own approach to framing 
as a counter-narrative to the lies in the media controlled by the regime:  
I was trying to help break … the media blackout the regime was trying to impose. 
When I was watching the Tunisian TV, it was mainly lies. … It was very 
important for me to show the reality, to give voice to people who didn't have a 
voice at the time and showing the reality of what’s happening—because the image 
constructed by our media wasn’t the real image. 
Many other interviewees also described as alternative, contrasting narratives the frames 
they encountered on regime-controlled media and the frames they encountered on 
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Facebook, on other social media, and through other communication with citizens in 
Tunisia.  
 I now turn to exploring the content of that alternative narrative, and in preface I 
want to note that I am presenting data that interviewees gave from their work decoding 
frames and not as organizers and participants crafting frames for an imagined audience. 
Interview subjects often described this alternative narrative as pure information, 
unfiltered by any agenda. One organizer called these frames “raw material,” and he added 
that it lacked debate or critical thinking. Karim Ben Said referred to it as “information 
that was clean.” A participant from Tunis said that Facebook was the “only place you can 
get honest news.” These descriptions can only be understood in opposition to the frames 
deployed by other actors such as the regime—content on Facebook can be clean, honest, 
or raw, as opposed to the dirty, dishonest, processed content that had been disseminated 
for decades by the regime. Several interviewees discussed this cleaner flow of 
information as coming largely from the country’s poorer interior. One interview subject 
said that the most important things on Facebook were the pages of those in interior towns 
such as Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine. The central topics of the raw information from the 
interior were the massacres of protesters by the coercive forces, many interviewees said. 
In sum, social-movement actors were able to construct this alternative narrative largely 
by providing evidence—often uncut video evidence—about the crackdown in the interior 
by the security forces. I want to separate this narrative from many of the other frames 
discussed here. To be sure, social-movements actors constructed and deployed an 
abundance of other frames, such as the prominent framing of regime corruption and of 
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the economic hardships of the interior, but these frames are contexts and causes of the 
revolution, not a narrative of the events of the revolution. 
 Two items, however, problematize this description of clean information on 
Facebook. Although interviewees held up the frames on Facebook as clean and honest, I 
presented in the section on collective-action frames much evidence that social-movement 
actors—including those from the interior—strategically constructed frames of the events 
in the interior that were intentionally inaccurate and dishonest, specifically with inflated 
accounts of killings by the security forces. One could see this contradiction as ironic, in 
that Facebook and other technologies offered social-movement actors a chance to show a 
much more accurate framing of their lived experiences, but they decided to lie just as the 
regime did. However, one could also interpret the dishonesty of the organizers’ framing 
as a justifiable approach, whether as an account of events or as a strategy to win over and 
mobilize potential adherents, to combat the wholly dishonest propaganda of the regime, 
which also had many more sites through which to disseminate its framing of the situation. 
One could also argue that the revolutionaries were constructing and deploying 
propaganda, in much the same way that regimes have used new communication 
technologies in this century (for an overview, see Morozov, 2011). The second 
complicating factor is that the construction of this alternative narrative was not confined 
to Facebook. Social-movement actors deployed this alternative narrative in person and on 
the phone, interviewees said. Multiple interview subjects said that Facebook was the most 
important site for constructing an alternative narrative, but interpersonal and phone 
communications were also important. In addition, satellite television networks such as 
Al-Jazeera and France 24 were broadcasting frames that had been posted to social media 
  114 
or given directly to the networks by Tunisian protesters, and several interviewees said 
that they either provided their content to these networks or saw their social-media content 
broadcast on the networks. Sadok Ben Mhenni, the father of Lina and a journalist and 
former political prisoner, summed up this dynamic by saying that, thanks to the 
coordination of social networks and television, the people could all immediately see what 
was happening in Sidi Bouzid. I will interrogate the phenomenon of Al-Jazeera in 
separate section in the second part of the chapter, but here I need to mention that many 
interviewees said that they thought the network’s coverage was inaccurate and/or 
biased—in other words, yet another narrative. Because frames of the revolution were not 
a simple binary of regime frames and protesters’ frames, but rather a range of framings, 
the term alternative narrative represents a more precise designation than counter-
narrative, though I will use the latter term to emphasize, when necessary, the framing 
contest between the regime and social-movement actors. 
 This finding of framing as alternative narrative represents a contribution to 
theories of social media and social movements. In the literature on social movements, I 
have only found one mention of social-media use as the construction of an alternative 
narrative, and that was in a work by Al-Ani, Mark, Chung, and Jones (2012) that 
examined the Arab Spring in Egypt. In Tufekci’s (2017) book on social media and social 
movements, she mentions only once that content on social media can provide a counter-
narrative to the framing constructed by a state actor (p. 112). I will build more theory 
about social media in the second part of this chapter, but here I want to present an 
argument that social media, together with other communication technologies, offer a 
potentially rich terrain for social-movement actors to construct a coherent set of frames 
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that represent an alternative narrative or a counter-narrative to the frames deployed by 
actors with disproportionately more resources, such as a nation-state and media outlets 
under its control, particularly if those encountering the narrative already question the 
legitimacy of that more-powerful actor. The evidence to support my claim is not only the 
preceding data but also the data that I will present in the section on resonance, because 
the finding of successful resonance supports my claim for the potential fruitfulness of the 
opportunity offered by social media and similar communication technologies. 
Furthermore, I believe that scholars could find a wealth of evidence to support my 
argument throughout the years that social-media use has been widespread. For example, 
an organizer from Tunis said that his opposition to the regime was sparked by the 
framing of Ben Ali, Leila Traboulsi, and the government that he saw on YouTube in 
2008 in videos created by a man in Canada. 
To put this contribution in context, I want to make clear that I am not only 
building theory in the field of framing in social movements; instead, this theory helped 
guide the findings that allow me to build theory in multiple disciplines. My argument 
about the alternative narrative, for example, contributes to theories of social movements 
and theories of social media in disciplines such as communication and sociology. Perhaps 
it might sound banal and obvious to say, as I essentially do, that social-movement actors 
can use social media and other communication technologies to construct a counter-
narrative to that of a state actor such as an authoritarian regime. To be sure, countless 
studies have researched how social-movements actors used social media during the Arab 
Spring; Breuer et al. (2014) and Lim (2013) specifically interrogate social media usage 
during Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, and Castells (2012), Gerbaudo (2012), Fuchs 
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(2017), Salem (2015), and Tufekci (2017) all examine at length the uses of social media 
during the Arab Spring. But nearly all these scholars have been concerned foremost either 
with the relationship between social media use and mobilization (e.g., Castells, 2012; 
Salem, 2015) or with the relationship between social media use and the horizontal or 
vertical hierarchies of social-movement organizing (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Wolfson, 2014). Scholars tend to identify what social-movement actors 
do on social media through the prism of their objects of inquiry, so, as of today, the 
scholarship has not yet articulated this fundamental conceptualization that I provide here. 
This finding lays the foundation for a second contribution to theory, although this 
point represents a practical, universal directive for social-movement actors as much as it 
does a new element of theory. The finding for social media providing a site for resonant, 
alternative framing is also an argument that, to increase chances for success in 
constructing resonant framing, any social-movement actors engaged in a framing 
contest—particularly in a contest against an opponent with greater resources, and 
particularly against an authoritarian state—should seek out communication technologies, 
such as social media, that enable social-movement actors to construct and deploy to large 
audiences an alternative narrative of events. Certainly, social-movement actors can and 
do use telephones, email, and other media to construct and deploy alternative narratives, 
but the crucial element here is the affordance of the technology to directly disseminate 
the content to a larger audience, a process that some literature refers to as 
disintermediation (e.g., Garon, 2012). In the parlance of the communications field, social-
movement actors would have greater chances for success using media that are not one-to-
one but rather one-to-many and many-to-many. In this dissertation, the primary medium 
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is Facebook, but we should not limit our thinking even to the technology of social 
media—the key trait of the communication technology is that it affords dissemination to 
a wide audience. After all, before the invention of social media, dissidents in the former 
Soviet satellite states used samizdat to construct an alternate frame of the era’s lived 
experiences, though I would defer to that field’s experts as to whether or which samizdat 
works constituted an alternative narrative of events. The practical aspect of this 
contribution to theory answers the call of Etling, Faris, and Palfrey (2010) for research 
into how new technologies and social media can be proficiently used to struggle against 
dictatorships and authoritarian governments. 
 I conclude this section with a narrow discussion of the qualitative data on the 
framing contest between social-movement actors and the regime, because the data here 
also help build new theory on framing contests. The data presented in this section make 
plain that such a contest existed, but I want to add a few salient examples to fill out the 
contours of that contest. The framing contest began on the day of Mohammed Bouazizi’s 
self-immolation, said Ali and Lassad Bouazizi. On December 17, they said, the national 
news agency reported that opposition figures were trying to make the demonstration in 
Sidi Bouzid seem bigger than it was, and the agency reported that the opposition’s claims 
of mistreatment of the interior were untrue. In other words, the regime was contesting the 
framing that the Bouazizi cousins and others had constructed that day on Al-Jazeera and 
elsewhere. Another organizer said that his framing strategy was solely to counter the 
narrative deployed by the government that the opposition was an uneducated band of 
lawbreakers, the situation was calm, and Ben Ali was beloved. This organizer’s approach 
corresponds perfectly with the definition of the term framing contest. Sofiane Ben Haj 
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M’Hamed, the internet activist known online as Hamadi Kaloutcha, added an important 
element to the discussion of the framing contest, and I present his testimony at length in 
chapter 4. In short, he said that more of his time was spent on cyberwar, as he captured 
and shared content from blogs and websites that the regime had blocked, while the 
regime struggled to block his page on Facebook. The first two examples here follow the 
traditional schema of a framing contest, but Kaloutcha’s account, buttressed by many 
other interviewees, presents a meaningful addition to the scholarship on framing contests: 
Framing contests are not only about whose frame is legitimated by adoption in traditional 
media discourse, but social movements now wage framing contests also by means of 
cyberwar. Social-movement actors attempt to suppress competing frames by deleting, 
blocking access to, or otherwise hacking the websites and internet pages of their 
opponents, as well as by defending their sites and pages from attack, restoring deleted or 
blocked content, and establishing new sites to deploy frames. Scholars of framing 
contests should consider cyberwar as part of the contest. A second contribution to theory 
is what I call dichotomous legitimacy. My data show clearly that the frames of one side—
the regime and regime-controlled media, in this case—were treated as a priori false by 
the intended audience of the frames. One interview subject said that he chose to watch the 
news on state television only to monitor the regime’s framing, but he did not believe any 
of it as an accurate account. To add context to the study of framing contests, scholars 
should interrogate perceptions of the sides in a framing contest anterior to the contest as a 
meaningful indicator of the dynamic of the framing contest and its outcome. To conclude, 
the above data reveals the specific dynamics of the framing contest in Tunisia, a finding 
that also helps answer research question R3 about how organizers and participants 
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constructed collective-action frames and used various communication technologies to do 
so.  
 
3.2.2.3 Framing Strategies and Frame Alignment 
 In this section, I will present the data on and discuss the revolutionaries’ framing 
strategies and their methods for constructing framing strategies. The literature on framing 
in social movements uses the term frame alignment to refer to the process of the strategic 
production of frames by organizers and activists to align their movement with what they 
perceive to be the values and goals of allies and potential adherents (Snow et al., 1986, p. 
468). Rooting this concept in the link between framing strategies and the intended 
audience will help untangle the problem of the interviewees who said they did not have a 
strategy, a topic I cover at the end of the section. This section will answer research 
question R4, which asks how organizers and participants used communication media for 
frame alignment. 
 Because the organizers and participants discussed many framing strategies at 
length, I will first list the strategies. Interviewees said that they made conscious decisions 
to construct and deploy frames of corruption, economic issues, the crackdown, 
overcoming fear, freedom, dignity, unity, humor, and lies and exaggeration. There was no 
predominant strategy; nearly all these strategies were mentioned multiple times, yet no 
framing was mentioned as a strategy more than five times. Some interviewees said that 
they deployed multiple framing strategies, such as the economy and the crackdown, or 
dignity and corruption. The multiplicity of strategies—and the variety of frames they 
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generated—comprise a compelling argument against the hypothesis that a master frame 
prevailed in the revolution; I return to this point in a section below.  
 Similarly, interviewees reported multiple methods for constructing their framing 
strategies. The most common method was face-to-face communication, with eight 
interviewees saying they concocted strategies this way. Two interviewees said they 
constructed their strategies through email discussions among activists. No interviewees 
reported discussing on Facebook what a framing strategy for Facebook should be; I 
return to this point in the section’s conclusion. A few interview subjects pointed out that 
they engaged in prolonged debates about what the best strategy would be. One organizer 
said that she and a group of five or six fellow activists were together constantly in 
January, constructing framing strategy and giving interviews to foreign media. One 
organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that he and his fellow activists met for about an hour 
every evening to discuss framing strategy. In a rather empirical approach, a pair of 
friends from Tunis said that they were part of a group of about five or six who would go 
out every day and try to convince people to join the protests; in the evenings, the friends 
would meet and discuss which framing strategies had been most effective, and then they 
would deploy those frames while continually honing their message. As a result of their 
research, they chose to deploy frames about economic issues, corruption, and police 
brutality. In the sample’s sole example of hierarchical strategy construction, the leader of 
the UGET branch in Sousse said that he received regular emails from the UGET national 
leadership instructing members to deploy specific framing strategies; some strategies 
were to emphasize unemployment, corruption, or a specific site in Tunis where protests 
were tumultuous. In an extreme contrast to this, Skander Ben Hamda, known online as 
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Bullet Skan and a co-founder of the online activist collective Takriz, said that the 
members of Takriz had a clear strategy (a prominent part of which was profanely taunting 
Ben Ali and the regime), but they had never debated or even articulated it. When he was 
nearly tortured to death at the Interior Ministry near the end of the revolution, he said, he 
was only tortured more when he told his inquisitors the truth: He could not give them the 
names of other Takriz leaders, because he had never even met some of them. They were 
mostly a band of young men who met online and shared a hacking ethos and an 
insouciant, youthful disdain for the regime. To sum up the methods of constructing 
strategy, the qualitative data show clearly that most interviewees constructed their 
framing strategies during face-to-face meetings, though some interview subjects used 
email, and the revolutionaries took a variety of approaches to constructing strategy. 
 In responding to questions about their framing strategies, several interview 
subjects responded that they did not have a strategy. Most of these interviewees said that 
they chose to deploy frames that would show just the facts. To be precise, six of 25 
organizers said that they tried to follow such an approach; three of 24 organizers said that 
this was their strategy to attract potential adherents to the opposition. four of 14 
participants said that they chose to deploy frames that would show just the facts. A 
participant from Tunis said that there was not much time for analysis or strategy, so she 
was just acting and reacting, when she chose which frames to deploy. An organizer in 
Kasserine said that he posted all his photos and videos without any editing. At the same 
time, he said that, in his status updates on Facebook, he wrote about the persistence of the 
demonstrators, to give them support and encouragement. A participant in Kasserine said 
that he was not thinking about strategy, nor did he discuss it with anyone. His social 
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network was already full of antipathy toward the regime and did not need to be 
persuaded. He uploaded lengthy videos made by a person from Kasserine whom he never 
met, and he only edited them to take out blank shots, such as of a wall or of the ground.  
This begs the question: Is no strategy a strategy? Framing theory in social 
movements offers fruitful ways to consider this question. As mentioned in the discussion 
of collective-action frames, social-movement actors construct and deploy frames to 
inspire followers and potential adherents and to legitimize the movement. One category 
of inspiration is mobilization (Snow et al., 1986), so if social-movement actors deploy 
frames in an effort to mobilize adherents and potential adherents, then such an approach 
qualifies as a framing strategy. In analyzing the goals of social-movement actors in frame 
alignment, scholars posit that frame alignment is the process of trying to construct a 
frame with resonance (Coe, 2011; Ferree, 2003; Noakes & Johnston, 2005; Snow & 
Benford, 1988). This means that, in frame alignment, social-movement actors want their 
frames to fit with the recipients’ understandings of events addressed by the frames. If 
these organizers and participants were deploying these unalloyed frames just to construct 
a narrative that would fit with Tunisians’ understandings of the situation—a counter-
narrative to the one promulgated by the regime, for instance—then this, too, would be a 
framing strategy. To restate the larger point, even if these interviewees said that they did 
not have a strategy in constructing frames, this does not mean that their frames were not 
examples of collective-action frames or frame alignment. If these social-movement actors 
wanted their frames to mobilize the citizenry, legitimize the uprising, or construct a 
narrative that they believed would fit with their perception of the citizens’ beliefs, then 
these actors had a framing strategy, even if they say that they did not consciously 
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consider the construction of the content of their frames. As an example, an organizer 
from Tunis said that he gave an interview to a journalist from the French television 
station TF1, in which the organizer was reporting that the security forces were shooting 
citizens in the streets of Tunis. He was screaming, he said, declaring that this regime 
cannot go on. And yet, he said he was not saying these words from any strategic 
calculation, rather simply out of conviction. But if he said that the regime cannot go on, is 
there any way not to see this as a call to mobilize against the regime? In the view of 
framing theory, this is strategic framing.  
This seeming contradiction between the words of social-movement actors and the 
theory of social movements presents a ripe opportunity to build new theory. Ferree 
(2003) criticizes a certain reductionism in considering the framing process as merely a 
search for resonance, because this reduces the framing process to a marketing technique 
(p. 305). In light of the data, I find the definition of the term frame alignment to be 
constricting in a way that obscures the framing process. Frame alignment demands that 
social-movements actors try to fit their frames with their intended audience’s 
understandings and cultural repertoires. In my data, as I explained in my discussion on 
the alternative narrative, the social-movement actors in Tunisia’s revolution were not 
trying to fit their frames into anyone’s understanding of events—on the contrary, they 
were working to construct that understanding of events. Tunisia’s state-controlled media 
were constructing a narrative that nearly everyone in the national audience believed was 
false, but the only alternative sources that this audience had for its understanding of the 
events were the frames that they encountered on social media, on blogs, in emails, in 
telephone conversations, and in face-to-face conversations—and eventually in traditional 
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media such as Al-Jazeera and France 24. On the other hand, one could argue that, once 
these reports of persistent protests had been established, and audiences had created their 
own meanings for and understanding of events, then the frames constructed and deployed 
by organizers and participants were indeed examples of frame alignment. However, I 
would argue that social-movement actors continued the initial construction of 
understanding, because events such as the later, brutal crackdowns on protesters first 
came to light only through the mediated frames deployed by social-movement actors, 
regardless of medium.  
In other words, the term frame alignment seems to obscure important elements of 
the process of frame construction, if the term requires such a limited definition of 
strategy. To look at the field more holistically, we should distinguish between the frame 
and the framing process. The concept of collective-action frames focuses on the frames 
themselves—the type of frames—even though it does consider the intent of social-
movement actors. Resonance is a frame trait, though scholars often judge resonance by a 
movement’s success or by the wider adoption of a specific frame. If one wanted to 
scrutinize only frames, then scraping Facebook and/or Twitter data, along with some 
footage from satellite networks, and running various statistical regressions would 
suffice—and many scholars have taken this approach. But I want to bring the scholarly 
focus back to the process of frame construction, as Snow and Benford (2005) called on 
scholars to do (a call also made by Ryan, 2005). I conducted interviews in Tunisia to 
collect data on the framing process, as well as on specific frames. The construction of 
meaning is a process, as is the construction of frames. By making this process the unit of 
analysis, my dissertation sheds new light on how and why Tunisia’s revolutionaries 
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constructed and deployed mediated frames. They intended to mobilize, they intended to 
legitimize their movement, to delegitimize their opponent (i.e., the regime), to construct 
an initial narrative of the revolution (or first draft of history), and to construct an 
alternative narrative to the one in the discredited state-controlled media, in some cases 
without any regard for what that regime narrative might be. These findings represent an 
answer to research question R4, and they also represent a coherent and rich set of 
categories that scholars can use when analyzing the framing process in any episode of 
contentious politics. In addition, these findings lay the groundwork for future research, in 
that these categories easily translate into specific questions that scholars can ask social-
movement actors about the actors’ strategies and intentions. Although shared protest 
identity is a topic that I will discuss in chapter 5, I want to note here that, when social-
movement actors worked to construct frames that they believed would align with a shared 
belief that the regime was illegitimate, corrupt, oppressive, or otherwise against the 
people, they were also working to construct a shared protest identity, which is a crucial 
trait in forging the broad coalition of citizens necessary for a successful revolution.   
 To conclude this section on framing strategies, I want to reiterate that social-
movements actors did not deploy a single, monolithic approach to framing, but instead 
they deployed several different strategies. I listed the strategies in the preceding 
paragraph; at one step remove from the strategies per se, it also seems clear that nearly all 
the organizers and participants indeed had a strategy for constructing frames, whether 
they articulated it as a strategy or in terms of intent. I would like to spend a bit more time 
discussing their methods for constructing their framing strategies. They did not use social 
media much for this task, but rather they preferred face-to-face communication, with 
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some use of email and phones. Another answer to research question R4 is that organizers 
and participants deployed a bifurcated use of communication for framing strategy: They 
tended to construct strategy using one communication technology, in order to deploy 
their strategies in other media. As was the case with framing strategies, social-movement 
actors did not follow a uniform approach to constructing their strategies, but rather they 
followed a range of methods, from using a decentralized, group dynamic, to the empirical 
approach of the friends in Tunis, to the centralized, hierarchical approach of UGET.  
Even though the interviewees reported a range of approaches, the centralized, 
hierarchical approach of UGET was unique. In a similar case, an activist from the 
Lawyers’ Syndicate said that a group of 20 young lawyers had also worked to create a 
messaging strategy for the syndicate, and then many lawyers followed this strategy. Still, 
the strategy was not issued by the syndicate’s leadership, so this does not represent an 
example of top-down, hierarchical framing strategy, but rather another example of the 
horizontality that is both celebrated and critiqued by scholars (e.g., Castells, 2012; Fuchs, 
2017; Gerbaudo, 2012; Wolfson, 2014). This debate about the relationship between 
organizational structure and social-movement success is not my primary (or even 
secondary) focus, and while I will present more data on this topic in the section on social 
media and the costs of organizing, I want to use the topic of framing strategy to open my 
discussion of this topic. My data show that the revolutionaries in my sample did not 
adhere to a centralized organizational structure in their movement, nor to a vertical 
hierarchy. There was no single group that led the revolution. I am not a historian, but 
even though history provides examples of communist revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba, 
etc., led by a single, hierarchical organization, one can find a wealth of counter-examples, 
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such as the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and, perhaps most relevant to 
our contemporary time, the wave of revolutions in 1989 in the Soviet satellite states, in 
which revolutions were not led by a hierarchical organization (with all immense respect 
due to the Polish labor union Solidarity).  
In Tunisia, revolutionaries constructed multiple framing strategies, and they 
followed multiple approaches for constructing those strategies. The paradigm of these 
approaches, which I will elaborate in the second half of this chapter, was hybridity—a 
variety and multiplicity of strategies, approaches, and communication technologies. 
Regarding framing strategies, the example of Ali and Lassad Bouazizi illustrates the 
point of hybridity well. Their strategy was to lie and exaggerate, and they first heard this 
strategy from officials in Tunisia’s Communist Party in 1994. Because the regime so 
tightly controlled the nation’s media, and because the majority of Tunisians had become 
politically apathetic, lying and exaggerating was the only way that the Bouazizi cousins 
believed they could construct a story substantial enough to garner attention from foreign 
media such as Al-Jazeera. Let me bring together many levels of the hybrid network in 
their approach: In terms of organizational structures, the two cousins appropriated their 
strategy from the epitome of a centralized, hierarchical organization, but they deployed it 
as part of a horizontal network of activists in Tunisia’s interior—and no other activists in 
Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, or Gafsa told me that they had communicated with anyone about 
this strategy. In terms of technologies, social-movement actors had developed this 
strategy before the internet was widespread in Tunisia, and long before social media were 
invented, and the strategy was designed for traditional media such as television and 
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newspapers—and then the template was simply applied to a new communication 
technology that had arrived in the intervening years. 
 
3.2.2.4 Frame Variation by Medium and by Audience 
Coe (2011) observed that some social-movement actors construct different frames 
for the same audience. I pursued this question among organizers and participants, but I 
asked the question in a slightly altered form: I asked whether they used different frames 
for different media and/or for different audiences. Ten of 23 organizers said that they had, 
and six of 16 participants said that they had. Altogether, that works out to 16 of 39 
interviewees, or just more than 41 percent. Their responses help answer research 
questions R3 and R4, about how revolutionaries constructed collective-action frames and 
used communication technology to do so, as well as which framing strategies they 
employed in the framing process. The variety of dependent framing strategies supplies 
further evidence against the existence of a single, master frame, which I will examine in a 
section below. Their strategies show how they perceived the affordances of various 
technologies, especially Facebook. Their strategies also reveal the bases on which they 
differentiated various audiences. Despite varying perceptions of different communication 
media and audiences, the interview subjects’ goal in constructing different frames was 
largely uniform: to convince the recipient of the frame to join the protests or at least agree 
with the protesters’ position. 
Nearly all the variations stemmed from different strategies for Facebook and other 
communication technologies, whether Twitter, YouTube, blogs, email, or interpersonal 
communication. Even within Facebook, two interviewees said that they deployed 
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different framing strategies for different pages that they maintained on the site. Both said 
that they used different strategies because they believed that the audiences of the various 
pages were more likely to be convinced by different frames. However, many variations 
sprang from interviewees’ perceptions of the uses of different communication 
technologies. For example, interviewees perceived various social-media sites differently. 
One participant said that Facebook was more about relaying news, whereas Twitter was 
more concise, direct, and to the point. On the other hand, an organizer from Tunis said 
that, on both Facebook and Twitter, he deployed frames to convince Tunisians to go into 
the streets, whereas he used YouTube to disseminate frames to show events in Tunisia to 
the world. In other words, he thought that different social media had different audiences. 
Another organizer from Tunis had the same belief, but he perceived that audiences 
differed intellectually rather than geographically. He said that the Twitter audience was 
more politically aware, so his posts there were more analytical, structured, and related to 
ideas; on Facebook, his strategy was to play on emotions, for example by posting 
information about the numbers of people who had died in the protests. Three interviewees 
said that they deployed different framing strategies on Facebook and on their blogs; one 
of the three said the sites’ audiences differed, and two said that the technologies of social 
media and blogs were different. One said that he wrote Facebook posts with an audience 
of “all the people” in mind, but his blog was intended for other activists, so he wrote 
more conceptual posts there about ideas and sociology. Another organizer said that he did 
not think about the different audiences for his blog and his Facebook page, but he 
similarly used his blog for analysis, opinion, and ideas, such as ideas on how to increase 
the number of protesters. On Facebook, he said, he just posted status updates and words 
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of encouragement. An organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that his framing strategy for 
Facebook was to construct frames of a shared identity as Tunisian citizens, whereas on 
his blog he wanted to provide an explanation for the uprising, making political arguments 
about how the regime had marginalized the interior region. To repeat an account 
mentioned earlier, one organizer said that his framing strategy on Facebook was to lie 
and exaggerate, but he gave only accurate information to foreign news outlets, partly 
because he felt that he could not exaggerate to these media. Four interviewees said that 
they deployed different framing strategies on Facebook and when they spoke to others in 
person. The interviews subjects did not present their different strategies as related to the 
technology of Facebook, but rather because they had different strategies that they 
believed more fitting for the individuals to whom they spoke in person. All these 
accounts present a picture, perhaps not altogether coherent, of Facebook. The picture that 
emerges from these interviews is that social-movement actors in Tunisia saw Facebook as 
a technology for delivering brief, newsy status updates to a broad, representative 
audience of Tunisians, though framing on Facebook could also be emotional and untrue. 
Organizers and participants did not see Facebook as a technology for analysis, opinions, 
or ideas. Another salient trait is that three interviewees said they felt freer on Facebook to 
take more risks, because they feared regime surveillance or retribution for what they 
might say in person, in a domestic newspaper, or to foreign media. In other words, even 
though they used their real names on their Facebook pages, they felt a sense of freedom, 
if not anonymity.  
Interview subjects said that they also frequently followed different strategies—
whether in different communication technologies or when using the same technology—
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based on the audience. Some of the varying audiences given by interviewees include 
Islamists and communists, domestic and foreign audiences, and even soccer fans and 
“normal people,” as an organizer from Tunis differentiated his target audiences. In 
considering the differences between these pairs and among other audiences for whom 
social-movement actors constructed different frames, I found consistent traits that divided 
these groups: The audiences differed either in their levels of opposition to the regime, 
their levels of political knowledge, or their socio-economic statuses. 
The differing frames did not follow a discernible pattern. The differences were 
not between salient types of collective-action frames such as corruption versus economic 
issues, but the differences instead related to elements such as tone (e.g., gradations of 
humor and emotion) or arguments about why individuals should side with the opposition. 
The goals of the interviewees in deploying varying framing strategies, however, were 
almost entirely uniform: Interview subjects deployed these framing strategies to 
legitimize the opposition, to convince potential adherents to join the opposition, and to 
convince potential adherents to mobilize and participate in the protests. In the end, these 
social-movement actors followed different strategies because they believed those 
strategies would be the most effective ones for a specific medium and/or audience. In 
conclusion, the interviewees’ rationales for constructing varying framing strategies 
represents an answer to research question R4 about which framing strategies the 
organizers and participants deployed.   
 
3.2.2.5 Strategy as Emergent and Contingent 
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Another strategy that social-movement actors deployed was to change their 
framing in response to events and conditions during the revolution, a finding in line with 
Ellingson’s (1995) argument that the framing process is dialectical, in that social-
movement actors adjust their framings in response to events in contentious politics. 
Ellingson argues that the framing process is situated, contingent, and emergent, and in 
Tunisia this dynamic played out in ways beyond the simple dialectic of the framing 
contest. For example, social-movement actors altered their framing strategies to fit the 
conditions at the time of the revolution. The UGET leader from Sousse said that the 
organization decided to change its framing strategy at a meeting of the national 
leadership on December 20 in Tunis. Their slogan before the revolution was “bread, 
liberty, and dignity,” but the leaders thought that unemployment had become such a 
significant problem that they adjusted their slogan to “jobs, liberty, and dignity,” he said. 
One fascinating question raised by this change is how their decision was shaped by the lie 
of the Bouazizi cousins that Mohammed Bouazizi had been a college graduate unable to 
find appropriate employment, though that lie, of course, was shaped by the lived 
experience of many Tunisians, college-educated and otherwise, who could not find 
appropriate employment. In an earlier section, I presented the account of the two friends 
in Tunis who honed their framing strategy to fit what they found to be the most effective 
frames. This episode does not reflect a reaction to the events of the revolution, but their 
framing strategy was evidently emergent, in the sense that it emerged from their 
empirical inquiry into the relative effectiveness of various strategies. As a reaction to the 
events of the revolution, two organizers reported that they changed their framing during 
the revolution, once they sensed that the protesters were gaining strength and that the 
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regime was wobbling. An organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that his framing shifted from 
writing posts about Sidi Bouzid and poverty to writing about the regime. An organizer 
from Tunis, whom I mentioned earlier as pursuing a strategy of making the regime seem 
ridiculous, in order to make the regime seem less threatening, said that she and her fellow 
activists changed their strategy once they sensed that the protesters had a certain 
momentum. Their new strategy was to say that the regime’s days were numbered, and the 
people had broken with the regime, overcome their fear, and would not go away. The 
regime also changed its framing in response to events, multiple interviewees said. It is 
worth pointing out that these changes, as reported by the interview subjects, were not 
simply part of a framing contest, because the regime was altering its framing to respond 
to the events of the revolution and not solely to counter any opposition narrative deployed 
through mediated frames. As an organizer from Tunis said, “We were seeing that they 
were responding somehow to the fact that it’s gaining momentum.” The change, as 
reported by interviewees, was that the regime began to acknowledge that the 
demonstrations were not abating, and opposition figures were even allowed to criticize 
the regime on state television, even though the regime never abandoned its framing that 
the regime was in control and working to improve conditions in the country.  
The qualitative data lead me to suspect that social-movement actors shifted their 
framing during the revolution to give greater prominence to frames of the crackdown, 
whether of the coercive forces’ brutality or of the crackdown’s victims, but I recommend 
that scholars pursue this hypothesis in further research. The interview questionnaire did 
not include a question about whether or how interviewees changed their framing during 
the revolution, and I would recommend that social-movement scholars in the future 
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include this question, tailored to the specifics of whichever episode of contentious 
politics they examine. I quoted in an earlier section the leader of the UGET branch in 
Sousse, who said that images of regime killings were the best framing to mobilize 
protesters. An organizer from Tunis said that he believed that the videos of the 
crackdown in Kasserine changed the minds of many citizens to side with the protesters. 
He said that he noticed a “big shift” in opinion on Facebook after videos of the episode 
were disseminated. Considering the interview data that I cite throughout this chapter, I 
find it highly likely that many social-movement activists noticed the potency of these 
frames for persuasion and mobilization and then adjusted their framing strategies to make 
these frames more salient. I do not have evidence to support this argument, but the data I 
presented in this section do provide compelling evidence that the revolutionaries and the 
regime did alter their framing strategies during the revolution in response to emergent, 
contingent events. This finding answers Ellingson’s (1995) call for more research to 
explore how the framing process emerges and potentially changes during the events of 
contentious politics (p. 107), and the finding also answers research question R4 about 
which strategies organizers and participants followed to deploy mediated frames. These 
altered frames constructed by organizers and participants, moreover, were not uniform, 
which adds further evidence to for the hypothesis that there was no master frame for the 
revolution, a topic I shall address in the following section. 
 
3.2.3 A Master Frame? 
 Throughout this chapter, I mention the concept of the master frame, which is a 
central explanation or problem-solving schema around which diverse social groups 
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coalesce (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 140). The quantitative and qualitative data point 
clearly toward the conclusion that there was no master frame in Tunisia’s revolution. To 
bring together the evidence cited so far in this chapter, a robust majority of interviewees 
used multiple frames; interviewees also said that they consciously constructed widely 
differing framing strategies; about 40 percent of interviewees said that they used different 
frames for different media and for different audiences; and interviewees said that they 
changed their frames and/or framing strategies in response to the events of the revolution. 
To repeat another point I made above, the data also do not support the existence of 
dichotomous master frames for social-movement actors in Tunis and in the interior. 
Whatever different views they might have had of the regime or of the country’s economic 
situation, social-movement actors made strategic choices about the frames that they 
thought would be most effective for persuading and mobilizing potential adherents, and 
these strategic choices were not uniform. The UGET leader from Sousse provided one 
explanation for the absence of a master frame. The long-time opposition was splintered 
into three rough groupings in their analyses of the situation and in their demands, he said. 
One group focused on reform, demanding changes in human rights, civil rights, and 
political freedoms; a second group focused on the corruption of the Traboulsi clan and 
wanted the exit of Leila Traboulsi and her relatives from all political and economic 
positions; the third group wanted Ben Ali to go, period. To be sure, many social-
movement actors constructed framing strategies based on beliefs about effectiveness, but 
it also seems likely that some adherents of these three groups among the long-standing 
opposition would have also favored differing frames that reflected these diverse issues. 
  136 
 This finding against the existence of a master frame contradicts arguments made 
by other scholars. Howard et al. (2011) argued that social-movement leaders in Tunisia 
had constructed a “freedom meme” that mobilized masses of citizens around the ideas of 
liberty and revolution (p. 3). Their finding was based on searches of keywords in 
Tunisian blogs during the revolution, and this seems to be the root of their questionable 
conclusion. In the second part of this chapter, I will present a wealth of quantitative data 
on media use, but by this point it is likely clear that more people used Facebook and 
watched television—and for longer periods—than the number of people who read blogs. 
Moreover, my data on the types of collective-action frames show that freedom was not a 
common frame; some interviewees mentioned it, but not enough did to merit inclusion 
among the frequently used frames. Howard et al. (2011) do not discuss the concept of a 
master frame, but I wanted to confront their claim about a dominant “meme” with 
empirical research about the frames that the revolutionaries in Tunisia constructed and 
deployed. 
 Lim, however, claims that a master frame did indeed obtain: 
The Bouazizi story, crafted by a combination of the burning body images and Ali 
Bouazizi’s mythical twist, had become a master frame that guided interpretation 
of not only the Sidi Bouzid protests, but also the Tunisian revolt, and the Arab 
revolts in general. (p. 928) 
By “mythical twist,” Lim writes that she means Ali’s lies that Mohammed Bouazizi had 
been a college graduate unable to find appropriate employment and had been humiliated 
by a local inspector who had slapped him in public and confiscated the scale that he had 
used to weigh fruit and vegetables. Together, these elements created a master frame of 
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justice, freedom, and dignity, Lim writes. Before considering the data about this 
argument, there are two problems to consider with the formulation of the argument. First, 
the lie about Mohammed Bouazizi’s education and employment would seem to indicate a 
frame including a strong economic component, but Lim ignores this. Instead, she talks 
about how this mythical twist transformed Bouazizi’s suicide from yet another critique 
about poverty from the interior into a frame that all Tunisians could identify with, a frame 
of citizens “whose rights and freedom were denied” (p. 927). I cannot see how this lie 
does more than turn the suicide into a frame explicitly and directly related to economic 
concerns. The second problem is whether justice, freedom, and dignity can constitute one 
master frame. I think they cannot, because the verbal and visual content that social-
movement actors use to construct frames cannot be so easily abstracted, and because this 
assumes that specific collective-action frames will be decoded by those who encountered 
them in a way that leads to these abstract extrapolations. My quantitative and qualitative 
data, summarized at the beginning of this section, add abundant evidence to my critique. 
On the most basic level, no one mentioned using Bouazizi’s suicide as a frame. The data 
show a preponderance of frames about the regime’s corruption, economic issues such as 
unemployment, and the coercive forces’ crackdown on protesters. None of these fit Lim’s 
master frame. To be sure, one could argue that all three of these phenomena represent 
injustices against the Tunisian people by the regime, but such an argument represents, in 
my view, the foundational problem with the concept of an injustice frame as put forward 
by Gamson (1995): Almost any frame that criticizes can, on an abstract level, be called 
an injustice frame. Simply put, social-movement actors constructed and deployed richly 
varied frames during the revolution, with no single frame predominating. As mentioned 
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in chapter 2, Lim did not travel to Tunisia and conducted only two interviews, both by 
phone.  
I want to end this section with one final note about the frame of Mohammed 
Bouazizi’s suicide, from the interview with Ali and Lassad Bouazizi: There are no 
images of Mohammed’s self-immolation. The fire was extinguished before Ali arrived 
and before anyone else began filming, Ali said. The only video of an ambulance that day 
was for another family member who collapsed upon hearing that it was Mohammed who 
had immolated himself. Ali said that many videos and images of self-immolation were 
disseminated throughout Tunisia at the time, but this content had been appropriated from 
other self-immolations. In other words, perhaps many Tunisians saw images of a self-
immolation that they thought was Mohammed’s, and maybe they were angered, felt a 
sense of injustice, or were inspired to act. However, my interviews did not find any 
empirical evidence of Tunisians saying they had watched videos of the suicide and were 
moved by it. I am not saying that the act of self-immolation was not important, regardless 
of whether any video record exists. My point is that any argument about framing during 
Tunisia’s revolution is significantly weakened if it focuses or relies on claims about the 
framing of Mohammed Bouazizi’s suicide. 
 
3.2.4 Frame Resonance  
 This section will provide an answer to research question R5, which examines the 
relationship between frame resonance and specific communication technologies. This 
question approaches interviewees not as actors who constructed frames to deploy, but as 
actors who constructed the meanings of the frames they encountered in various 
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communication technologies. Framing theory addresses the reception and decoding of 
frames through the variable of resonance, which is the measure of how effective a 
collective-action frame is for mobilization (Snow & Benford, 1988; Valocchi, 2005). As 
mentioned in chapter 2, the relationship between mediated frames and mobilization can 
involve several confounding factors, to which I return in the conclusion of this section. 
To interrogate how interviewees constructed the meanings of the frames they 
encountered, I created two measures of resonance: credibility, or the fit an individual sees 
between a frame and the events addressed by the frame (in this case, the events of the 
revolution); and narrative fidelity, or the fit an individual sees between the frame and the 
individual’s values, beliefs, and ideology (Noakes & Johnston, 2005; Snow & Benford, 
1988). To measure credibility, I asked interviewees whether the frames they encountered 
in a given communication technology fit with their understanding of the situation. To 
measure narrative fidelity, I asked interviewees whether the frames they encountered in a 
given communication technology fit with their values, beliefs, and ideologies. I asked 
interviewees these two questions regarding the frames that they encountered on 
Facebook, blogs, and news websites, as well as on television, the radio, and in 
newspapers. To connect these measures to mobilization, I asked participants about the 
degree to which their decision to join the uprising was influenced by what they had seen 
in the media. One potential shortcoming of this approach is that I did not ask interviewees 
whether specific frames had resonated with them. Asking interviewees such a question 
from the outset would not have been practical, because I first had to ascertain what the 
most frequent frames were. Moreover, it could be redundant to ask those who made 
strategic choices about constructing frames to judge the resonance of various frames, 
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because their strategic choices largely reveal their answers. In other words, the data 
throughout this chapter on the specific collective-action frames that interviewees 
constructed can also be read as strong indications about beliefs in the likely resonance of 
those frames. For future research on framing in social movements, I do think that 
researchers interviewing participants should strive to ask them about the resonance of 
specific frames, by preparing an initial set of frames and adjusting that list as data 
emerge. 
Interviewees’ answers reflected the dichotomy of legitimacy that I introduced 
earlier in this chapter—in other words, interview subjects frequently answered that the 
frames constructed by protesters fit with the interviewees’ understandings of events and 
with the interviewees’ values, but the frames constructed by the regime and by some 
other actors did not. To account for these divergent responses, I coded answers to both 
measures in each technology for positive fit and negative fit. This approach allowed me 
to capture the fact that some interviewees expressed both a positive and negative fit for 
the frames they encountered in a given technology. The quantitative and qualitative data 
do not indicate that the frames on any single communication technology or related group 
of technologies, such as all internet pages, were more likely to resonate with 
interviewees. The data also add further evidence to my argument that organizers and 
participants constructed an alternative narrative that contradicted the regime’s narrative 
and contrasted with the narratives in some traditional media.  
 Regarding Facebook, 18 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered 
fit with their understanding of events; four interviewees said only that the frames they 
encountered did not fit with their understanding of events; and two interviewees said both 
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that they saw frames that did and that did not fit with their understanding of events. 
Regarding narrative fidelity, 12 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered 
fit with their values, beliefs, and ideology; one interviewee said only that the frames he 
encountered did not fit; and four interviewees said both that they saw frames that did and 
that did not fit. The cases of positive fit strongly outweigh the cases of negative fit. To 
explain some of the cases of negative fit, an organizer from Kasserine said that he saw 
many fake, pro-regime profiles on Facebook. Other interviewees said that they had also 
seen pro-regime sentiment on Facebook. From these accounts, it seems clear that 
Facebook was another site where a framing contest took place, and it was a key site 
where social-movement actors constructed narratives of events.  
 As for blogs, 11 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit with 
their understanding of events; four interviewees said only that the frames they 
encountered did not fit with their understanding of events; and one interviewee said both 
that she saw frames that did and that did not fit with her understanding of events. 
Regarding narrative fidelity, eight interviewees said only that the frames they 
encountered fit with their values, beliefs, and ideology; four interviewees said only that 
the frames they encountered did not fit; and one interviewees said both that she saw 
frames that did and that did not fit. Again, the cases of positive fit strongly outweigh the 
cases of negative fit. Strikingly, all five interviewees who gave negative answers to both 
questions (one gave positive and negative answers), also read the blog of opposition 
activist Lina Ben Mhenni5. Two of these four also said that they read the opposition blog 
                                                 
5 Lina Ben Mhenni did not have a blog during the revolution, but rather she only had a Facebook page, she 
said in her interview with me. Because other interviewees called her work a blog and gave answers 
regarding blog resonance based on this view, I coded their answers in the blog category. 
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Nawaat, but this might not be predictive, because none of the 14 others who read Nawaat 
answered the questions negatively. In addition to these five who read Ben Mhenni’s blog, 
another nine interviewees said that they read her blog but did not answer these questions 
negatively. As a result, I hesitate to attribute the lack of fit solely to her blog, but one 
organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that he hated her blog—as I mentioned above in this 
chapter, he liked the information on her blog, but he detested her politics, which he called 
“bourgeois,” because she was constantly writing about freedom. I see this critique as 
pointing up some of the different narratives of the revolution in the interior and in Tunis. 
In other words, the negative fit was not caused by regime framing but largely because 
social-movement actors had differing understandings—and I think it would be accurate to 
label these understandings as frames—of the events of the revolution. Moreover, the 
blogs of opposition activists, such as Nawaat, Tunizine, and Lina Ben Mhenni, tended to 
be associated with positive answers to the questions on resonance.  
 Regarding news websites such as the websites for France 24, Al-Jazeera, CNN, 
and BBC, 20 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit with their 
understanding of events; one interviewee said only that the frames he encountered did not 
fit with his understanding of events; and three interviewees said that they saw frames that 
both did and did not fit with their understanding of events. Regarding narrative fidelity, 
12 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit with their values, beliefs, 
and ideology; three interviewees said only that the frames they encountered did not fit; 
and two interviewees said that they saw frames that both did and did not fit. Cases of 
positive fit strongly outweigh the cases of negative fit. Of the negative responses, all but 
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one of these interviewees said that they went to the Al-Jazeera website, and I will explain 
in the paragraph below on television the relationship between Al-Jazeera and negative fit.  
 As for television, 16 interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit 
with their understanding of events; one interviewee said only that the frames he 
encountered did not fit with his understanding of events; and six interviewees said that 
they saw frames that both did and did not fit with their understanding of events. 
Regarding narrative fidelity, 14 interviewees said that the frames they encountered fit 
with their values, beliefs, and ideology; six interviewees said that the frames they 
encountered did not fit; and four interviewees said that they saw frames that both did and 
did not fit. Cases of positive fit prevailed, but there was a higher percentage of negative 
responses to these question in regard to television than for any other medium. The 
negative answers can be explained by two factors: All interviewees who gave negative 
responses watched Tunisian state television and/or Al-Jazeera. Although these two 
networks explain the cases of negative fit, interviewees also gave negative answers about 
the fit of some French networks. I coded answers for the same two questions solely for 
Tunisian state television and for Al-Jazeera, and the answers are telling. For Tunisian 
state television, all nine interviewees who answered said that the frames they encountered 
did not fit with their understanding of events, and all eight who answered said that these 
frames did not fit with their values, beliefs, and ideology. The numbers for Al-Jazeera are 
mixed. There were no responses of both positive and negative fit—an interview subject 
said that Al-Jazeera’s frames either fit or did not fit. Seven interviewees said that the 
network’s frames fit with their understanding of events, while two interviewees said the 
frames did not fit. The results for the question on values are more telling: Four 
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interviewees said that the network’s frames fit with the interviewees’ values, beliefs, and 
ideology, while three interviewees said the frames did not fit. In other words, 
interviewees apparently saw a marked ideological component to the frames on Al-
Jazeera. I provide qualitative data on Al-Jazeera in the second part of this chapter, to add 
understanding to this finding for mixed resonance because of ideological factors. To 
conclude this examination of the resonance of frames on television frames, I would like 
to present one qualitative account, to add some richness to the finding for the mixed 
resonance of frames televised on networks not controlled by the regime. Lassad Bouazizi 
said that the frames that he saw on television did not fit with his understanding of events, 
because television networks were largely repeating the lies and exaggerations that he had 
helped to disseminate through a variety of technologies. Other interviewees also said that 
they saw frames on television that they thought were exaggerated and so did not fit with 
their understandings of events. 
 Regarding radio, five interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit 
with their understanding of events, and four interviewees said only that the frames they 
encountered did not fit with their understanding of events. Regarding narrative fidelity, 
five interviewees said only that the frames they encountered fit with their values, beliefs, 
and ideology, and three interviewees said only that the frames they encountered did not 
fit. The cases of positive fit and negative fit are roughly equal, but the explanation is 
simple: Those who answered negatively listened to regime-controlled radio stations, 
while those who answered positively did not.  
 As for newspapers, four interviewees said only that the frames they encountered 
fit with their understanding of events; four interviewees said only that the frames they 
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encountered did not fit with their understanding of events; and one interviewee said both 
that he saw frames that did and that did not fit with his understanding of events. 
Regarding narrative fidelity, four interviewees said only that the frames they encountered 
fit with their values, beliefs, and ideology; three interviewees said only that the frames 
they encountered did not fit; and one interviewee said both that he saw frames that did 
and that did not fit. The cases of positive fit and negative fit are roughly equal, but, as 
with frames on the radio, the responses were determined solely by whether the 
interviewee read newspapers controlled by the regime or newspapers that sided with the 
protesters, such as Al Mawqif and Al Tariq al Jadeed.  
These data give rise to a parsimonious finding that a negative fit, whether with an 
interviewee’s understanding of events or values, beliefs, and ideologies, is largely 
explained by whether that interviewee encountered frames that had been constructed by 
the regime or by Al-Jazeera, though there are a handful of specific exceptions, such as the 
blog posts of Lina Ben Mhenni. This finding represents further evidence supporting my 
argument for the construction of an alternative narrative, as I mentioned in the 
introduction to this section, and I will develop this argument in the conclusion of this 
section. Another finding is that these data support an argument for a hybrid network, 
meaning that media users encounter frames of contentious politics across numerous 
communication technologies. That is, no single communication technology stands out as 
offering a unique framing or unique frames that are not deployed through other 
communication technologies. 
 Participants’ answers were mixed on the question about how their decision to 
participate was shaped by what they had seen in the media. I coded their answers on a 
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scale of 1 to 5, with higher numbers representing reports of greater media influence. Of 
15 responses, the mean was 3.2, and the standard deviation was 1.74. In other words, the 
answers varied greatly. There were five 1s but also five 5s, along with three 4s and two 
3s. In response to the question, one participant from Tunis said that his decision to 
participate was largely shaped by what he had seen on Facebook. However, the 
abundance of answers downplaying the significance of mediated frames could be 
interpreted as support for an argument that, while Tunisians might have followed the 
events of the revolution through various communication technologies, their decisions to 
participate were shaped mostly by factors exogenous to media coverage, such as their 
grievances against the regime, their grievances about their economic conditions, or their 
anger at the regime’s brutal treatment of their fellow citizens. It is important to note here 
the difficulty of untangling the relationship between media content and mobilization. As I 
stated in the previous chapter, the fact of a popular uprising is not evidence that any 
mediated frames resonated. I am not arguing that the frames constructed by social-
movement actors were the sole or primary cause for more than a million Tunisians to 
occupy their streets and demand the fall of the regime—but I do think the data in this 
section support the hypothesis that the frames constructed by organizers and participants 
did resonate. 
 The preponderance of positive responses to the questions on resonance supports 
my hypothesis that the frames constructed by organizers and participants resonated. The 
degree to which mediated frames shaped participants’ decisions to join the protests, 
however, remains an open question. I explain above the negative responses to the 
questions about resonance, so I would like to conclude this section by briefly considering 
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why the protesters’ framing resonated. To be sure, much of these social-movement 
actors’ framing was an accurate representation of events and did accord with the values, 
beliefs, and ideologies of many Tunisian citizens, so the finding for resonance is hardly 
surprising. Still, as many interviewees said, they lied and exaggerated in their framing, 
and some activists had strongly different views of conditions in Tunisia than did other 
members of the opposition. Still, what is striking about these organizers’ and participants’ 
frames is their novelty. Until 2010, the regime had so thoroughly controlled 
communication technologies in Tunisia that it was nearly impossible for opposition 
activists to share their views of the regime or their accounts of anti-regime activity. To be 
sure, Al-Jazeera and some French satellite networks had given voice to grievances 
against the regime, but these networks did not always find a welcoming audience in 
Tunisia, even among longtime members of the opposition. What happened in December 
and January was the construction of an alternative narrative of protests against the Ben 
Ali regime and an alternative narrative of Tunisia, one filled with grievances against the 
injustices of the regime, whether its marginalization of the interior, its corruption, its 
economic malaise, or its thuggish security forces. This alternative narrative was 
constructed mostly by social-movement actors, and it was mediated to Tunisians through 
Facebook, blogs, news websites, television, radio, and newspapers—and also in person 
by one Tunisian to another. As a final thought, I want to mention the connection between 
frame resonance and the construction of a collective protest identity, a connection that I 
will examine in chapter 5. In short, a revolution requires that a broad, cross-class 
coalition of citizens rebels against a regime, and one necessary condition for a 
revolutionary mass to coalesce is the construction of a shared protest identity (Goldstone, 
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2001), and social-movement actors work to construct a collective identity as an effective 
way to mobilize adherents (Garrett, 2006)—and to construct this collective identity, 
social-movement actors need to construct and repeatedly disseminate frames that 
resonate.  
 
 
3.3 Social Media and Social Movements  
In this second part of the chapter, I present findings and discussion on how 
organizers and participants used social media and a hybrid network of communication 
technologies for framing (and examine the place of Al-Jazeera in that hybrid network), 
for nurturing information cascades to overcome fear, for fostering weak ties, and for 
reducing the costs of organizing and raising the costs of repression. The first part of the 
chapter focused on the processes through which social-movement actors constructed 
frames, whereas this second part of the chapter will examine how these actors used a 
hybrid network of communication technologies for a variety of specific actions, among 
which framing is just one action. The sections in this part of the chapter will provide 
answers to research questions R1, about how interviewees used media, and to research 
question R6, about how interviewees exemplified the active roles of users in the social 
construction of technology. 
 
3.3.1 The Hybrid Network and Framing  
 In this section, I will present findings and discussion on how organizers and 
participants used a hybrid network of communication technologies during the revolution, 
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and I will show how they used this hybrid network for the framing processes interrogated 
in the first part of the chapter. Tufekci and Wilson (2012) describe this network as the 
complex intertwining of multiple online and offline spheres, especially the interrelated 
uses of the internet, satellite television stations, and cellphones (pp. 376-77). Social 
media, they write, are “superimposed” on existing social ties among friends, families, and 
neighbors (p. 376). This nuanced conception not only helps debunk any exaggerated 
claims for the uniquely powerful influence of social media during the Arab Spring, but it 
also allows for a richer approach to interrogating how social-movement actors use these 
various communication technologies during contentious politics. To explore whether and 
how interviewees used a hybrid network for framing and other social-movement tasks, I 
asked interview subjects whether, how often, and how they used social media, blogs, 
news websites, phones, television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. In addition, I asked 
participants how they heard of the first protest that they attended and how they found out 
about protests in general. 
 The quantitative and qualitative data on media use show that interviewees used a 
hybrid network, with nearly universal use of Facebook, television, phones, and face-to-
face meetings related to the revolution. It seems impossible to escape the conclusion that 
organizers and participants in Tunisia’s revolution used Facebook as much as, if not more 
than, more than any other communication technology. Of the 44 interview subjects, only 
two said that they did not use Facebook. In my opinion, one of the more interesting 
quantitative data points in my research is that the mean daily use of during the revolution 
was 373 minutes—about six hours and 15 minutes. Four respondents said that they used 
Facebook on average for more than 16 hours each day. Of the 42 interviewees who used 
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Facebook, only 11 said that they used it for less than four hours per day on average. 
Interviewees reported using other social media much less frequently. Only 13 interview 
subjects said that they used Twitter, and, among those users, the mean usage per day was 
just less than 79 minutes. Regarding YouTube, 14 interview subjects said that they used 
YouTube, and, among those users, the means usage per day was about 49 minutes. It is 
important to note that the regime had blocked YouTube in Tunisia, so internet users 
could typically only get to YouTube by hiding the IP addresses of their computers in 
some way; I explore this dynamic in greater depth in the following chapter. In other 
internet usage, 32 interviewees said that they read blogs related to the revolution, and 31 
said that they used news websites to read about Tunisia. Regarding email, 17 
interviewees said that they used email for communication related to the revolution, while 
18 said that they did not.  
 Usage of phones and face-to-face meetings did not lag too far behind Facebook. 
As for phone use, 39 of 41 interviewees said that they used their phones for 
communication related to the revolution, and, among those who made phone calls, the 
mean usage per day was just less than 80 minutes. The interview questionnaire did not 
include a question about whether interview subjects met in person to communicate about 
the revolution, but it emerged during the interviews that such meetings were common and 
important. I began to ask whether interview subjects met face-to-face, and, of the 34 who 
gave an answer to the question, 30 said that they did. This works out to slightly more than 
88 percent, which is not too much lower than the percentages for Facebook or phone 
usage, both of which were slightly more than 95 percent.  
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In regard to television use, 40 of 44 interviewees said that they watched television 
for news of the revolution. The most frequently watched channel was Al-Jazeera; 35 
interviewees said that they watched it, and five said that they did not. For those who 
watched, the mean usage per day was about 47 minutes. The data show, however, that 
nearly all of those who watched Al-Jazeera also watched other channels. Only four of the 
35 interviewees who said they watched Al-Jazeera said that they watched only Al-
Jazeera; of those four, one watched Al-Jazeera for five minutes per day on average, and 
another two watched for about 30 minutes per day, they said. As for other channels, 27 
interviewees said that they watched France 24, and, among those who watched, the mean 
usage per day was slightly less than 27 minutes. Al-Arabiya was watched by 15 
interviewees for a mean of just more than 19 minutes per day, while 16 interviewees said 
that they watched one of the regime-controlled Tunisian networks, with a mean usage of 
a bit more than 15 minutes per day. In the following section, I add more quantitative and 
qualitative data on Al-Jazeera. As for other traditional news media, interviewees used 
them markedly less frequently: Only 13 of 41 interviewees said that they read a 
newspaper during the revolution, and 13 of 42 said that they listened to the radio for news 
of the revolution.  
The data show that interviewees used Facebook more than any other 
communication medium, though they did not use it in isolation. Throughout this part of 
the chapter, I examine the ways in which interviewees used Facebook and other 
communication media in a hybrid network, and here I want to begin that discussion by 
exploring the ways in which interviewees used Facebook and other social media. One 
significant finding is that several interviewees said that they used different social media 
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for different purposes. For example, two interviewees said that Twitter was typically used 
by people with greater political knowledge, such as activists. One of these two said that 
he, who had a graduate degree and described himself as a member of the upper middle 
class, associated more with Twitter and was encouraged by what he saw there, because of 
the sophistication of the discourse. Another difference between Facebook and Twitter 
during the revolution, he added, was that he found very little news on Twitter, and even 
less news that he had not already seen on Facebook. An organizer from Tunis reported 
that he, too, primarily used Facebook for gathering news from around the country about 
the revolution, but he used Twitter in January to exchange details about the locations of 
snipers throughout Tunis, so that he could avoid being in their vicinity. YouTube, he said 
was like Facebook in that he used to collect and spread arguments in favor of the 
protesters. Bullet Skan, the co-founder of the online collective Takriz, said that he 
approached YouTube as a place to inform foreigners about events in Tunisia, because the 
site was blocked domestically by the regime. The varying ways that organizers and 
participants used different social media leads to an important conclusion: There is no 
single, correct use for a communication technology. This might sound obvious, but it is a 
significant argument for the social construction of technology. According to this theory, 
when Mark Zuckerberg and his college friends created Facebook for students at Harvard 
to communicate, it was not determined by any exogenous, nonhuman factors that users of 
this new technology would use it either to share cat videos or to topple a dictator. Instead, 
the users determined the spectrum of its uses. My interviews show the ways that these 
social-movement actors used it, and even among these revolutionaries, there was no 
single, prescribed way to use it. All interviewees shared frames of the uprising through 
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their shared visual and verbal content, indeed, but some used it for organizing tasks, and 
some did not. Some used Facebook one way and used Twitter another. For instance, the 
usage of YouTube to focus on a foreign audience was determined by the regime’s 
blocking the site, not by any inherent traits of the technology. As support for my 
argument for the usage of a hybrid network, the data show that Facebook was never the 
only technology used for a given action; social-movement actors made choices about how 
to calibrate their uses of different social media, telephones, email, and face-to-face 
discussions.  
The use of different social media does not constitute a hybrid network, to be sure. 
Perhaps the most salient manifestation of the hybrid network was the cross-pollination 
between social media and television. As I mentioned in this chapter, many interviewees 
reported that they saw satellite networks broadcasting frames that they had posted to 
social media or that they had seen first on social media sites. By broadcasting frames of 
the alternative narrative that social-movement actors were constructing in Tunisia, the 
television networks reproduced the narrative and amplified it to a larger audience. As 
former political prisoner Sadok Ben Mhenni said, the protesters’ narrative from Tunisia’s 
interior was disseminated through the mutually reinforcing hybrid network of social 
media and television. The cross-pollination ran in both directions: One participant said 
that he would take anti-regime arguments that he had heard on television and write them 
on his Facebook page. Frames that Tunisians (or anyone else) encountered on television 
and on Facebook were not treated equally, however. As I discussed in the section on 
resonance, interviewees said that they attributed a variety of biases to Al-Jazeera and 
France 24, which influenced their opinions of the resonance of the frames these networks 
  154 
broadcast. At the same time, an organizer from Tunis said that he lied and exaggerated on 
his Facebook page, but he provided only accurate information to foreign news outlets, 
because he thought that traditional news media were a site for “truth.” When speaking 
with journalists from these media, he said, “You can’t exaggerate.” I found another 
contour in the hybrid network of television and social media in the way that interviewees 
encountered the frames on each one. An organizer from Tunis said that he and his friends 
would watch television together—and they did this daily during the last days of the 
revolution—and use the frames they encountered on television as topics for analysis. 
In the foregoing paragraph, I described the relationship between social media and 
television in the hybrid network. I discuss below how interviewees constructed a hybrid 
network for other uses, but here I want to analyze in greater detail how interview subjects 
constructed this hybrid network of multiple communication technologies for framing. In 
the first part of the chapter, I interrogated how interviewees constructed different frames 
for different audiences, and though I briefly discussed there how interviewees constructed 
different frames for different media, here I want to focus on the technologies rather than 
on the frames. Of the 42 interview subjects who used Facebook, all used it for some sort 
of framing activity, whether exchanging news and information, persuading, encouraging, 
or overcoming fear. But interview subjects frequently used other media, as well. Of the 
17 interview subjects who used email, all said they used it for some sort of framing 
activity. Of the 39 interview subjects who used their phones for communication related to 
the revolution, 31 said they used their phones for some sort of framing activity. Of the 30 
who met in person with other people to discuss the revolution, 26 said they used it for 
some sort of framing activity. Clearly, then, most interviewees were using multiple 
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communication technologies, or a hybrid network, for framing. One participant from 
Tunis said that she used email for framing more than she used Facebook. Several 
interview subjects said that they used face-to-face meetings for framing more than they 
used Facebook, and some said they used these differently than they used Facebook. For 
example, a participant from Tunis said that he preferred using in-person meetings as a 
method of persuasion to join the protests: “I think the face-to-face contact is the best way 
to convince and not only to convince, but also to see how people think and how people 
react,” he said. Some interviewees said that they used identical content in multiple 
technologies. For instance, when one participant from Tunis would try in person to 
persuade potential adherents to join the protests, he would sometimes use his phone to 
show video from Facebook to those people who seemed more willing to listen to his 
perspective. An organizer from Tunis said that he would print out blog posts that he had 
written, so that he could show them in person to potential adherents. The UGET leader in 
Sousse presented an interesting approach to using different frames in different 
technologies: He and his fellow UGET leaders would announce on Facebook that they 
were coming to local education institutions to give speeches with important information 
for students, but the officials would not include in these Facebook messages any mention 
of opposition or demonstrations, because the police would then be waiting for them at the 
sites of the speeches. Once the UGET officials arrived to give speeches, their frame was 
to speak about how Tunisians in specific interior towns were suffering from the brutal 
crackdown by the coercive forces, because the UGET officials expected that there would 
be students from those areas mentioned who would react with displays of outrage. Then, 
the officials believed, other students from other, similarly affected areas would try to 
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outdo one another with displays of outrage and defiance of the regime, in performances 
of one-upmanship and/or masculinity, and the crowd of assembled students would thus 
be compelled to join the protests. This, the officials believed, was the most effective way 
to take advantage of the dynamic of in-person meetings to win over potential adherents to 
the protests. Analogous to the data on frames, the data on media usage show that there 
was no dominant technology used for framing, nor was there a single technology that was 
clearly most effective or that interviewees believed to be always most effective. Instead, 
social-movement actors deployed a hybrid network of communication technologies for 
framing, and they made strategic choices to use various communication technologies for 
distinct and clearly delineated reasons.  
The above paragraph illustrates that social-movement actors would perform the 
same action—constructing and deploying frames—through multiple nodes of the hybrid 
network, and another distinguishing feature of the network is that social-movement actors 
would limit certain actions to certain nodes of the network. Some simple examples would 
be the myriad interviewees who were cited in the earlier section on framing strategy and 
who said that they had used one technology to construct a framing strategy and then used 
a different technology or technologies to deploy the strategy. In that discussion, I 
mentioned many interviewees who constructed framing strategy in face-to-face meetings 
and then constructed frames online; another example is a participant from Tunis who 
used email with fellow protesters to discuss strategy and to construct petitions and texts 
that they would then share on their Facebook pages. Similarly, an organizer from Tunis 
said that he viewed Facebook as a medium of persuasion, but he used email as a 
communication tool among fellow activists, where they could exchange news, photos, 
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and videos, and to communicate with foreign journalists. Another organizer from Tunis 
said that he used open chat forums for persuading, encouraging, and exchanging news, as 
well as for letting people know about demonstrations, but he used secret groups on 
Facebook to construct strategies for organizing and other tasks—and he also used his 
phone to spread information about demonstrations. An organizer from Kasserine said that 
he used Skype daily to exchange information among a core group of activists from 
interior towns such as Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, and Thala, as well as to speak with foreign 
journalists after Ben Ali fled. He used face-to-face meetings for his organizing tasks, but 
I discuss social-movement organization in a section below. He also would chat on 
Facebook or in person with trusted activists to verify information that he had seen on 
websites of traditional news media such as Le Monde or The New York Times. Several 
interviewees said that they, too, used one node in the network to verify information from 
another node. An organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that he, too, used the chat function on 
Facebook to verify video content that he had seen on television or elsewhere on the 
internet. In his hybrid network of communication, he used in-person meetings to 
construct his framing strategy for Facebook. A participant from Tunis said that she used 
her phone to verify content that she had seen on Facebook. I cited above an organizer 
from Tunis who used Twitter to exchange details about the locations of snipers 
throughout Tunis; in addition to Facebook and Twitter, he also used Facebook and his 
phone to verify content that he had seen on the internet, and he used YouTube, along with 
Facebook, to disseminate arguments against the regime, and he met with groups of 
friends and with groups of activists to analyze the situation, and to give encouragement. 
Although this might seem to be a dizzying array of examples with little in common, the 
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varying contours of these social-movement actors’ uses of communication technologies 
epitomize the richness of the hybrid network that they constructed during the four weeks 
of the revolution. They exchanged information, they verified information, they 
persuaded, they constructed strategy, and they organized demonstrations—and they made 
distinct choices to use all available communication technologies to do so. This data 
sketches out how they constituted a hybrid network, and it also enriches the account of 
how Tunisian revolutionaries used Facebook and other social media. Moreover, it builds 
theory about how social-movement actors construct a hybrid network, and it builds 
theory about what they use that network to do. This contribution to knowledge builds 
theory in the fields of social-movement studies and communication, as I will explain at 
the end of this section. 
To add to this rich account of the hybrid network, I want to discuss how 
participants found out about demonstrations, because the quantitative data show that 
interviewees found information on attending protests in many ways. Six participants said 
they found out from social media alone, while four found out from friends. Another three 
participants said that they found out from both social media and friends, while one said 
that she found out from social media, friends, and a family member. One participant 
found out from a colleague at work, one from an acquaintance, and one by email. This 
data reinforces the finding that social-movement actors used a hybrid network in differing 
and unpredictable ways.  
As final data about the elements of the hybrid network, I want to present some 
qualitative data that might complicate assumptions about how social-movement 
organizers used and did not use social media. At one extreme is Sofiane Ben Haj 
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M’Hamed, the internet activist known online as Hamadi Kaloutcha, who used only 
Facebook. He did not use the phone or even speak in person about his opposition 
activities, because he wanted to avoid detection and persecution by the regime. Because 
of his online pseudonym, his fellow activists did not know his name, nor had he ever met 
them in person. And yet he was perceived as such a potent opposition activist that he was 
one of the several prominent online activists arrested on January 6. At the opposite 
extreme, the organizers of the first mass demonstration in Tunis, which took place on 
January 11 in the area known in French as Passage, prepared the demonstration 
completely offline and then let people know about it in person, by text message, and by 
some chat messages online, multiple organizers reported. They never mentioned the 
demonstration on a public Facebook page. The Lawyers’ Syndicate followed a similar 
strategy, one syndicate official said. About 20 lawyers met in person to organize their 
January 14 demonstration, and they sent out text messages and made phone calls to let 
other lawyers know about the demonstration. They did post a video to YouTube 
advocating for other lawyers to join. The official said that more than 1,000 lawyers 
attended the demonstration. Finally, Lassad Bouazizi said that he did not have a 
Facebook profile and did not use the site during the revolution. He conducted all his 
organizing and persuading work on the phone and in person, he said. These examples, 
however exceptional, bring out a critical point for the theory of a hybrid network: There 
is no formula for its usage, no standardized user, no average or typical user—individuals 
can use the hybrid network in a range from one extreme to another, from only using a 
specific node to never using that node. 
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In this section, I defined the hybrid network of communication technologies used 
by organizers and participants during the revolution. I described the nodes of the 
network, as well as the rich variety of ways that actors used these nodes for framing and 
for other acts of communication and coordination. Many interviewees well understood 
that they were using technologies in this networked fashion; one organizer from Tunis 
said that all communication technologies—or nodes in the network—were important and 
were “complementary.” The data allow me to build theory about the hybrid network and 
about the uses of communication technologies during contentious politics. First, scholars 
(and everyone else) should always hesitate to attribute to any one medium a decisive or 
determining influence on the events of contentious politics, such as protests or a 
revolution. Second, even if some social-movement actors rely on a specific technology, 
other actors can meaningfully participate in—and even lead—episodes of contentious 
politics without using that technology, as the examples of the Passage demonstration and 
Lassad Bouazizi show. Finally, the actors determine how to use the nodes of the network; 
each episode is contingent not only on where the users of the network are situated 
temporally and spatially, but also on individually contingent factors such as technical 
skills, perceptions of efficacy, and credibility or trust. 
 
3.3.2 Al-Jazeera 
 Within the hybrid network, Al-Jazeera was a special node meriting individual 
consideration. I discussed Al-Jazeera briefly in the section above on resonance, but I 
believe the best place to discuss Al-Jazeera at length is within the framework of the entire 
constellation of communication technologies used during the revolution, rather than 
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trying to disentangle it from this dense, interrelated network of technologies. As Aday et 
al. (2012) write, it is increasingly difficult to separate traditional media from new media 
such as Facebook (p. 21). To be sure, social-movement actors in other nations in the 
MENA region might have used Al-Jazeera somewhat differently than the revolutionaries 
used it in Tunisia, because other populations rebelled after the widespread coverage of 
Tunisia’s revolution (see, e.g., Bellin, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2015a; Lynch, 2011a), but 
perhaps my data can contribute to others’ future research on this topic. Examining the 
data on Al-Jazeera will add meaningful nuance to my accounts of the hybrid network and 
of the use of social media during Tunisia’s revolution.  
 To restate the finding from the quantitative data on Al-Jazeera, interviewees 
reported mixed responses to the questions about whether the content they saw on Al-
Jazeera fit with either their understandings of events or their values, beliefs, and 
ideologies. The qualitative data support the quantitative data and reveal some sources of 
the mixed responses. Interviewees expressed contradictory accounts of the importance 
and accuracy of Al-Jazeera, and they explained the specific biases that they saw in its 
content. A participant from Gafsa said that she thought Al-Jazeera was the most 
important satellite network, but she also said that the content that she saw on France 24 
was more authentic and realistic. Al-Jazeera, she added, was using the content from 
Tunisia to promote the network’s Islamist ideology. An organizer from Sidi Bouzid also 
said that French news media were more accurate, and he contradicted as a “stereotype” 
the claim that all Arabs were glued to Al-Jazeera. The quantitative data show that Al-
Jazeera was the most-watched satellite network, but France 24 did not lag far behind in 
the number of interviewees who watched it (35 for Al-Jazeera, 27 for France 24) or in the 
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mean number of minutes they spent watching (about 47 for Al-Jazeera, about 27 for 
France 24); in addition, interviewees reported watching more than a dozen other 
television networks, in Arabic, French, and English. In sum, Al-Jazeera was widely 
watched by the interview subjects, but, overall, they spent more time watching other 
stations. Regarding Al-Jazeera’s ideology, a participant from Tunis said that Al-Jazeera 
only infused its content with ideology after Tunisia’s revolution, but many other 
interviewees provided contradictory views about the ideology and accuracy of its 
coverage during the revolution. An organizer from Tunis said that Al-Jazeera was 
exaggerating its coverage in the beginning of the revolution with claims that large and 
violent demonstrations were occurring throughout the country, when the protests in the 
first days of the revolution were largely confined to the interior and were not being 
violently repressed. An organizer from the interior town of Kasserine supported this 
view, saying of Al-Jazeera, “There was something smelly about them. … They were 
exaggerating.” Another organizer from Tunis said that he sensed a bias in favor of the 
protesters on Al-Jazeera and on France 24. Several interviewees said that they perceived 
an Islamist bias in Al-Jazeera’s coverage. An organizer from Tunis said that France 24 
was searching for truth, but Al-Jazeera’s content was propaganda. To repeat a point that I 
raised in an earlier section, many interviewees said that they saw content on Al-Jazeera 
that the network had taken from the interviewees’ social media accounts. In a unique 
example, online activist Hamadi Kaloutcha said that Al-Jazeera had taken from his 
Facebook page a video that he had filmed inside a mosque, but the network broadcast it 
with a completely different narrative than the narrative of the event that he had given on 
Facebook.  
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Lynch (2006) credits Al-Jazeera with constructing a new public sphere in the 
Arab world, but the data show a more nuanced picture of how Tunisian social-movement 
actors used Al-Jazeera during the revolution. Al-Jazeera was the most watched satellite 
network, but it did not dominate watching habits. Some interviewees acknowledged the 
importance of Al-Jazeera broadcasting information about the protests in Tunisia from the 
first day of the uprising, while others downplayed the network’s relative importance. 
More importantly, just less than half of the interview subjects who commented on Al-
Jazeera expressed some sort of reservation with the accuracy and/or bias of the 
revolution-related content broadcast by the network. The data show that Al-Jazeera was 
one of the more significant nodes in the hybrid network, because it relayed and amplified 
content from social media, while social-movement actors appropriated content from Al-
Jazeera and reproduced it on social media. However, because many social-movement 
actors perceived the frames on Al-Jazeera as inaccurate and/or biased, Al-Jazeera’s 
framing of Tunisia’s revolution represented for many Tunisians yet another narrative of 
events in the country, a narrative that did not always resonate with them or accord with 
the narratives that they encountered through other nodes in the hybrid network, such as 
social media, or with the regime’s narrative of events. Interviewees reported perceptions 
of inaccuracy and/or bias in Al-Jazeera’s content—and in the content of other satellite 
networks—and this multiplicity of narratives further supports my use of the term 
alternative narrative to define the social-movement actors’ frames on Facebook. In other 
words, their framing was not merely a counter-narrative to the a priori discredited 
narrative of a regime viewed as illegitimate, but the revolutionaries’ framing was an 
alternative to the narratives of the regime and of problematical traditional media. These 
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conclusions answer the part of research question R1 that asks how organizers and 
participants used Al-Jazeera. 
 
3.3.3 Pluralistic Ignorance, Information Cascades, and Fear  
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the topic of fear in terms of the relationship 
between citizens and the regime, but here I want to delve into the topic of fear as a 
problem for social-movement actors. In the previous two sections, I defined the hybrid 
network and described its contours and nuances, and in this section and the following 
one, I want to show how revolutionaries used the hybrid network. To be sure, they used 
nodes of the network, such as various social media, email, phones, and in-person 
meetings, to construct and deploy mediated frames to win over and mobilize potential 
adherents, as I discussed in the first part of the chapter. Here I want to explore the details 
of how organizers and participants also used all the nodes of the network at their disposal 
to help citizens overcome their fears of the regime and join or support the rebels. To use 
precise terminology from social-movement studies, the organizers and participants used 
the hybrid network to create an information cascade to solve the problem of pluralistic 
ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance is the condition when individuals in a society do not 
know that their opinion is widely shared (Tufekci, 2017, p. 26). Tufekci (2017) writes 
that social media can help overcome pluralistic ignorance by allowing people to reveal 
their preferences in a semi-public setting and quickly discover that their opinion, such as 
grievance against a regime, is widely shared. However, my quantitative and qualitative 
data show that Tunisian social-movement actors did not rely solely on social media to 
deploy the frame that citizens should not fear the regime. As I explained in the previous 
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chapter, Granovetter (1978) calls this process an information cascade, when activists 
signal a political position to sympathetic individuals who share the same position, which 
leads to more individuals publicly expressing that position, which leads to a greater 
likelihood of mobilization. 
 In the previous chapter, I quoted Mohamed ElBaradei speaking about the 
pervasive fear of authoritarian regimes that prevailed throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa before the Arab Spring. In the following chapter, I present abundant 
qualitative data in which interviewees speak about their long-standing fears of the 
regime, as well as about the persistence of fear during the revolution. In short, 
interviewees said that most Tunisians were afraid even to speak about politics before the 
revolution, because of fears of regime surveillance and of harsh punishments for dissent. 
To provide one example, the publisher Karim Ben Said said that he and his friends would 
be afraid to talk about politics even behind the closed doors of their homes; when they 
met, they would remove the SIM cards from their telephones, because they were afraid of 
regime surveillance—and these people were not even involved in the opposition. Many 
organizers said they thought that the widespread fear of the regime and its coercive forces 
was a key problem for them to solve. The journalist and opposition activist Aymen 
Rezgui said, “Our mission was just to stop their fear.” Fears of the regime persisted 
during the revolution, as well. To reduce any redundancy with the data in the following 
chapter, I will present the data concisely: Interviewees said that they were afraid to 
criticize the regime on Facebook during the revolution; to express criticism on their own 
blogs; to go to Facebook pages or blogs that supported the opposition; to use their own 
names on Facebook, which led them to create fake profiles; to join the protests; to let 
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people know about demonstrations by word of mouth; to speak loudly in meetings to 
organize protests; or to speak online or on the phone about their opposition activities, 
which led them to create systems of code words.  
 Before presenting the quantitative data, I want to note that the interview 
questionnaire did not include any questions about fear. The topic of fear emerged during 
the interviews, and I began to ask in follow-up questions whether interviewees 
constructed frames to help citizens overcome fear. In the section above on collective-
action frames, I presented detailed findings on the frames that organizers constructed, so I 
will not repeat all that data here. In short, 10 of 25 organizers said that they constructed 
and deployed frames to help citizens overcome fear, which is just less than the numbers 
of organizers who constructed and deployed frames of the crackdown, economic issues, 
and dignity. Regarding frames to attract potential adherents to the opposition, five of 22 
organizers said that they constructed and deployed frames to help citizens overcome fear. 
That total of five matches the number of organizers who constructed and deployed frames 
of economic issues. These data make clear the prominence of the framing to overcome 
fear. Regarding Facebook usage, 15 interviewees said that, whether through their posts or 
through messages, they used Facebook to urge others to overcome their fear. That total is 
only slightly less than the numbers of interview subjects who said that they used 
Facebook to persuade and to encourage, and it is about the same as the number of those 
who used Facebook for organizing tasks. Regarding phone usage, seven interviewees said 
that they used it to urge others to overcome their fear, a total that is just slightly less than 
the numbers of those who used it to persuade and to encourage. The importance of those 
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numbers is that they show that the work to push Tunisians to overcome their fears of the 
regime took place in an analogous manner throughout the hybrid network. 
 Organizers and participants deployed several varied frames and strategies to help 
their fellow Tunisians overcome their fears of the government. An organizer from Tunis 
said that he and his fellow activists constructed a strategy to emphasize all Tunisians’ 
shared identity as aggrieved victims of regime, and they added that it was possible to do 
something about the situation, if only they can overcome their fear. A participant from 
Tunis said that he used empathy, by asking people to see themselves as just like those 
who had been killed in the crackdown. An organizer from Tunis said that he and his 
fellow organizers told prospective protesters that they should not be afraid of joining 
demonstrations, because the leaders of the opposition would be at the front of the 
demonstration and be the only ones arrested, while participants in the back could escape 
persecution. The UGET official from Sousse said that UGET published an analysis on 
Facebook to say that victory over the regime was possible, as a strategy to get people to 
overcome their fears of joining the opposition. As I mentioned in earlier sections, an 
organizer from Paris said that she and her fellow activists followed a strategy of framing 
the regime as ridiculous and out of touch, as way to get citizens not to fear the regime. 
She and her group, known as BIRSA, also deployed strategies on Facebook and on the 
streets to help citizens overcome their fears. On Facebook, they would tag protesters by 
name in videos from demonstrations, and many of those tagged would de-tag themselves 
out of fear of regime persecution, and then the activists would tag them again. If a 
protester took her or his name off repeatedly, the activists would try to speak with the 
person on chat to convince the person to leave her or his name on the video, by saying 
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that the regime was not persecuting anyone because of Facebook videos. She and her 
fellow activists chatted with more than 100 people about these tags, she said. Their 
strategy on the street was to hold events, such as concerts or conferences, that were not 
protests but had an opposition message, so that attendees could see that they were not 
alone in their opposition to the regime. The activists’ hope was that attendees, realizing 
that they could oppose the regime with impunity, would return for another event and 
bring new attendees with them, repeating the process of overcoming fear. In addition, the 
activists would conduct interviews with people on the streets, and the interviews would 
include criticism of the regime, so that these interviewees would see that it was possible 
to speak out against the regime in public without repercussions. I listed these strategies 
partly out of completeness, so that social-movement scholars could benefit from my data, 
but I also want to point out that these data reveal that the interviewees constructed 
different strategies for different technologies, and they pursued their strategies in multiple 
nodes of the hybrid network. 
 Multiple interviewees described moments when they saw fear dissipate among 
citizens, but I think the fact that millions of Tunisians expressed their opposition to the 
regime and went into the streets to demand its fall, constitutes compelling evidence that 
many Tunisians overcame their fears of the regime. Some interview subjects gave credit 
to Facebook for affording an information cascade that helped social-movement actors 
solve the problem of pluralistic ignorance. Online activist Hamadi Kaloutcha said that 
many people inside Tunisia felt as though they were the only ones with grievances 
against the regime, so they kept silent. Because of Facebook and WikiLeaks, Tunisians 
could see how many people opposed the regime and how few supported it, he said. 
  169 
Tunisians felt freer on Facebook, less fearful that the regime was surveilling them there 
than on their phones or in public places, he added. Karim Ben Said, the publisher, 
described the information cascade on Facebook this way:  
But what Facebook brought us was the fact that when you are three, you feel like 
five; when you are five, you feel like 15; and when you are 20, you feel like 
invincible. That’s probably the most important thing. It was not the content; it was 
the fact that you didn't feel alone. 
The data in this section lead to a fine distinction in the working of the hybrid 
network: The revolutionaries constructed and deployed strategies throughout various 
nodes of the hybrid network to overcome fears of the regime, but the affordances of 
Facebook enabled all Tunisians on the site to use it as the primary technology to produce 
an information cascade to overcome pluralistic ignorance. Throughout this dissertation, I 
take pains to dismantle any notions that Facebook somehow caused the revolution or 
determined its outcome, and in this part of the chapter I define in detail a hybrid network 
of multiple, interrelated, overlapping communication technologies. But to dig deeply into 
exactly what social-movement actors did on Facebook and other social media during the 
Arab Spring, as some scholars have called for (see, e.g., Comunello & Anzera, 2012), 
this section offers one specific answer: They used Facebook to discover others’ opinions 
about the regime, they found out that grievances against the regime were widely shared, 
they revealed their own opinions about the regime, through which they created an 
information cascade, and these actions were instrumental in overcoming the problem of 
pluralistic ignorance, a problem that many actors were working hard to solve through a 
variety of communication technologies. 
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3.3.4 Organizing in a Hybrid Network 
 Many social-movement scholars have focused on how social media and other new 
communication technologies reconfigure the architecture of organizing by lowering the 
costs of communication (see Tufekci [2017] for a discussion of this topic in terms of the 
Arab Spring). Because this dissertation primarily examines communication, I did not 
include interview questions about hierarchies and centralization of social-movement 
organizations, but I did uncover information that contributes to the knowledge of how 
social-movement actors use communication technologies for organizing. The interview 
questionnaire did not include any question about organizing methods, but I followed up 
on questions about uses of individual technologies with queries about organizing. Not all 
interviewees gave answers about their organizing techniques, so these answers are partial, 
but the quantitative data show that organizers used in-person meetings and phones about 
10 percent more than they used Facebook. The qualitative data support the point that in-
person meetings were crucial for organizing, and the data also show that many 
interviewees used multiple nodes of the hybrid network to accomplish various organizing 
tasks. 
 Regarding Facebook, 13 of 26 interviewees (50 percent) said that they used 
Facebook for organizing tasks, such as planning protests and coordinating plans with 
other activists. More interviewees—24 of 42 (about 57 percent)—said that they used the 
phone for organizing tasks, and the highest percentage of interviewees—20 of 33 (about 
61 percent)—said that they used in-person meetings for organizing purposes. Only three 
interviewees said that they used email for organizing tasks. A key finding in this 
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quantitative data is that, among those who gave positive answers in one technology, a 
large majority also used another communication technology for organizing tasks. Of the 
13 interviewees who said they used Facebook, all 13 used at least one other technology. 
The qualitative data tell a similar story: Interviewees described how they used 
combinations of Facebook and in-person meetings; Facebook and phones; and chat 
forums, secret Facebook groups, and phones, to give some examples. Two interviewees 
combined Skype and face-to-face meetings. Others combined in-person meetings and 
phone usage.  
A few accounts of face-to-face organizing techniques underscore the importance 
of this organizing method. For example, an organizer from Kasserine said that he and a 
group of more than six other activists from nearby towns would meet every day to plan 
that evening’s demonstrations, and sometimes their meetings ran for six or seven hours. 
One member of a banned political party said that party members only ever met face-to-
face with one other party member, to reduce the damage that a regime spy could do to the 
party. During the revolution, they conducted their organizing work exclusively in person 
and in written messages passed by hand. As an illustration of the party’s disciplined 
communication and organizing, he said he knew two party members who had been 
housemates for years, but neither knew that the other was in the party until after the 
revolution. Aymen Rezgui, who was a journalist at the newspaper Al Tariq al Jadeed, 
said that the newspaper allowed him and fellow journalist Sofiene Chourabi to start a 
cinema club. The two used the club as a cover for a group of opposition activists, and 
they met four or five times during the revolution for planning and strategy sessions. They 
were among the lead organizers of the first demonstration in Tunis, at Passage, which 
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was never mentioned on Facebook. An organizer from Sidi Bouzid said that he and his 
fellow activists met every day in a local café to do organizing work; in Arabic, the café 
has since been renamed Revolution Café. 
Facebook and other social media nearly eliminate the cost of notifying large 
groups of people about social-movement events such as protests and demonstrations, and 
the data show that about half of the participants found out on Facebook about the first 
protest that they attended during the revolution. The data show that organizers are using 
the affordances of Facebook and other social media to conduct organizing activities 
through these technologies, but the data also support two other conclusions. Organizers 
mostly used Facebook as only one node in a hybrid network of communication 
technologies for organizing, and some organizers relied on face-to-face meetings for all 
or much of their organizing work. 
In addition to these conclusions, I also want to explore the relationship between 
this horizontal organizing structure and framing. One could perhaps argue convincingly 
that the lack of a unified framing strategy, or the lack of a master frame, will be a likely 
trait of social movements that lack vertical, hierarchical, or centralized organization. That 
might be the case, but I think a more interesting question is, so what? Even if this more 
horizontal, less hierarchical organizational structure that typifies many recent social 
movements usually corresponds with disparate framing strategies, how does that matter? 
An interesting avenue for future inquiry might be to focus more intently on whether 
frames in such episodes tend to be any more or less resonant, or whether and how this 
affects mobilization. Considering the relatively brief length of the revolution in Tunisia, it 
seems unlikely that a lack of hierarchy or centralization slowed the coalescing of a cross-
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class, nationwide revolt against the regime—and that conclusion leads to important 
questions about the dynamics of the regime, many of which I will address in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
 
3.3.5 Other Work in the Hybrid Network 
 In this section, I want to address two concepts that are topics of much research in 
social-movement studies and for which my data can perhaps contribute some 
illumination. The first concept is weak ties, or the connections among individuals from 
different ages, classes, and geographic locations. Scholars (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; 
McAdam & Paulsen, 1993) have long argued that the formation of weak ties are crucial 
to social-movement mobilization, and scholars of social media (e.g., Crossley, 2015; 
Polletta et al., 2013) argue that social media afford the capability for weakly linked 
individuals to easily communicate information about contentious politics. Aday et al. 
(2012) write that this bridging of social groups, such as the linking of core activists to 
mass publics, might have been the “key role” played by social media during the Arab 
Spring (p. 5). My data problematize this argument. As I write throughout this part of the 
chapter, social-movement actors used social media as one node in a hybrid network; 
absent compelling data, of which I am unaware, it seems difficult to argue that any single 
node in the network played a key role on its own. As for the specific point of linking core 
activists and mass publics, my data provide some contrary evidence. The Passage 
demonstration was never announced on Facebook. The Lawyers’ Syndicate did not use 
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Facebook to invite its members to its demonstration, thought it did post a video invitation 
on YouTube, which was blocked in Tunisia. Many interviewees reported that they spread 
word of demonstrations by text message, phone call, in-person meetings, and mass 
meetings at schools. In sum, many organizers announced future demonstrations on social 
media, and many participants found out about future demonstrations on social media, but 
both groups also used other communication technologies for these activities. To be sure, 
it remains an interesting thought experiment to imagine how these events would have 
unfolded without the existence of social media, but we will never know the answer to this 
question. Many interviewees expressed the opinion that the reason that events in Sidi 
Bouzid sparked a revolution, while the protests in Gafsa in 2008 did not, was the 
existence of Facebook. Even if we grant that to be entirely true, it seems to me that the 
difference is not in how Facebook allowed leading activists to connect to mass publics, 
but rather that it afforded all social-movement actors the capability to construct and 
disseminate their own narratives of events, largely beyond the reach of the regime’s 
censors. After all, one organizer from Kasserine said that he did not need to connect with 
the town’s citizens to tell them where to go for a demonstration, because they all knew 
that anti-regime protests were held in the main square in front of the local government 
offices. That said, I will argue in chapter 5 that social-movement actors used all the nodes 
of the hybrid network to construct a collective protest identity, a process that might help 
provide a more parsimonious explanation of how weakly linked individuals throughout 
Tunisia were about to forge a cross-class coalition of protesters who successfully 
overthrew an authoritarian regime. 
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 The second concept is how the hybrid network can raise the costs of repression by 
an actor in contentious politics, in this case repression by the Ben Ali regime. I am not 
sure whether my data represent evidence in support of this argument, because I did not 
collect data about the framing of the crackdown by traditional media or about how 
coverage of the crackdown affected the regime’s relationships with other state and 
international actors, nor can I divine the relative degrees to which revulsion at the 
crackdown and the accumulated grievances against the regime drove Tunisians into the 
streets. My data do show, however, the salience of the crackdown as a frame deployed by 
social-movement actors, and the qualitative data also offer evidence that the crackdown 
was viewed as a crucial moment by many interviewees. Moreover, many interviewees 
also said that Al-Jazeera reported extensively on the regime’s attempts to violently 
suppress the protests, including regular exaggeration of the extent of the regime’s 
brutality, as well as the appropriation of frames of the crackdown from the social-media 
accounts of some of the interviewees. In sum, the hybrid network affords a robust 
opportunity for the construction and deployment of frames of repression that can be 
shared reciprocally throughout the network as part of a strategy to mobilize opposition 
against the source of that repression. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this conclusion, I bring together the key findings from the two parts of the 
chapter and explain how they help answer most of the research questions posed in chapter 
1. The first section of the first part chapter helps answer research question R3, which asks 
how organizers and participants constructed collective-action frames and asks how they 
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used communication media to do so. Almost all organizers used multiple frames, but they 
did not use any single frame in a dominant fashion. The most common frames were those 
portraying the regime’s corruption, economic issues, dignity, the violent crackdown on 
the protests, the regime as dictatorship, and encouraging citizens to overcome their fears 
of the regime. Despite differences of opinion between organizers from the interior towns 
and organizers from the coastal cities on the country’s problems and their solutions, the 
quantitative data did not display different framing tendencies for interviewees from the 
two regions. The reason is that most organizers said that they were thinking strategically 
about the process of frame construction on terms of the best ways to win over differing 
target audiences. 
The section on frame construction provides further answers to research question 
R3. Interviewees constructed frames by using a range of communication media, including 
social media, blogs, email, telephones, and in-person conversation. Interview subjects 
most frequently used Facebook for constructing frames, and they used telephones and 
face-to-face communication at slightly lower rates, while they used email and blogs less 
frequently. On Facebook, interview subjects tended to construct frames through visual 
imagery, whether photos or videos. 
 In the section on the alternative narrative, I developed the answer to research 
question R3 with my finding that interview subjects constructed and deployed mediated 
frames to offer an alternative narrative to the framings put forward by the regime in 
traditional and new media and to the framings deployed by other communication media. 
Interviewees described this alternative narrative as clean, honest, or raw, and social-
movement actors based much of this narrative on frames of the regime’s efforts to quash 
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the protests in the interior. The revolutionaries’ frames of the crackdown, it should be 
added were not always accurate, because these social-movement actors sometimes 
exaggerated or lied, because they thought the inaccurate frames would be more effective 
in winning over and mobilizing potential adherents. Social-movement actors deployed 
this narrative through multiple communication media, including social media, blogs, 
email, phones, and in face-to-face discussion. In this section, I introduced the concept of 
dichotomous legitimacy, as a way to describe the a priori stance of most Tunisians 
toward the frames they encountered: They inherently distrusted any account from the 
regime, which they viewed as illegitimate, and they tended to trust frames from social-
movement actors. I also found that the revolutionaries and the regime were engaged in a 
framing contest and that one means of waging this contestation was cyberwar.  
 In the section on framing strategies, I began answering research question R4, 
which asks how organizers and participants used communication media for frame 
alignment and other framing strategies. Nearly all interviewees reported that they 
intentionally constructed and deployed frames according to some sort of strategy, but 
interviewees constructed several different strategies to win over and mobilize potential 
adherents. Interview subjects did not follow a single, dominant strategy, and some 
interviewees reported deploying multiple strategies. The revolutionaries’ intentions were 
to mobilize potential adherents, to legitimize the opposition, to delegitimize the regime, 
to construct a narrative of the revolution, and to construct an alternative narrative to the 
one in the distrusted regime-controlled media, in some cases without regard for what that 
regime narrative might be. The interviewees’ methods for constructing strategy were 
mostly bifurcated: Typically, they constructed their strategies using one communication 
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technology, in order to deploy their strategies in other media. Specifically, organizers and 
participants tended to use face-to-face communication to construct strategy, though they 
also used social media, email, and phones less frequently. In other words, interviewees 
engaged in multiple methods of constructing strategy. This interrogation of framing 
strategies showed that the definition of the term frame alignment is too narrow to 
encompass the full range of approaches to constructing strategy. While interviewees were 
working to construct frames that would fit with the beliefs about the regime of the 
individuals who would encounter these frames, as the definition dictates, these social-
movement actors were also trying to construct resonant frames through the approaches 
mentioned above, and scholars should broaden the definition of frame alignment to 
include these approaches. 
 The following section, on frame variation by medium and by audience, added to 
the answers to research questions R3 and R4 through the finding that roughly 40 percent 
of the interviewees deployed different strategies for different audiences and for different 
communication technologies. The interviewees varied their frames by audience according 
to the interviewees’ beliefs about the audiences’ levels of opposition to the regime, levels 
of political knowledge, or socio-economic status. In terms of communication 
technologies, the interviewees typically varied their strategies between Facebook and 
other technologies such as Twitter, YouTube, blogs, email, or interpersonal 
communication. In deciding to vary their framing strategies, the interview subjects’ goal 
in nearly all cases was to win over and/or mobilize those who encountered the frames. 
 In the section on emergent and contingent strategy, I found that interviewees 
changed their frames and framing strategies in response to the crackdown and to the 
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protests gaining momentum. Throughout all these sections on frame construction and 
frame strategy, I approached framing as a process of making meaning, rather than 
examining frames as units of analysis. This approach answers the calls of multiple 
scholars, including Snow and Benford (2005), who first laid out the theory of framing in 
social movements in the 1980s. Reflecting on how the field had developed, they wrote 
(2005) that scholars were focusing too much on frames instead of on the interactional and 
situated social construction of the frames. Ryan (2005) similarly laments that scholars 
seldom interrogate the processes of frame construction, because scholars rarely interact 
with the social-movement actors who construct frames or the audiences who mobilize. 
Ellingson (1995) calls for more research exploring how framing processes emerge within 
a contingent, situated environment. This dissertation fulfills these demands both by 
interviewing the revolutionaries and by taking the processes of the construction of 
meaning (and, in addition, the uses of technology to deploy the products of those 
processes) as the unit of analysis.  
 In the brief section on the concept of the master frame, I presented a wealth of 
evidence rebutting the notion that a master frame obtained during the revolution, largely 
because of the multiplicity of frames and framing strategies, such as strategies to deploy 
different frames through different communication technologies, for different audiences, 
and at different points of the revolution. 
 The section on frame resonance answered research question R5, which explores 
the relationship between frame resonance and individual communication technologies. 
The data showed resonance for the frames that were constructed by organizers and 
participants, though the relationship between resonance and mobilization remains a 
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question for future research. The data showed that a lack of resonance was almost always 
associated with frames constructed by the regime in any medium, the frames constructed 
by Al-Jazeera on television, and by online activist Lina Ben Mhenni. The unanimous 
finding for the negative fit of the regime’s frames offers further evidence for my concept 
of dichotomous legitimacy, which scholars can apply to similar cases of contestation of 
frames constructed by multiple actors. Another finding is that these data support an 
argument for a hybrid network, meaning that media users encounter frames of 
contentious politics across numerous communication technologies. That is, no single 
communication technology stands out as offering a unique framing or unique frames that 
are not deployed through other communication technologies. 
The second part of the chapter, which shifted the focus from framing to 
communication technologies, addressed research question R1, which asks how organizers 
and participants used communication media, and research question R6, which asks how 
organizers and participants exemplified the roles of active users of technology. This 
second part began with a section on the hybrid network, in which I found that 
interviewees used almost universally the communication technologies of Facebook, 
television, phones, and face-to-face meetings related to the revolution, and they used 
Facebook as much as, if not more than, more than any other technology. Some of the 
distinguishing features of the hybrid network used by social-movement actors in Tunisia 
were that social-movement actors used different nodes of the network for different 
purposes; some actors chose to limit specific actions to specific nodes of the network. 
One of the most prominent features of this hybrid network was the cross-pollination of 
framing content between social media and television. Social-movement actors used 
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multiple nodes of the hybrid network for framing, but there was no single technology in 
which framing activity predominated. Interviewees did not express a consistent belief that 
any one technology was the most effective, but rather they made strategic choices to use 
specific nodes of the network for specific reasons. In other words, the social-movement 
actors determined both the uses of the communication technologies that comprised the 
network and the contours of the network—the technologies did not determine how the 
interviewees would use them. Moreover, they use the technologies in the network in 
ways that are situated and contingent on their location, technical skills, beliefs about the 
efficacy of frames and technologies, and beliefs about the actors who constructed the 
content in a specific node.  
 In the section on Al-Jazeera, I found that the satellite broadcaster, as the most-
watched television network during the revolution, was a significant node in the hybrid 
network, but many interviewees perceived its content as inaccurate and/or biased. Its 
framing, then, represented yet another alternative narrative of the revolution to the 
narratives constructed by the regime and the protesters. 
 In the section on information cascades and pluralistic ignorance, I moved to 
discuss how social-movement actors used this hybrid network. They used it—and 
Facebook foremost—to reveal their grievances against the regime and to discover the 
grievances of others, a process that allowed them to overcome the problem of pluralistic 
ignorance. Overcoming the pluralistic ignorance of their shared grievances against the 
regime appears to have been a key step for citizens to overcome their enduring fears of 
the regime and fears of expressing opposition to the regime. 
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 The section on organizing explained how social-movement actors used the 
affordances of Facebook and other social media to conduct organizing activities, though 
they tended to use multiple nodes in the hybrid network for organizing. Even with new 
technological affordances, some organizers chose to use face-to-face meetings for all or 
much of their organizing work. The revolution was also marked by a lack of organizing 
coordinated on a national scale, yet, even without such centralization, hierarchy, or 
coordination, the disparate organizers of the various protests were able to construct and 
deploy frames that resonated, helped overcome pluralistic ignorance, and may have 
mobilized citizens in revolution. In the closing section, I briefly discussed the 
relationships between the hybrid network and weak ties, as well as between the hybrid 
network and raising the costs of repression. 
 The second half of the chapter built much of the answer to research question R1, 
about how organizers and participants used communication media during the revolution. 
In doing so, this dissertation answers the calls of Aday et. al (2010) and Comunello & 
Anzera (2012) for qualitative research to interrogate how social-movement actors use 
recent technologies, especially social media, during episodes of contentious politics. The 
second half of the chapter also helped answer research question R6, about how organizers 
and participants exemplified the active roles of users in the social construction of 
technology, and I will explore this topic at length in the conclusion of the dissertation. 
 Beyond the confines of this dissertation, the findings presented and the theories 
built in this chapter can potentially be generalized to other organizers of and participants 
in social movements and popular revolts. These findings and theories can also make 
important contributions to the practices of social movements, in that this dissertation lays 
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out the details of how the organizers of a successful social movement used 
communication media to help accomplish their goals. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NEO-PATRIMONIALISM 
4.1 Introduction 
Brownlee (2002) writes that Tunisia, from 1956 until the time of his writing, fit 
the neo-patrimonial model of authoritarian regimes, and this theory helps make sense of 
the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia. In this chapter, I will call on this theory to help 
understand the interview data, and I will use the interview data to build new theory for 
the neo-patrimonial model. To restate the theory in brief, neo-patrimonialism posits an 
authoritarian regime of “personal rulership on the basis of loyalties that do not require 
any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualification, but are inextricably linked to 
material incentives and reward” dispensed by the ruler (Roth, 1968, p. 196). The theory 
explains this dynamic largely as the result of the kleptocratic actions of the ruling elites 
and the asphyxiating repression of the citizenry by the regime’s coercive forces. The 
ruling coterie arrogates to itself the country’s economic resources through systems of 
cronyism and nepotism, creating endemic corruption and wealth concentration, which 
give rise to broadly shared grievances among the public about regime corruption and 
ordinary citizens’ dim prospects for prosperity or even for simple employment 
(Brumberg, 2011; Heydemann, 2007; Hinnebusch, 2015). Security forces are the key 
instrument for repressing dissent, and their omnipresence and brutality foster among the 
people fears of expressing criticism, of participating in civil society, or even of voicing 
any political or ideological positions (Bellin, 2004). Heydemann (2007), in a process that 
he terms authoritarian upgrading, observes that neo-patrimonial regimes in the new 
millennium did allow for some political contestation and for the establishment of civil 
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society, though the regimes nevertheless carefully controlled and strictly limited both 
phenomena. In the main, however, populations under neo-patrimonial rule remain 
depoliticized (Comunello & Anzera, 2012). Neo-patrimonial regimes also strive to 
control the introduction and spread of new technologies, particularly digital 
communication technologies (Heydemann, 2007). 
 Neo-patrimonial theory predicts that populations under such regimes will hold 
certain types of grievances. The theory predicts that the interview data should show 
entrenched grievances against the regime, specifically discourses about the general 
populace’s economic exclusion and the regime’s corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. 
Interview subjects should describe the security forces as pervasive and repressive, and 
some subjects should have personal experience or anecdotal knowledge of persecution by 
the coercive forces. Interview subjects should express fears of the security forces and 
should describe an atmosphere of fear among their compatriots. These grievances against 
the regime’s corruption and the coercive forces’ relentless brutality provide an important 
bridge to revolution theory, as I will discuss in the conclusion of this chapter. In regard to 
political participation, interview subjects should describe a lack of experience in civil 
society or political contestation, as well as a fear of participation. However, because 
organizers of the revolution comprised a majority of the interview subjects, such a sample 
might well have some experience in civil society, even though the model would predict 
such participation to be constrained or punished by the security forces. Finally, interview 
subjects should provide evidence that their uses of new communication technologies 
were surveilled, blocked, or otherwise impeded by the regime.  
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The scholars who developed the neo-patrimonial model (Bellin, 2004; Brownlee, 
2007; Brumberg, 2002; Heydemann, 2007) elaborated it as a way to explain the seeming 
imperviousness of these Middle Eastern and North African regimes to the wave of 
revolutions that swept away autocratic regimes near the end of the 20th century, typified 
by the fall of totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. And yet, as 
described in chapter 2, these regimes did change in regular, predictable ways in the years 
before the Arab Spring. Heydemann (2007) calls this the process of “authoritarian 
upgrading” (p. 1), and I will use the term authoritarian weakening for the new concepts 
that I attempt to contribute here. As I build theory throughout this chapter, all my 
contributions emanate from the same approach to amending the model: Explaining how 
the established traits of a neo-patrimonial regime simultaneously created the combustive 
potential for the Arab Spring revolution. This chapter will consist of sections presenting 
and discussing findings on the economy, the security forces, depoliticization and civil 
society, and government control of communication technologies. In the next section, I 
provide an overview of my findings, as a guide to the remainder of the chapter. 
 
4.2 General Findings 
 The evidence supporting the neo-patrimonial model is overwhelming. All 44 
interview subjects said the regime was unjust. Of the 39 interview subjects who answered 
the question whether the regime was corrupt, all 39 said the regime was corrupt. In 
response to the question about whom the interview subjects blamed for the issues that led 
to the revolution, 41 of the 43 interview subjects who responded to the question blamed 
the Ben Ali regime. In response to the open-ended question about how they viewed the 
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regime, nine interview subjects used the words dictator or dictatorship. Two other 
interview subjects described the regime as authoritarian. No one would expect these 
interviewees to cite or even to know an academic model such as neo-patrimonialism, but 
it seems clear that they found the regime to represent a particularly corrupt and unjust 
form of one-man rule. In sum, hatred of the regime and grievances against it were 
pervasive among all interview subjects. Many respondents said that nearly the entire 
Tunisian population detested the regime and knew that the regime was corrupt and 
authoritarian. For example, one interview subject said that “everyone” knew that Ben Ali 
was a dictator and that the family of his wife, Leila Traboulsi, was gorging itself at the 
public trough. To connect these grievances to the revolution, another respondent said that 
he and his fellow organizers felt that there was latent hostility toward the regime and that 
citizens just needed encouragement to go out and demand change. Another respondent 
said that he and his fellow organizers did not need to spend much time convincing 
Tunisians to participate in the uprising, because so many of them had firsthand 
experiences of poverty, joblessness, or the repression and brutality of the security forces. 
In the following section, I will explore how this connection between grievances and the 
revolution can help build theory. 
 Before delving into the specifics of the grievances, it’s important to note the 
overlap here among theories of social movements, neo-patrimonialism, and revolution, as 
part of the central goal of this dissertation to reveal the terrain shared by these fields 
through the processes of communication. Widespread grievances among the public are 
typical of neo-patrimonial regimes (e.g., Lust-Okar, 2005; Ulfelder, 2005), and these 
grievances are a crucial source of revolutionary protest identity, which Goldstone (2001) 
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defines as “a sense of being part of a group with shared and justified grievances, with the 
ability to remedy those grievances by collective action” (p. 153). The previous chapter 
explained the link between these grievances and social-movement theory, in the chapter’s 
presentation of evidence of how interviewees identified with their fellow protesters. This 
shared identity was partly constructed through the work of social-movement actors 
deploying frames of shared grievances and shared protest. 
 Before presenting my findings, I want to point out that interview subjects 
discussed these areas—the economy, the security forces, depoliticization, and regime 
control of communication technologies—even though the interview questionnaire did not 
contain any questions that mentioned any of these topics. Interview subjects were asked 
about whether they thought the regime was corrupt and whether they thought it was just 
or unjust, but all the responses cited below were given as part of answers to open-ended 
questions or during the semi-structured parts of the interviews that interrogated subjects’ 
responses to the questions on the interview questionnaire. These unprompted discourses 
seem further evidence of how deep-seated these grievances were, in that the interview 
subjects volunteered disquisitions on these problems. There are two other minor points to 
consider before exploring the findings: One, the attributes of neo-patrimonialism overlap 
in many ways, so some concepts will be mentioned in multiple sections of this chapter. 
As an example, the coercive forces, as part of their leading role in repression, enforced 
the strict limits on civil society and opposition to the regime, and the security forces also 
surveilled and blocked citizens’ uses of communication technologies, and interview 
subjects expressed fears of the security forces’ actions in all these fields. The second 
point is the relationship between these grievances and framing. I consider the data on 
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framing to be weaker evidence than interviewees’ testimonies as support for the neo-
patrimonial model, because many of these frames were strategically constructed. That is, 
the frames did not always reflect a reasoned critique of the regime on the part of the 
interview subjects, but instead many frames were constructed as the result of an actor’s 
decision about what would most likely mobilize or win over potential adherents. To be 
sure, actors’ framing choices reflect beliefs that such specific grievances were festering 
among much of the population, and these choices reflect the framers’ lived experiences, 
but on one level these frames simply represent evidence for social-movement actors’ 
beliefs that others held these grievances. As discussed in the previous chapter, some 
organizers strove to present “just the facts,” as they said, so some frames can be read as 
representations of the respective organizers’ perceptions of the country’s issues at the 
time, but not all frames should be read this way.   
 
4.3 Findings and Discussion: Economic Issues 
 Heydemann (2007) writes that the authoritarian upgrading that took place in neo-
patrimonial regimes during the years preceding the Arab Spring revolutions was marked 
by a lack of shared economic gains; whatever economic growth may have occurred was 
systematically appropriated by the ruler, his family, and the tiny clique surrounding him. 
Wulf et al. (2013) find that, in Tunisia, it was largely Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Traboulsi, and 
her extended family who zealously scooped up the country’s wealth and owned and 
controlled key economic assets. As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the model 
of neo-patrimonialism predicts that interview subjects would confirm the regime’s 
corruption, nepotism, and cronyism, as well as confirm the economic exclusion of the 
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vast majority of the population, for example through their poverty or dim employment 
prospects. 
 Interview subjects stated unanimously that they thought the regime was corrupt. 
As mentioned above, of the 39 interview subjects who answered the question whether the 
regime was corrupt, all 39 said the regime was corrupt. In addition to the 41 of 43 
respondents who blamed Ben Ali for the problems that led to the revolution, 17 interview 
subjects, or roughly 40 percent, said they blamed the Traboulsi clan. The Traboulsi clan 
represents a nearly perfect heuristic for corruption and nepotism, because Leila Traboulsi 
and her family were largely invisible in the political or security fields, but they were 
active and known nationwide in the economic sphere. Some interview subjects provided 
strong support for this aspect of the neo-patrimonial model through their descriptions of 
the regime as infected with nepotism, cronyism, and kleptocracy. Five interviewees used 
the word mafia to describe the regime. One used the term clientelism, and another 
explicitly mentioned nepotism. Two other interview subjects labeled the regime a 
kleptocracy. One interviewee said that corruption was “the core issue” of the broader 
public’s discontent. Sadok Ben Mhenni, an activist, journalist, and former political 
prisoner under Ben Ali’s predecessor, former President Habib Bourguiba, said that 
corruption of all types had taken on enormous dimensions in Tunisia before the Arab 
Spring revolution. Ben Mhenni added that even members of Ben Ali’s political party 
were beginning to clash with Ben Ali, because the intractable corruption was preventing 
development in so many fields. Here he brought up the crucial connection between the 
endemic corruption and the wider Tunisian economy: Because corruption had resulted in 
many individuals being blocked from participating in the economy as entrepreneurs, and 
  191 
because the existing economic institutions had been so thoroughly hollowed out by the 
gluttonous appetite of the Traboulsi clan and its tentacles, employment had become 
increasingly difficult to find, a problem felt more acutely by young people beginning 
their work lives.  
In Tunisia, this economic cleavage, characteristic of neo-patrimonialism, was 
divided largely along geographic lines, with the ruling coterie and its economic assets 
concentrated in coastal cities such as Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax, while the interior of the 
country was plagued by endemic poverty, most evident in the continuous dearth of 
employment opportunities. Interview data underscore the connection between corruption 
and the dismal economic situation in Tunisia’s rural interior, as a clear association exists 
in the interview data between where an interviewee resides and whether the interviewee 
blames the Traboulsi clan—that is, corruption—for the problems that plagued Tunisia. Of 
the 44 interview subjects, nine resided in the in the country’s interior region (Sidi Bouzid, 
Kasserine, and Gafsa), and six of these nine, or two-thirds, said that they blamed the 
Traboulsi clan for the issues that led to the revolution. Of the 33 interview subjects from 
the coastal regions who gave an answer regarding blaming the Traboulsis, 11 
respondents, or one-third, said that they blamed the Traboulsis. Still, interview subjects in 
Tunis and other coastal cities were well aware of the economic problems of the country’s 
interior. One interview subject from Tunis called poverty the biggest problem in Tunisia 
before the revolution. An interview subject from Kasserine recounted a litany of 
grievances that one would expect to hear from a local resident: poverty, joblessness, and 
oppression. Another interviewee from Kasserine said the interior region had been 
economically neglected by the nation’s rulers since the founding of modern Tunisia in 
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1956: “We believe it’s a catastrophic situation for people living here,” he said. An 
interview subject from Sidi Bouzid said that he believed that the origin of the revolution 
lay in socioeconomic issues and not in questions of individual freedoms. Another 
interview subject from Tunis echoed this same sentiment; the speaker was a leading 
member of the Lawyers’ Syndicate who helped craft several of the syndicate’s 
communiques during the revolution. He said that the revolution was founded on the lack 
of economic development in the interior. People there had been marginalized, he said, 
while freedom of expression was a concern for those of higher socioeconomic status—
not for the people of Sidi Bouzid. Sadok Ben Mhenni added that the economic and social 
neglect of the interior foretold an uprising. Throughout Tunisia’s history—in the eras of 
the Corsairs and the fight for independence, for example—political upheaval has always 
ignited in the interior regions, he said. Such unrest is typically repressed by the authority 
of the time, he added, but sometimes rebellions reach Tunis, which greatly increases a 
rebellion’s chances for success. 
 The interview subjects spoke in a unanimous voice: They found the Ben Ali 
regime profoundly corrupt, and they located the source of much of the corruption in the 
family of Leila Traboulsi. Interview data confirms neo-patrimonial theory’s prediction of 
a kleptocracy based on nepotism and cronyism. Interview subjects from the rural interior 
of Tunisia, which has traditionally been poorer than the coast, testified to experiencing 
economic exclusion and an economy so bad that it was perceived as a just cause for 
revolution. In quantitative terms, those with greater experience of this poverty, from the 
interior, also assessed greater blame for the revolution to the Traboulsi clan and, ipso 
facto, to corruption. The dynamics of Tunisia’s economy in the years before the 
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revolution clearly conform to the neo-patrimonial model, but they also suggest a revision 
to the theory. I would add to the theory a postulate that the revolutionary potential of the 
populace in a neo-patrimonial regime rises in tandem with the sum of the level of 
corruption (or perceived level of corruption) and either the presence of poverty, perhaps 
as measured by GDP per capita, or by measures of economic inequality such as the Gini 
coefficient. 
 
4.4 Findings and Discussion: Security Forces 
 Bellin (2004) labels the state’s coercive forces the foremost guarantor of a neo-
patrimonial regime. Security forces and the military are able and willing to crush any 
opposition to the regime (Bellin, 2004, p. 144). As mentioned in chapter 2, the coercive 
forces’ constant repression of the citizenry leads to widespread fear of the coercive 
apparatus. If the model’s predictions are accurate, the interview data should reveal 
extensive fears of the security forces, such as fear of surveillance, fear of expressing 
political views in person or online, fear of meeting for political purposes, or fear of taking 
public action to oppose the regime. Moreover, I would argue that the data on the use of 
frames related to the security forces and to the crackdown can be interpreted as evidence 
of the salience of this grievance, albeit with the foregoing caveat about the reliability of 
frames as an indicator of public sentiment. On a more basic level, however, the first place 
to look for evidence of the security forces’ repression is in the experiences of the 
organizers and participants, both before and during the revolution. Their experiences of 
repression should represent an accurate indicator of the robustness of the coercive forces. 
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 Because the coercive forces are a factor in the system of criminal justice or part of 
perceptions of justice generally, it’s worth repeating that all 44 interview subjects said 
that the regime was unjust. To be sure, the coercive forces are not the only factor 
influencing perceptions of justice, but the coercive forces’ activities certainly affect 
perceptions of the relative justness of a regime. One interview subject provided a pithy 
heuristic for the position of the coercive forces: “The regime is the police.” The interview 
data show that the coercive forces had long punished opposition to the regime. Of the 28 
interview subjects who were organizers during the revolution, six said that they had 
become active in the opposition because their family members had been imprisoned by 
the regime for political activities. While such limited data cannot provide a thorough 
account of the relationship between persecution by the regime and the future political 
activity of the victim or the victim’s family or acquaintances, the data do hint at a 
potential explanation for the weakness of neo-patrimonial regimes: The continual, cruel, 
and unjust repression of the population engenders deep and abiding grievances, which 
can provide a basis for subsequent anti-regime action, which I would also submit as an 
addition to the neo-patrimonial model. Brumberg (2011) partly blames the excesses of 
the security forces for the revolutions of the Arab Spring, and I’ll return to this point later 
in the section. In a pertinent anecdote, one interviewee said that she had felt like a slave 
under the Ben Ali regime because her sister, an activist, had been followed even in 
France by the Tunisian security forces, who made no effort to hide their identities as 
security officers even in a foreign country. 
 As evidence of the active and repressive work of the coercive forces, 14 of 44 
interview subjects (32 percent) reported that they had experienced persecution at the 
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hands of the security forces, whether arrest, harassment, beatings in public, or torture in 
detainment—and other interview subjects might also have had these experiences but not 
shared them during the interviews. As an example of the extent of the reach of the 
coercive forces, one organizer said that she had hosted meetings of activists in her 
apartment, so, in order to surveille her and her fellow activists, the Tunisian coercive 
forces rented out the apartment across the street from hers—in Paris. Another interviewee 
was stopped by police for serving as an interpreter for American researchers interviewing 
a Tunisian opposition leader. The blogger Lina Ben Mhenni and her father, Sadok, said 
that the coercive forces had broken into their family home in the summer of 2010 and 
stolen her computer, camera, and some jewelry. One interview subject reported that, 
shortly after he had interacted with Tunisian activists in his role as an information officer 
for the International Red Cross in Geneva, the coercive forces had bulldozed some shops 
belonging to his family in Menzah, an area of Tunis. Radhia Nasraoui, a human-rights 
lawyer and the spouse of former presidential candidate of the Workers’ Party Hamma 
Hammami, said that she bears a permanent scar on her forehead from a beating by police 
during a demonstration at the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Tunis in 
2005. Another interviewee said that he was arrested and beaten by the security forces, but 
he felt that he was spared worse persecution because he was a member of the one legal 
opposition party, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). This framing—that he could 
feel relatively protected from the wrath of the coercive forces while they beat him after 
arresting him—underscores the widely held beliefs about the horrors that the coercive 
forces were capable of inflicting if unrestrained. As further evidence of this belief, Lassad 
Bouazizi, Mohammed’s cousin, said that he, too, had joined the PDP to have protection 
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against regime retribution for his political activism. Even as a member of the PDP, he 
was still arrested repeatedly, he said.  
 Here I will present findings on persecution during the revolution, but it is 
important to understand that the actions of the coercive forces during the revolution did 
not constitute a separate episode of repression. Instead, the crackdown on the protests in 
2010-11 was just another instance of a practice that had persisted for decades. 
Uncompromising repression of dissent is a central feature of neo-patrimonial regimes 
(Bellin, 2004), and the violent crackdown on the demonstrations of 2010-11 is powerful 
evidence of the robustness of the coercive forces of the Ben Ali regime. On January 6, 
2011, the coercive forces targeted online activists by hacking into the activists’ emails 
and Facebook accounts and by arresting some of the most prominent online activists. Six 
interview subjects were arrested during the revolution, and a seventh barely escaped an 
attempt to arrest him. One interview subject was arrested on January 2, and he said that 
he was tortured by the coercive forces during his detention. Two interview subjects were 
arrested on January 6, as part of the wave of arrests of online activists. Skander Ben 
Hamda, known online as Bullet Skan, said that he was nearly tortured to death in the 
Interior Ministry. Sofiane Ben Haj M’Hamed, known online as Hamadi Kaloutcha, was 
also arrested on January 6, as was the leader of the Sousse branch of the student union 
UGET. The student leader said that he, too, was tortured. Members of the security forces 
arrived at the Tunis home of journalist Aymen Rezgui on January 6 to arrest him, but he 
escaped through a back door that the police did not know about, he said. Another activist 
reported that the police had wanted to arrest her on January 6, but she did not provide any 
evidence for her claim, so she is not counted among these seven. In addition, Mohammed 
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Bouazizi’s cousins Ali and Lassad Bouazizi said they were arrested on January 10 and 
beaten while in detention.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, many interview subjects deployed frames of 
the security forces and of the crackdown on protesters during the revolution. The 
previous chapter also discussed the costs of repression. Here I do not want to discuss the 
uses of those frames or the correlations between frames and interviewees, but rather how 
the uses of these frames reveal the relationship between the coercive forces and the 
regime. In all journalistic accounts and scholarly research on Tunisia’s Arab Spring 
revolution of which I am aware, there is a curious absence. To be sure, there is much 
evidence that many Tunisians were motivated at least partly to participate in 
demonstrations in response to the brutality of the coercive forces’ crackdown on the 
protests, but I have not seen any record of protesters making demands for reforms of the 
coercive forces. Instead, protesters in Tunisia coined and entrenched the phrase that 
became a slogan throughout the ensuing protests in other Middle Eastern and North 
African countries: The people want the fall of the regime. In other words, protesters 
understood the coercive forces and these forces’ repressive tactics as an embodiment of 
the regime itself. The actions of the coercive forces were not taken as a signal to demand 
reform or punishment of the coercive forces, but rather as a signal to make demands on 
the regime as a singular entity. The fact that the coercive forces appear to have been an 
equivalent substitute for the regime—whether as an object for framing by social-
movement actors or in the minds of citizens—builds a compelling case that the coercive 
forces were a central feature of the regime, as posited in neo-patrimonial theory.  
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One salient topic that emerged during data collection was fear of the coercive 
forces, as I discussed in the preceding chapter and will also address in the following 
chapter. Later in this section, I will discuss fear in examining the lack of political 
participation and in examining how the regime attempted to control new communication 
technologies, as further examples of the reach of fear. In this section, and in this chapter 
more broadly, the focus is the citizens’ fears of the regime’s coercive forces, which partly 
underlay both the framing and social-movement work discussed in the previous chapter, 
as well as the collective identity to be discussed in the following chapter. Interview 
subjects expressed not only fears of being surveilled by the coercive forces through 
personal email addresses, Facebook accounts, and cellphones, but they expressed fears of 
the coercive forces in nearly all areas of social interaction. Interviewees expressed fears 
that the coercive forces would monitor and punish speaking about politics on the phone, 
conversing about politics online, meeting in person for political reasons, or taking any 
form of political action. Not only were these fears of the coercive forces expressed, but 
interview subjects also said that fear of the security forces was a fundamental attribute of 
Tunisian society before the revolution. Hamadi Kaloutcha said that the regime had 
created a “virtual police in the head of every Tunisian.” Another interviewee called the 
dynamic a “cycle of fear”:  
I couldn’t express my opposition to the regime on Facebook during the 
revolution. Only towards the end that I was able, when I saw that my friends 
broke this cycle of fear. It’s all about fear. We lived with a regime that mastered 
so well social media that, if you wrote something against the regime, the next day 
you will have policemen coming to your door. 
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 One interview subject, the publisher Karim Ben Said, said that he was scared to 
talk politics even at home with friends before the revolution. He added that he and his 
friends so feared surveillance by the coercive forces that they would remove the SIM 
cards from their cellphones while meeting socially—even when none of them were 
members of the opposition. Interviewees also reported that they were afraid that the 
coercive forces were watching them online. One interview subject said that many 
Tunisians had created fake Facebook profiles in order to hide their identities. This 
interview subject said that this type of fear, which he described as a form of self-
censorship, was the biggest problem before the revolution. Interview subjects also 
reported that they were afraid to meet for political purposes. One interview subject said 
that he and his fellow activists used to whisper during their meetings, even in private 
homes, because they were so scared of being caught by the security forces. Many 
Tunisians were scared to participate in politics, because they feared the harsh punishment 
to be doled out by the coercive forces for such temerity, interview subjects said. Ali and 
Lassad Bouazizi said that even during the revolution, other activists were telling them to 
be careful, because their actions were inviting grave retribution by the coercive forces. 
The two said that they did not tell any journalists that they were helping lead the 
demonstrations in Sidi Bouzid, because they were so afraid of what would happen to 
them if they were arrested as leaders of such large-scale unrest.  
 In the preceding chapter, I discussed the topic of fear as a problem for social-
movement actors to solve. I will not repeat the data concerning fear and recount how the 
protesters overcame fear, but it is important to restate very briefly in this chapter the 
dynamic of fear during the revolution, in order to present complete findings about the 
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scope of Tunisians’ fears of the coercive forces. Organizers said that fear of retribution 
by the coercive forces inhibited citizens’ participation in the protests. One interview 
subject estimated that 80 percent of the population was simply too afraid to join the 
protests. One organizer said that he and his fellow activists believed that the coercive 
forces had attempted to infiltrate the demonstrations in Sidi Bouzid, so they lied to some 
individuals whom they did not trust and told them that the activists were not planning any 
protests. Organizers said they considered fear a problem to solve, in that fears of 
punishment by the coercive forces for political participation were deeply ingrained 
among citizens. One organizer said that fear was “the biggest enemy.” Without reiterating 
the data on the uses of the crackdown or the security forces for framing, I want to argue 
here that the use of the crackdown for framing does not represent a discrete phenomenon, 
related only to the events of December 2010 and January 2011, but rather that the uses of 
both the crackdown and the security forces as frames to motivate participation and attract 
newcomers serve as evidence that the grievances against the harsh and unjust repression 
practiced by the coercive forces were a long-standing feature of the Ben Ali regime. In 
other words, citizens’ anger and revulsion at the brutality of the coercive forces was not a 
spontaneous element of the revolution. Instead, the preceding decades of excessive 
punishment of dissent and even of mere political engagement—along with the other 
enduring grievances against the regime presented in this chapter—provide a 
parsimonious explanation for the outbreak of rebellion, as well as compelling evidence 
that the Ben Ali regime provides empirical support for the neo-patrimonial model. These 
findings also provide compelling evidence on which to create new praxis for social-
movement actors. As I mention in the following chapter, social-movement actors should 
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direct a substantial part of their framing practices toward overcoming fears of the 
coercive forces, along with constructing the other necessary elements of a shared protest 
identity. This is not a blanket recipe for revolution—as the examples of Bahrain and 
Syria demonstrate, even having a significant mass of anti-regime protesters is not enough 
to dislodge a neo-patrimonial regime, if the rebels are unable to overcome social 
cleavages, especially those of sectarian and/or clan affiliation in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Throughout this chapter, I move toward creating an addendum to the neo-
patrimonial model that I call authoritarian weakening, but I am reluctant to include any 
mention of the coercive forces in this theoretical scaffolding. Simply put, there are too 
many examples of authoritarian regimes in which robust and ruthless coercive forces 
appear able to kill, imprison, or exile enough opposition activists so that the only threat to 
these regimes’ stability has thus far come from either the death of the ruler (e.g., Franco 
in Spain) or the loss of the military’s loyalty (e.g., Mugabe in Zimbabwe). 
 There is overwhelming data supporting the hypothesis that a robust coercive 
apparatus was a prominent feature of the Ben Ali regime, as the theory of neo-
patrimonialism predicts. Bellin (2004) writes that one role for the coercive forces in a 
neo-patrimonial regime is to thwart any uprising, though the failures of regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria to prevent mass uprisings could serve 
as evidence that the coercive forces of neo-patrimonial regimes are not always successful 
in extinguishing outbursts of discontent. However, the regimes in Bahrain and Syria 
remain in place, offering wholly mixed evidence on the efficacy of regime repression. 
The next section, on civil society and depoliticization, will also reveal a similar dynamic: 
Even though the success of a popular revolution upends some of the assumptions of the 
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neo-patrimonial model, a successful revolution does not mean either that neo-patrimonial 
theory is somehow invalidated or that the regimes lately overthrown did not accord to the 
model. Neo-patrimonial theory was developed largely to explain why and how these 
Middle Eastern regimes remained immune to the third wave of democratization, 
embodied in the collapse in 1989 of totalitarian regimes in Soviet satellite states. 
Brownlee, who did much to elaborate neo-patrimonial theory, gave his 2007 book a title 
that epitomizes this framing: Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. However, 
the theory never claims that these regimes would plod on interminably or that they were 
frozen in a sort of apolitical amber, impervious to any change whatsoever. Heydemann 
(2007) builds his concept of authoritarian upgrading on the important changes that took 
place in neo-patrimonial regimes in the years preceding the Arab Spring, and my concept 
of authoritarian weakening also acknowledges the shifting dynamics of neo-patrimonial 
regimes. In the following section, I will explore and build theory regarding one of these 
significant changes, the modest opening given by the regime to civil society.  
 
4.5 Findings and Discussion: Depoliticization and Civil Society 
 In delineating the model of neo-patrimonialism, Brumberg (2002) and 
Heydemann (2007) describe how authoritarian regimes adapted to external political and 
economic pressures by allowing a degree of political contestation, albeit one tightly 
circumscribed and fiercely policed by the coercive forces. For many decades preceding 
this minimal opening at the outset of the 21st century, a large majority of citizens under 
the rule of Arab despots had been depoliticized (Brumberg, 2002; Heydemann, 2007). 
The model of neo-patrimonialism predicts that the data should show some limited 
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participation in nascent civil society alongside broad depoliticization, with swift and 
severe punishment for overstepping the narrow boundaries of political engagement—and 
a concomitant fear of transgressing these limits. Specifically, my hypothesis is that 
interview subjects would have a modest degree of involvement with formal structures 
such as unions, professional associations, the legal opposition party, and NGOs, but 
activists would be likely to have nearly as much experience in being persecuted by the 
coercive forces for their activism as they would have in activism. The population of the 
revolution’s organizers is not representative of Tunisian society as a whole, but even a 
greater degree of political activism among this population would not be dispositive of 
neo-patrimonialism, as long as they confirm the depoliticization of the general populace, 
have experience of repression, and recount an atmosphere of fear of political 
participation. In regard to fear and the role of the coercive forces, I would point the reader 
to the preponderance of evidence in the previous section that most Tunisians were afraid 
of engaging in political activities because of the potential retribution of the coercive 
forces. In this section, I will briefly discuss fear again, but only to explain its relationship 
to the depoliticization of Tunisian society before the Arab Spring revolution. Before 
examining the findings, I want to reiterate that the data below were collected without the 
help of any questions on the interview questionnaire that directly probed their 
experiences as activists before the revolution. One question asked why that individual 
had become an organizer, but the questionnaire did not ask for any evaluations of civil 
society or of relative levels of politicization among the citizenry. Interviewees 
volunteered this information during follow-up questions or during the semi-structured 
parts of the interviews. 
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 The previous section established the dominant role of the coercive forces in 
constricting political participation of any sort, as well as the climate of fear that prevailed. 
One participant clearly expressed the relationship that this dynamic had to the emaciation 
of civil society in Tunisia. He said that neither he nor most people whom he knew had 
any interest in politics, largely because of the fear of retribution for political expression: 
“Before the revolution, we never spoke of politics. We never spoke of them. You cannot. 
We don’t have the right. You are afraid to say anything.” One organizer said that the 
revolution was a political awakening for many Tunisians, because so many young people 
had been afraid of involvement in politics. Interviewees frequently said that the mass of 
Tunisian citizens, including those who participated in the revolution, lacked an 
articulated set of political beliefs. In discussing whether what they saw on Facebook fit 
with their values, beliefs, and ideology, many interview subjects said that they did not see 
on Facebook any ideology per se; they saw no mentions of political parties or any 
systems of political beliefs, whether democracy, Islamism, or communism. To fill out this 
picture of a depoliticized society in Tunisia, the two interview subjects who were 
members of Tunisia’s leading Islamist party, En-Nehda, said that the domestic population 
was depoliticized, but there were many Tunisians who had been politically active but 
were at the time of the revolution living in exile outside the country. In much the same 
way as fear was perceived by social-movement actors, the depoliticization of society was 
also considered by social-movement actors as a given and as a problem that they needed 
to solve. Bullet Skan said that, to raise awareness of the problem, he and his fellow 
activists in Takriz made a series of videos to call out citizens for their apathy and 
inaction. Another organizer said that he and his fellow organizers made a strategic choice 
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to use the coercive forces’ crackdown as a frame, because the activists believed that the 
population had been so depoliticized for decades that activists could not use political 
arguments. The quantitative data on interview subjects’ levels of political interest adds 
evidence for the depoliticization of the population before the revolution, in terms of 
interviewees’ low levels of participation in civic organizations. On a Likert scale of 1 to 
5, where 5 stood for high interest in politics, the mean for the 43 subjects who answered 
this question was 4.75, and 38 of the 43 respondents rated their interest as a 5. The 
sample of organizers, as stated previously, was not representative, and most organizers 
had years of experience as activists. Many of the participants joined civil society after the 
revolution; for example, three participants became journalists. And yet, despite these high 
levels of political interest, only four interview subjects belonged to groups that were 
operating legally within civil society. Three more were members of banned political 
parties, two others were members of Takriz, the online activist collective, and one 
interviewee was a member of a football fan club. In other words, among a sample of 
individuals with exceptionally high levels of political interest, including 18 individuals 
who helped organize protests during the revolution, fewer than 25 percent of this sample 
had had any pre-revolution experience in political engagement, and roughly only 10 
percent had had formal participation in the institutions of civil society.  
 Another finding about political experience emerged from the interview data, and 
this finding enables the crafting of new theory: Despite the depoliticization of the 
majority of Tunisian society, the space granted to civil society provided years of training 
for activists in social-movement skills and in using new communication technologies. 
Even something as apparently banal as the use of code words during conversations 
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between activists represents a form of training. When the revolution came, various groups 
of activists had already developed sets of code words that they could deploy to subvert 
potential surveillance by the coercive forces. In addition, at least a dozen organizers 
recounted the events of the miners’ strike in the Gafsa region in 2008 as a seminal 
moment for the opposition. Miners, their families, and unemployed graduates conducted 
a series of sit-ins and protests beginning in January 2008 in the town of Redeyef in the 
Gafsa region; after the protests turned violent in April, the coercive forces brutally 
cracked down on the protests, and intermittent clashes lasted until July, when the regime 
extinguished the unrest (Gobe, 2010). Crucially, the conflict remained confined to the 
Gafsa region, as the protests did not take root in the coastal cities (Gobe, 2010). As an 
illustration of the significance of this episode, one participant said, “The real revolution 
started in 2008 in Gafsa.” An organizer said that he had established his Facebook account 
solely because of the Gafsa protests, and those protests were the only topic of his posts at 
the time. An organizer from Tunis offered a connection between Gafsa and the 
accumulation of protest know-how: She said that her first experience in demonstrations 
had been in 2008, and she had been learning the techniques of political activism since 
that time. Regarding new communication technologies, another organizer said that she 
had organized many demonstrations before the revolution erupted, so she and her fellow 
activists already had created a practice for sharing event information on Facebook. All 
these elements are tied together by the organizer who was the leader in Sousse of the 
student union, UGET, which was one of the few civil society organizations tolerated by 
the regime. He said that the government blocked his Facebook page during the protests in 
Gafsa in 2008, and he said that it was the first Facebook page ever blocked by the 
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government in Tunisia. After his page was blocked, he called the Tunis-based activist 
Azyz Amami, who put him in touch with the international hacktivist collective 
Anonymous, and Anonymous was able to restore his access to and the public’s access to 
his Facebook page. In other words, he gained experience during the Gafsa protests, and 
he had also learned the skills to deploy new communication technologies for the tasks of 
social movements. His experiences during the Gafsa protests shed light on how activists 
learned from these early forays into civil society. For example, UGET held a meeting 
after the Gafsa protests ended, in order to examine why the protests had failed to spread 
nationwide and to consider how UGET members could have helped the movement 
spread, he said. From December 17, 2010, the day of the first protest in Sidi Bouzid, he 
said, he and many other activists worked to help the demonstrations expand to other 
locations. Once protests had begun in 2010, UGET held a strategy meeting for its 
leadership that lasted six hours, because there was disagreement among the activists 
about whether the protests would remain confined locally, as in Gafsa in 2008, or 
whether the protests had the potential to grow. This history demonstrates the importance 
of Gafsa as a pivotal learning experience for many of the future leaders of the revolution. 
Specifically, this history exemplifies how Gafsa and similar events taught activists how 
to deploy digital communication technologies and how to develop and pursue strategies 
to turn isolated outbursts of anti-regime hostility into sustained, nationwide protest, 
despite the continuous threat of retribution by the regime. Ali and Lassad Bouazizi 
recounted a similar history of how they cultivated their knowledge of social-movement 
practices in the years before they deployed this know-how after their cousin’s suicide. 
They mentioned repeatedly their earlier membership in the PDP, the only legal 
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opposition party, as well as their activism in the years before the revolution. They 
presented their shared activist history as evidence of their hard-won credibility among the 
people of Sidi Bouzid. To restate a point made above in this chapter, they were also 
arrested repeatedly in the years before the revolution, and they were detained and beaten 
during the revolution. When they began fomenting protest after their cousin’s self-
immolation, they already had a wealth of experience in organizing techniques. 
 The interview data firmly support the theory of neo-patrimonialism’s predictions 
about the political engagement of the Tunisian population. Even though Brumberg (2002) 
provides a compelling account of the narrow remit given to civil society by neo-
patrimonial regimes, he seems to have made an error in assigning Tunisia to his category 
of total autocracy, in which a regime brooks no political contestation whatsoever. In his 
potential defense, he was writing in 2002, before the Gafsa protests of 2008 and before 
the beginnings of political involvement among nearly all of these interview subjects. 
Many scholars of the region seem to have made the mistake before the Arab Spring of 
focusing their analyses too narrowly on the practices of the regimes and their inner circles 
of elites and coercive forces, as Valbjorn (2014) later concludes. Such scholars accurately 
assessed the bulk of the populations under neo-patrimonial regimes as depoliticized, but 
the data in this dissertation show that scholars perhaps viewed these populations as static 
and that scholars did not find or accord enough importance to the worsening grievances 
of the people, or to the increasing skills of the small population of political activists, such 
as their adoption of new communication technologies. Valbjorn (2014) writes that there 
were some scholars, generally those without extensive influence, who at least focused on 
the growing discord between state and society, though even these scholars did not express 
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any expectation of regional upheaval. In assessing the Arab Spring revolutions with the 
benefit of hindsight, Hinnebusch (2015a) succinctly anticipates the findings of my 
interview data concerning Tunisian civil society at the outset of the revolution: “But civil 
society was much more advanced in Egypt and Tunisia because the early onset of 
neoliberalism had both necessitated greater tolerance for it and had also led to years of 
protest experience by activists that generated organizational skills and networks that 
would be crucial in the uprisings” (p. 211). I would add that these Tunisian activists 
earned their know-how while under the constant surveillance and persecution of the 
coercive forces, and for years their efforts had come to naught, partly because of the 
political apathy and fears of the vast majority of their compatriots. Despite this proviso, 
this social-movement know-how constitutes the basis for another element of my theory of 
authoritarian weakening. Even though neo-patrimonial regimes can tightly restrict the 
range of operations for civil society, the experiences and skills that individuals can 
develop in the institutions of civil society—whether political parties, unions and other 
professional associations, NGOs, and other civic associations—present a potential source 
of regime weakness regardless of the repressive work of the coercive forces, because the 
practices of civil society institutions are identical in most respects with the practices of 
political organizing and social movements. As a corollary, the larger the institutions of 
civil society grow, and the longer that the actors in civil society work—and thus develop 
their skills—the greater the revolutionary potential in a neo-patrimonial state. An 
analogous dynamic exists in the field of communication technologies, which I will 
discuss next. 
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4.6 Findings and Discussion: Regime Control of New Communication Technologies 
Heydemann (2007) outlines how neo-patrimonial regimes worked to control new 
communication technologies in the years before the Arab Spring revolutions: As these 
authoritarian regimes opened ever so slightly to the outside world, they allowed the 
introduction and spread of various digital communication technologies, but the regimes 
sought to maintain firm control over the citizens’ uses of the technologies. As shown in 
the preceding chapter, organizers and participants in the revolution used these new 
technologies effectively to deploy mediated frames, but this does not disprove the 
validity of the neo-patrimonial model. The model postulates that these regimes would 
strive to exert control over the technologies, not that the regimes would always and 
forever succeed. The interview data show conclusively that the Ben Ali regime had for 
years clamped down on the use of new communication technologies for the purposes of 
political dissent. The regime surveilled and hacked the communication tools of activists, 
and it persecuted the individuals who pursued political activism through new 
communication technologies. The data also show that interview subjects were afraid to 
use new communication technologies (and some older ones) and that many interviewees 
avoided using communication technologies because of pervasive state control, but the 
data also show that, during the years leading up to the revolution, citizens also gained 
experiences in successfully eluding the state’s panopticon. Before exploring the data, I 
want to note that the interview questionnaire did not ask any questions regarding state 
control of communication technologies, so there is no quantitative data in this area that 
would cover all 44 interview subjects. All information in this section was given either as 
part of answers to other questions or during the semi-structured parts of the interviews. 
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 Because these findings concern new communication technologies, they will not 
include instances of regime surveillance of telephones. It bears noting, however, that 
several interviewees said that their telephones were monitored by the government. For 
instance, Aymen Rezgui, a journalist at the newsmagazine Tariq al-Jdid, said that when 
he used his phone to arrange a meeting, the police would frequently arrive at the meeting 
location before he did. As for digital communication technologies, he reported that the 
regime blocked both his blog and his Facebook page. Many respondents said that the 
regime had blocked their Facebook pages; in the previous section, I presented the finding 
that the UGET leader in Sousse said that the government had blocked his Facebook page 
in the spring of 2008, which he said made it the first Facebook page blocked in Tunisia. 
This history demonstrates that the state was working to control the use of Facebook 
relatively soon after its introduction in Tunisia. Interview subjects also reported that the 
regime had blocked their blogs and their organizations’ websites, had hacked their email 
accounts, and cut off their internet connections. As mentioned in the section on the 
coercive forces, Lina Ben Mhenni and her father, Sadok, said that the coercive forces had 
broken into their home and stolen her computer and camera around the time of the May 
2010 demonstrations against censorship. One organizer’s relationship to regime control 
over communication technologies is perhaps instructive: She said that she used to read 
the blog of a well-known cyber-dissident, Fatima Arabbica, but the regime blocked the 
blog and arrested Arabbica. The organizer said that she helped campaign for the 
blogger’s release, after which Arabbica’s subsequent blog was also blocked. As a result, 
the organizer said, she started her own blog. 
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 During the revolution, these regime practices continued. On the day that 
Mohammed Bouazizi immolated himself, his cousin Lassad spoke on the telephone with 
the Tunis-based journalist Zouhair Makhlouf to tell the journalist about the demonstration 
in Sidi Bouzid. Makhlouf was arrested at his home shortly after he got off the phone with 
Lassad Bouazizi. This story involves an older communication technology, but it serves 
well to tie together the ceaseless repression by the coercive forces, the regime’s continual 
surveillance of communication technologies new and old, and the regime’s work to 
severely limit the space for political contestation, all of which supply abundant evidence 
to fill out the contours of the neo-patrimonial model. During the revolution, the regime 
blocked YouTube, as a majority of the interview subjects confirmed. Lina Ben Mhenni 
said that the regime shut down her Facebook and Twitter accounts. Other organizers 
reported similar regime interventions, and Hamadi Kaloutcha’s experiences during the 
revolution provide rich data about the regime’s attempts to control new communication 
technologies. Kaloutcha explained that, before the revolution, many opposition activists 
had set up blogs on BlogSpot, but the regime was easily able to block or disable a single, 
unique URL. Facebook represented a greater challenge for the regime’s censors, because 
the site or even individual pages were not as easy to block, even though the regime did 
occasionally manage it. He shared on Facebook some content from blogs, such as 
Nawaat, that had been blocked by the regime during the revolution. Once Nawaat was 
back online, Nawaat published his original content from Facebook, such as analyses that 
he had written about material that had been on Nawaat before Nawaat was blocked. To be 
sure, this is complicated and somewhat circular, but it supports one of Kaloutcha’s 
contentions: He said that much of his time was spent on cyberwar with the regime. In my 
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view, when Tunisians were using Facebook and other new communication technologies 
to deploy mediated frames about the Arab Spring uprising, they were also counteracting 
the regime’s attempts to censor, limit, and control the digital space for communication. 
As support for this view, Kaloutcha also added that government censorship had 
contributed greatly to the development of online dissent. In the preceding chapter, I wrote 
about the costs of repression, and Kaloutcha is expressing this idea in terms of 
communication technologies: The regime clearly believed that it was acting in its 
interests by suppressing the use of new communication technologies for political dissent, 
but, in doing so, the regime incurred the cost of drawing greater attention to—and 
potentially making more alluring—these same technologies. This is one of the elements 
of authoritarian weakening, on which I will expand at the end of this section. 
Kaloutcha’s digital dexterity also invites discussion of how activists refined 
techniques for evading government control, a learning process analogous to the 
development of social-movement skills by activists during the first years that they were 
able to engage in the practices of civil society. Before examining the findings in this area, 
I want to mention two other reactions to the regime’s relentless attempts to control the 
use of new communication technologies. One is the fear of using new technologies, such 
as the fear of using email or even the fear of using the internet, both of which were 
expressed by multiple interviewees. This chapter has extensively interrogated the topic of 
fear, so this fear of using new communication technologies aligns perfectly with the 
findings of fear of the coercive forces in general, fear of expressing political views, and 
fear of engaging in political activity. The second reaction is avoidance. Even though 
interview subjects were not directly asked about fear of using email, many said they had 
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avoided using email for fear of regime surveillance: Of the 35 interviewees who gave an 
answer about whether they had used email, only 17 said that they had used email during 
the revolution for activities related to the revolution. One could argue that this relative 
lack of email use can be explained by the primacy of Facebook, but it could just as 
compellingly be argued that the greater use of Facebook can be partly explained by the 
fear of using email. In any case, the fact that many interview subjects reported fears of 
using email and other internet sites also demonstrates the existence of citizens’ beliefs 
that the government surveilled and punished the use of new communication technologies 
for political contestation. This is a powerful example of state control, in the sense that the 
regime determined the actions of citizens through instances of repression and through 
beliefs about regime surveillance and control.  
 Because the regime so vigilantly controlled the uses of new communication 
technologies, activists created several methods to evade the regime’s capabilities to 
surveille them. It’s worth noting here the frequent use of code words in telephone 
conversations, because this tactic for stymieing surveillance is not only analogous to 
tactics online, but also because this long-standing pattern of evasive techniques provides 
stronger evidence for the neo-patrimonial model as a system of omnipresent repression, 
including tight limits on civil society, on the uses of new communication technologies, 
and on any potential means for opposition. At least five organizers said that they and their 
fellow activists had constructed systems of code words to allow them to discuss 
organizing tasks without using any terms that might divulge important information to any 
members of the coercive forces who might be monitoring the conversations. Regarding 
the online milieu, organizers said that they learned to create their own websites to evade 
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regime detection. They learned to use hotspots to upload videos from the protests during 
the revolution, and they used virtual private networks, or VPNs, and proxies to get access 
to the internet and to content blocked in Tunisia. Many interview subjects recounted 
using proxies to keep their internet use anonymous. Two participants gave an unexpected 
account of how they and their friends had learned to use proxies before the revolution: 
porn sites. Tunisia had long blocked access to pornography websites, so many citizens 
learned to use proxies—these two participants emphasized the thorough dissemination of 
such knowledge among young Tunisian men—and they then deployed this know-how 
during the revolution for political purposes. Bullet Skan, one of the leaders of the Takriz 
online collective, also presented detailed evidence of the widespread tactics to evade 
regime detection online. He said that members of Takriz and the Tunisian Pirate Party 
purchased thousands of USB sticks and downloaded the anonymizing Tor browser onto 
them, along with directions written in the Tunisian dialect of Arabic. They then gave 
away the USB sticks for free in public places and in schools, to allow citizens uninhibited 
access to the internet. “That was an amazing experience. You touch freedom,” he said. 
 In the years before the revolution, the Ben Ali regime had an extensive history of 
aggressive intervention to control new communication technologies, including hacking 
email addresses and blocking blogs, Facebook pages, and organizational websites, as the 
neo-patrimonial model would predict. During the revolution, the regime continued to try 
to maintain control over these new technologies, for example by blocking YouTube, but 
the citizens were generally able to use the internet freely. One major explanation for this 
freedom was the know-how developed by political activists and non-activists to evade 
regime control during the preceding years. In other words, the regime conformed to the 
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neo-patrimonial model, but the model did not account for the agency of the citizenry in 
subverting the state’s intentions, even if the citizens’ actions were not primarily 
concerned with politics (i.e., many citizens were primarily concerned with pornography). 
As one interviewee summed up Ben Ali’s efforts to control Facebook during the 
revolution, “He couldn’t control it. He did everything to control it, and it went out of 
control.” To connect this attribute of the neo-patrimonial model with the findings from 
the previous chapter, I see the state’s failure to control new communication technologies 
as a crucial reason why the state also lost the ability to control the construction of the 
meaning of events during the revolution. I’ll address this topic again in the concluding 
chapter, but this section demonstrates, in any case, that the actions of the Ben Ali regime 
accord precisely with the neo-patrimonial model. Even though the citizens succeeded in 
gaining largely unfettered access to the internet and gaining control over the creation of 
internet content during the Arab Spring, the regime never stopped trying to exert control 
over these technologies. These findings also offer compelling evidence for the creation of 
new theory. Much akin to the relationship between neo-patrimonial regimes and civil 
society, once regimes allow for the entry—however minimal—of new communication 
technologies, citizens can gain experiences and skills that represent increased potential 
for opposition and rebellion, and thus the weakening of such a regime. Moreover, new 
communication technologies also represent revolutionary potential, in that social-
movement actors can learn to use these technologies to construct and deploy an 
alternative narrative of the lived experiences in that nation.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
The interview data provide compelling support for the validity of neo-patrimonial 
theory and for the hypothesis that the Ben Ali regime was an example of a neo-
patrimonial regime. The data also provide rich answers to the research question about the 
kinds of grievances that the revolution’s organizers and participants held against the Ben 
Ali regime. Grievances against the state were long-standing and deep-seated. More 
importantly, interview data show that these grievances focused on the regime as 
profoundly corrupt and unjust, based on a kleptocratic dynamic that enriched Ben Ali’s 
wife and her family while keeping much of the Tunisian citizenry trapped in grinding 
poverty. The data also provide a preponderance of evidence of widespread fear and 
hatred of the coercive forces, along with a wide variety of firsthand experiences with 
several categories of repressive actions by the coercive forces, including surveillance, 
harassment, harassment of family members, arrest, and torture. The data also offer a 
confirmation of the neo-patrimonial model in terms of the lack of political engagement of 
Tunisian society: Interviewees attested that the vast majority of Tunisians were 
depoliticized, frequently because of fear of the coercive forces’ retribution for dissent, 
while some activists were able to engage in the practices of civil society in a thoroughly 
circumscribed manner. The interview data resolutely confirm that the regime worked to 
control access to new communication technologies, particularly through hacking email 
addresses and websites, blocking access to various content, and persecution of those 
using new communication technologies for political purposes. To sum up, I found that 
the model of neo-patrimonialism, as articulated by Brownlee (2002), Brumberg (2002, 
2011), Bellin, (2004), and Heydemann (2007), accurately explained, described, and 
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predicted the actions of the Ben Ali regime, as well as citizens’ beliefs about and feelings 
toward the regime. 
 Not only do the data align precisely with the attributes and predictions of the neo-
patrimonial model, but the data and the model provide a parsimonious explanation why 
the Tunisian populace rebelled against the regime in late 2010. Grievances festered and 
metastasized at elite corruption and at the concomitant economic hardship of the people. 
The data show that some organizers began actively opposing the regime because the 
coercive forces had persecuted their families. On the topic of the coercive forces, I would 
also argue that the needlessly murderous response of the coercive forces to the outbreak 
of protests in December 2010 both accords with what the neo-patrimonial model would 
predict and partly explains why the protests turned into a mass, nationwide uprising. As a 
sliver of the population was allowed by the regime to participate in minimal political 
contestation and civil society, these individuals—many of them organizers in this 
dissertation’s sample—learned the techniques for social-movement success: organizing, 
protesting, and framing, for example. Despite vigorous efforts by the regime to control 
new communication technologies, the data show that many Tunisians learned numerous 
techniques to evade state attempts at control. The model elaborates a compelling recipe 
for revolution, so one might find some irony in the fact that the neo-patrimonial model 
was largely articulated to explain the seemingly unthreatened persistence of authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa after the wave of democratization that began 
in 19896.  
                                                 
6 See Bellin (2004) for an example of this approach; see Valbjorn (2014) for an account and a 
critique of the development of this approach. 
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Writing after the Arab Spring revolutions, Valbjorn (2014) argues that the work 
before the Arab Spring to elucidate the neo-patrimonial model focused too narrowly on 
the persistence of the regimes, whereas this scholarship could have presented the model’s 
traits as areas of potential future weakness, instead of framing them as the guarantors of 
unshakable stability. Throughout this chapter, I have helped to fill this gap in the theory 
with my concept of authoritarian weakening, which I will summarize in the following 
paragraph. My interview data point toward some reasons for the revolution in the terms 
of political science, and these data clearly support Valbjorn’s critique that the neo-
patrimonial model was flawed in attributing too much persistence, stability, and strength 
to such regimes. The data also support a second critique of the field articulated by 
Valbjorn (2014): While many scholars of the region were contributing important work on 
the mechanisms of governance and repression, the scholars paid relatively less attention 
to the actions of individual citizens. Perhaps this was an overcorrection to the previous 
phase of scholarship, during which much research in the years following 1989 examined 
the shoots and buds of would-be democracy, which were sparse and never seemed to bear 
fruit. Whatever the explanation, there was clearly a blind spot in the scholarship on the 
region—the neo-patrimonial model describes these regimes perfectly, but my data show 
that scholars were not paying enough attention to the beliefs held by and the skills being 
developed by the citizens of these regimes, in particular the work being done by political 
activists. The actions and the fundamental agency of citizens are the foundations that 
underlie much of my concept of authoritarian weakening. In general, scholars of the 
region and of political science should be wary of state-centered theories and of models 
that do not devote consideration to the agency and actions of the citizenry. 
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Heydemann (2007) contributed, in my view, an accurate and important update to 
the model with his concept of authoritarian upgrading, which I have used as a template 
for my concept of authoritarian weakening. Heydemann attributed five practices to neo-
patrimonial regimes in the 21st century; one of the five relates to foreign policy, so my 
data are silent in this field, but I have built new theory in the other four areas that he 
identified: capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms, managing political 
contestation, appropriating and containing civil societies, and controlling new 
communications technologies. Regarding economic reforms, I have shown that the 
kleptocratic nature of the Ben Ali regime, based on the nepotism, cronyism, and rampant 
corruption typical for the neo-patrimonial model, destroyed support for the regime among 
much of the population. Public support for a neo-patrimonial regime tends to weaken in 
direct proportion to the level of corruption and to the presence of poverty, income 
inequality, or the perceived economic hardship of the mass of the citizenry. As for 
political contestation, the success of the coercive forces in managing political 
contestation and in suppressing opposition—and the continued loyalty of the coercive 
forces to the ruler—appear to the be the key determinants of regime survival. Nepstad 
(2013) outlines this dynamic well, and my data add that public support for a neo-
patrimonial regime weakens when citizens overcome their fears of the coercive forces. 
Political contestation also encompasses the operations of civil society, and my data show 
that the experiences and skills gained by civil-society actors can potentially weaken a 
neo-patrimonial regime, because these individuals represent a competing power center in 
contentious politics. Analogously, the experiences and skills gained by citizens in 
deploying new communication technologies for political purposes can potentially weaken 
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a neo-patrimonial regime, because these individuals have the capability to construct and 
deploy alternative narratives that can help coalitions of citizens to coalesce in opposition 
to the regime. The principles of authoritarian weakening are predictive only in the sense 
that they predict the weakening of a regime, not its imminent or inevitable demise. I was 
careful to describe the weakening of the regime as potential, in the sense of energy 
potential that can be unleashed under the proper conditions. This is potential energy, 
potential weakness, and that potential may go untapped—simply introducing some civil 
society institutions or new communication technologies does not automatically weaken a 
neo-patrimonial regime. On the contrary, many authoritarian regimes have expended 
tremendous energy to use the introduction of new communication technologies in order 
to strengthen the regime and weaken its perceived enemies (for a review, see Morozov, 
2011). Still, neo-patrimonial regimes can be toppled by citizen-led revolutions, as 
happened during the Arab Spring, and in the following chapter I will present my data on 
the process of revolution in Tunisia. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REVOLUTION THEORY 
5.1 Introduction 
 The Arab Spring brought about the downfall of regimes in five countries, and 
protests shook most other Arab-majority states, so scholars of revolution have taken a 
keen interest in these uprisings. The ambit of revolution theory is far broader than the 
confines of this dissertation, but the theory’s concepts of protest identity and 
revolutionary ideology are closely linked to the construction and deployment of mediated 
frames, and in this chapter I build theory in both fields by interrogating this connection. 
As stated in the literature review, Goldstone (2001) defines protest identity as “a sense of 
being part of a group with shared and justified grievances, with the ability to remedy 
those grievances by collective action” (p. 153). In fourth-generation revolution theory, a 
participant in collective action develops a protest identity from three sources: 
participation in a formal or informal group that validates the individual’s grievances; a 
sense of empowerment and agency from participation; and a feeling that the regime 
considers the individual’s protest group as an enemy of the regime. The interview 
questionnaire included questions that examined each of these three sources. Goldstone 
(2001) also postulates that most participants in a revolution adhere to a revolutionary 
ideology, a system of beliefs about the uprising that should accomplish three goals: “(a) 
inspire a broad range of followers by resonating with existing cultural guideposts, (b) 
provide a sense of inevitability and destiny about its followers’ success, and (c) persuade 
people that the existing authorities are unjust and weak” (p. 156). The interview 
questionnaire also included questions to collect data on each of these three points. To 
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clarify the difference between these two similar concepts, protest identity largely relates 
to individuals’ feelings: feelings of identification with fellow protesters, feelings of 
agency, and feelings of enemy standing vis a vis a regime. Revolutionary ideology 
largely relates to individuals’ beliefs: beliefs in resonance with a cultural framework, 
beliefs in success, and beliefs about the regime. This chapter will present and discuss the 
data on these six important points of revolution theory, and the chapter is split into two 
parts, the first covering protest identity, and the second covering revolutionary ideology. 
The data thoroughly accord with the predictions of the fourth generation of revolution 
theory, and I build new theory in the field by redefining the attributes of revolutionary 
ideology and by bringing together concepts from the field and from framing theory. 
   
5.2 Findings and Discussion: Protest Identity 
 To begin the discussion of the three sources of protest identity, I want to examine 
the data that might superficially present contradictory evidence. Of the three sources of 
protest identity, the problem of group participation and validation of grievances 
represents the most nuanced phenomenon, because of the historical background of 
Tunisia’s revolution. Of the 43 interviewees who responded to the question whether they 
were members of a group that played a role in the revolution, 12 responded affirmatively. 
A 28-percent rate of participation might seem to be weak evidence for the presence of 
protest identity, given that one of the three sources of protest identity is a feeling of 
validation through group participation. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, 
civil society was enfeebled by the Ben Ali regime, as is typical in neo-patrimonial states 
(Heydemann, 2007). There was one legal opposition party, the PDP, and a smattering of 
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unions and professional organizations. Under conditions in which citizens faced 
considerable difficulties even finding a political group to join, a 28-percent participation 
rate might appear more substantial. Moreover, the 12 affirmative responses represent 11 
separate groups, ranging from a soccer fan club7 to the Lawyers’ Syndicate. Even if one 
accepts that 28 percent signifies a low rate of participation in formal groups, I would 
argue that this finding does not contradict the formation of protest identity. Goldstone 
(2001) carefully defines this first source of protest identity as participation in a protest 
group that helps to justify and validate the individual’s grievances (p. 153). The protest 
group in Tunisia’s Arab Spring was not any formal civic association, but rather the group 
of citizens who took to the streets in 2010-11 to protest against the Ben Ali regime. 
To explore interview subjects’ feelings about their participation in the protest 
group, the interview questionnaire asked interview subjects to what extent they identified 
with the people present at the demonstrations that the subjects attended. Of the 40 
interviewees who responded to this question, 38 said they identified with the other people 
present at the protests. This is robust evidence that these individuals possessed a protest 
identity in the sense of Goldstone’s definition. Interviewees described a feeling of unity 
among the protesters. One interview subject described the atmosphere as “more of a hope 
thing that you feel spreading among the Tunisian nation that was divided, and now it’s 
coming together.” An interviewee from Sidi Bouzid said, “We were united. We had a 
force. We were strong.” Two interview subjects told anecdotes from separate 
demonstrations in Tunis, during each of which an individual expressed Islamist views 
                                                 
7 Many soccer fan clubs were early and enthusiastic participants in the revolution; they participated in and 
organized protests throughout the country. See, e.g., Lim, 2013. 
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and was forced by fellow demonstrators to stop. How one interviewee presented his 
anecdote is telling:  
There is one guy who just screamed ‘Allahu akbar!’ Everybody turned to him and 
say to him, like, ‘No, this is not … our case. If you want to go scream that, you go 
scream it away. We are here against the regime, so your ideology—you can do it 
at home.’ It was like a spontaneous reaction, and everyone approved that reaction. 
In other words, the demonstrators were not atheists or even opponents of political Islam, 
but rather they possessed a coherent, shared identity of protest: “‘We are here against the 
regime.’” This position perfectly captures a protest identity as validation of grievance, 
because the unifying identity of these protests was the expression of shared grievances 
against the regime by a group of citizens. 
 Regarding the second source of protest identity—a feeling of agency of 
empowerment—interviewees gave a near-unanimous confirmation of feelings of agency. 
Interview subjects were asked whether their participation in the protests gave them a 
feeling of empowerment or agency, and their answers were coded on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 representing the strongest feeling of agency. Of the 34 
responses to this question, 28 responses (82.4 percent) were coded as a 58. The mean 
response was 4.4, and only five interviewees (14.7 percent) gave answers that were coded 
as a 1 or a 2. The data show that a predominant majority of interviewees felt a powerful 
sense of agency. This sense of agency is that much more striking in light of the decades 
                                                 
8 There was a strong association between reporting a feeling of agency and having voted in the last election. 
Of the six interviewees whose answers to the question about agency were not coded as a 5, only two voted 
in the last election. Of the 28 interviewees whose answers were coded as a 5, 25 voted in the last election (p 
= .001). This correlation could provide interesting hypotheses for researchers in civic engagement about the 
relationships between feelings of agency in political participation and subsequent voting behavior. 
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of fear that had permeated Tunisian society before the revolution. Since the Bourguiba 
era began in 1956, the regime had surveilled, jailed, and otherwise persecuted citizens for 
any expressions of dissent, and the preceding two chapters have discussed how 
profoundly citizens feared the regime before and even during the revolution—and yet 
interviewees resolutely reported feeling a sense of empowerment and agency. To be sure, 
an individual can feel both empowered by protesting and afraid of the authorities’ 
potential retribution for that protest, but the conditions of a neo-patrimonial regime would 
predict that, before the revolution, citizens would have expressed feeling extremely low 
levels of civic agency, so this data is that much more convincing as evidence of protest 
identity. 
 As for the third source of protest identity, interview subjects responded nearly 
unanimously to the question whether the regime labeled them its enemies during the 
revolution. Of the 42 interviewees who responded to the question, 39 (92.9 percent) said 
yes. The data speak clearly on this question. The data are less clear, however, in the 
answers to the follow-up question about how interviewees felt about the regime 
considering them enemies. These answers were coded on a bipolar Likert scale ranging 
from -2 to 2, with 2 representing the most positive response and -2 the most negative. The 
answers varied considerably: The mean was 0.59, and the standard deviation was 1.404. 
Overall, the answers to the three main questions concerning protest identity—whether 
interview subjects identified with other protesters, whether they felt a sense of agency, 
and whether they felt that the regime considered them its enemies—offer compelling 
support for the hypothesis that the interview subjects had formed a protest identity, but 
the answers to this follow-up question do not adhere to this pattern. One possible 
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explanation is that the status of enmity is indicative of protest identity, but one’s feelings 
about that status are less indicative. A second possible explanation is that the question 
was poorly written or asked, for the purposes of determining protest identity. A third 
possible explanation—and, in my view, a quite likely explanation—is that interview 
subjects did feel that the regime had labeled them its enemies, but their feelings about 
being its enemy were still affected by their fears of possible regime retribution. In support 
of this explanation, the preceding two chapters present copious evidence that even 
experienced activists continued to feel acute fear of the regime and of the coercive forces 
during the revolution. After all, many interview subjects were arrested and tortured (and 
saw their friends killed) during the revolution, so it would be more remarkable, in my 
opinion, if these revolutionaries had reported not having any fear of the regime or of 
being its enemy. 
 The data provide compelling evidence that these interview subjects had formed a 
protest identity as defined by the fourth generation of revolution theory. To conclude this 
section, I want to use this finding to build revolution theory and to contribute to praxis for 
social-movement actors, by bringing together this concept with my framing concepts of 
the alternative narrative and dichotomous legitimacy. The concept of dichotomous 
legitimacy, which I introduced in chapter 3, can build the concept of protest identity. 
Incorporating dichotomous legitimacy allows for new prediction for the revolution 
theory: Other variables being equal, actors in contentious politics will be likelier to form 
a shared protest identity when the legitimacy of regime discourse is low. My reasoning is 
that a relatively lower level of legitimacy creates a correspondingly greater opportunity 
for the construction of alternative narratives, especially a narrative of a protest identity of 
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shared grievances. When the level of legitimacy of regime discourse is low, the greater 
are the chances for an instance of dichotomous legitimacy to arise. Goldstone is clearly 
aware of the overlap between these disciplines; he (2001) cites Benford and Snow, who 
pioneered the study of framing, in a passage where he writes that the creation of protest 
identities is a “considerable project” (p. 153), and it seems that he is intimating that the 
construction of protest identity is a substantial project for social-movement actors. 
Writing more recently, Goldstone (2014) describes protest identity as a “persuasive 
shared narrative of resistance” (p. 18), and the mention of the concept of a narrative 
explicitly links protest identity to the framing process. To be sure, I am not arguing that 
the frames deployed by organizers of the revolution were the sole or even primary source 
of the creation of protest identity in Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, but it would be 
ludicrous on its face to suggest that the framing work of social-movement actors did not 
or could not contribute to the formation of protest identity. This leads to my contribution 
to the practice of protest: social-movement actors should use communication 
technologies to construct frames that nurture a shared protest identity, as defined by the 
three sources articulated in this part of the chapter, and these actors should take 
advantage of the compromised legitimacy of regime discourse to construct an alternative 
narrative of contentious politics. In other words, social-movement actors should strive to 
construct and deploy frames of shared grievances, frames of the status of protesters as 
enemies of a regime or other subject of protest, and frames of the protesters’ agency. 
From this perspective, the frames that criticized the regime’s corruption and the security 
forces’ brutality, the frames that portrayed Ben Ali as a dictator, and the frames that 
focused on empowering Tunisians by encouraging them to overcome fear, together 
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comprise a potent recipe for nourishing a shared protest identity. In the conclusion of this 
chapter, I will further discuss the connection between protest identity and specific frames; 
the next part of the chapter will take up the topic of revolutionary ideology.  
 
5.3 Findings and Discussion: Revolutionary Ideology 
 To restate, the three markers of the presence of revolutionary ideology are 
resonance with cultural frameworks, a belief in the success of the revolution, and beliefs 
that the authorities are unjust and weak (Goldstone, 2001). The term ideology here does 
not necessarily equate to an ideology that one might recognize as partisan or even as 
belonging to the political left or right. As I discussed in chapter 4, Tunisians were largely 
depoliticized during the Ben Ali era, and the regime barely tolerated the existence of a 
smattering of civil-society institutions. That said, the data on resonance from chapter 3 
present compelling evidence that the mediated frames encountered by interview subjects 
did resonate with them. This finding of frame resonance also represents a marker for the 
presence of revolutionary ideology. This overlap between framing in social-movement 
theory and in revolutionary ideology from revolution theory is significant for this 
dissertation. I will discuss the overlap in greater detail in the conclusion of this section 
and in the conclusion of the dissertation, but here I want to reiterate the definitions of the 
concepts of resonance and revolutionary ideology, to illustrate how these terms refer to 
the same idea. Frame resonance is the sine qua non of success for framing in social 
movements (Ferree, 2003, p. 305); if mediated frames resonate with relevant audiences, it 
dramatically increases the chances that audience members will side with the social 
movements that deploy these resonant frames. In revolution theory, a revolutionary 
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ideology needs to resonate with the cultural frameworks of the revolution’s potential 
participants and sympathizers (Goldstone, 2001, p. 156). The term “cultural framework” 
implies that the values, myths, and symbols in various cultures (here typically a nation-
state) are an assemblage of frames and narratives. The frames of a successful 
revolutionary ideology must resonate with individuals’ frames of their history and their 
current circumstances. To be sure, potential participants and sympathizers can encounter 
frames of an uprising through a wide variety of communication technologies, from social 
media to interpersonal conversation. But social-movement actors in revolutions 
strategically construct and deploy mediated frames, just as social-movement actors do 
during any other social movement. As I discussed in chapter 3, social-movement actors in 
Tunisia’s revolution strategically deployed mediated frames to encourage participation 
and persuade potential sympathizers; that mediated frames resonated is evidence both for 
frame resonance in social-movement theory and for revolutionary ideology in revolution 
theory. In other words, these frames resonated with Tunisians’ existing cultural 
guideposts and so represented a revolutionary ideology.  
 Most interview subjects expressed a strong belief that the revolution would 
succeed. Interviewees were asked about their beliefs in the revolution’s chances for 
success, and their answers were coded on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, with 5 representing the 
highest level of belief in success. The mean of the 43 responses to this question was 4.02. 
Only five interview subjects gave a response negative enough to be coded as a 1 or 2. 
During the interviews, it emerged from interviewees’ responses that many interviewees 
experienced increasing levels of belief in success during the roughly four weeks of the 
revolution. In the 43 responses to this question, 14 interview subjects (32.6 percent) 
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mentioned an increasing belief in success. The data reveal a clear association between 
being an organizer and having both a belief in success and an increasing belief in success 
(p = .001 and p = .007, respectively). One possible explanation could be some sort of 
optimism common to social-movement organizers more generally, but such 
psychological profiling falls far outside the scope of this dissertation. The features of neo-
patrimonialism offer another possible explanation: The correspondingly lower beliefs in 
success among participants could reflect their depoliticization. That is, they did not have 
strong beliefs in the success of the protests because they did not have any or only 
minimal personal experience of civic engagement. Interview subjects from the rural 
interior were more likely than interviewees from the coastal cities to say that they had an 
increasing belief in success (p = .013). I see two complementary explanations for this 
finding. One is the lingering disappointment of the experience of the 2008 protests in the 
rural town of Gafsa that failed to spread to the coastal cities and that were brutally 
quashed by the regime. It stands to reason that residents of the rural interior would have 
initially viewed the outbreak of new protests in 2010 with a measure of skepticism left 
over from the events of 2008, so they would have been less likely to believe in success at 
the outset of the protests. The second, complementary explanation lies in the restive 
history of the rural interior, which has regularly rebelled, protested, and otherwise voiced 
displeasure at being ruled by coastal elites such as those in Tunis—without any resulting 
change in the interior’s conditions—as described by interviewee Sadok Ben Mhenni. 
Because of their knowledge of the region’s history of rebelliousness ignored or quashed, 
residents of the interior might be less likely to view any new protest with a belief in its 
success. 
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 Even though interviewees generally answered that they believed in the 
revolutions’ chances for success, the interview subjects gave a wide variety of responses. 
For example, a participant from Tunis said that, on the day that Mohammed Bouazizi 
killed himself and the first demonstration followed, she told a friend that she thought Ben 
Ali would have to step down, and she said that she and her friend were excited by the 
promising potential of the circumstances. An organizer from Kasserine, on the other 
hand, said that he had no idea early on that the revolution would succeed. He said that he 
was scared in the early days of the protests, and he witnessed the security forces’ 
massacres of his fellow protesters in Kasserine. It was not until January 12 or January 13, 
after the police had left the streets of Kasserine, that he thought that the revolution would 
succeed. 
 The third attribute of revolutionary ideology is the belief that a regime is unjust 
and weak. In the previous chapter, I discussed the unanimous finding that all interview 
subjects who responded to this question said that they viewed the regime as unjust. This 
unequivocal finding is quite important, because the data are mixed regarding beliefs 
about the regime’s strength. Interviewees’ responses were coded on a Likert scale of 1 to 
5, with higher scores signifying greater strength. The mean response of the 42 responses 
was 3.55, which would mean a belief in the regime being slightly strong. However, the 
standard deviation was 1.549, which shows the extreme variance in the responses. Two 
factors can explain the variance in the responses to this question, in my view. First, the 
question might have been vaguely worded. Interview subjects were asked whether they 
thought the regime was strong or weak, but clearly a regime or government can 
simultaneously be strong in many areas and weak in many areas. I believe that 
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interviewees would have given opposite answers, had they been asked whether the 
regime was strong in the repressive capabilities of the coercive forces, or strong in its 
support among the people. The second factor that could explain the variance in responses 
is interviewees’ long-standing fear of the regime’s capabilities to discipline and punish 
dissent through the coercive forces. Throughout this dissertation, I have exhaustively 
examined the ways that Tunisians feared the coercive forces and the ways that organizers 
and participants thought about fear and deployed frames about overcoming fears. There is 
an abundance of evidence that interview subjects viewed the repressive capabilities of the 
regime as robust. After all, most interview subjects were either arrested, beaten, tortured, 
or saw their family members and friends arrested, beaten, and tortured, so this seems a 
parsimonious explanation why many expressed a belief in the strength of the regime.  
 In the article that established the fourth generation of revolution theory, Goldstone 
(2001) does not give any definition of the term weak, although the article does in other 
sections discuss fiscal weakness, weakness from battlefield losses, or poorly handled 
crackdowns on protests. In later work, Goldstone (2014) discusses at length how injustice 
can fuel revolutionary mobilization, as he writes that citizens tend to take the risk of 
joining revolts when they feel they are losing their proper place in society for reasons that 
are not inevitable and not their fault (p. 17). He does not elucidate the attribute of 
weakness in similar detail. Not to exaggerate the findings from a sample size barely 
larger than 40, but my data appear to rebuke this aspect of revolution theory. My findings 
suggest that revolution theory needs either to refine its definition of regime weakness or 
to abandon the term and base this aspect of revolutionary ideology solely on feelings of 
injustice, which seem more firmly rooted in empirical data. To build revolution theory, I 
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propose a new definition of this third attribute of revolutionary ideology, such that 
revolutionary ideology is marked by a belief that a regime is unjust, in the ways that 
Goldstone (2014) describes, and weak, which can be understood and operationalized as a 
belief that the regime is failing in its governing responsibilities to provide conditions in 
which its citizens have opportunities to thrive and succeed.  
 Correlations with other data add important context to the data on beliefs in regime 
weakness. There were associations between beliefs in the strength of the regime and 
lower age (p = .095), being a student (p = .100), and being unemployed (p = .035); the 
populations of students and the unemployed were largely identical. One possible 
explanation is that younger people had been socialized into believing that the Ben Ali 
regime was a strong one, capable of crushing its opponents, whereas Tunisians with more 
age and experience interacting with the regime had observed some of its weaknesses. A 
belief that the regime was weak also correlated with a belief in the success of the 
revolution (p = .008) and somewhat correlated with an increasing belief in the success of 
the revolution (p = .139). The relationship among these beliefs seems clear, in that one 
who sees the regime as weaker would logically have a greater belief that the revolution 
would succeed in deposing that feeble regime. 
 To conclude this section, the evidence clearly indicates that these interview 
subjects held the beliefs that comprise a revolutionary ideology. The events of the 
uprising resonated with their cultural frameworks, they largely believed that the 
revolution would succeed, and they believed that the regime was unjust. Some believed 
that the regime was strong, and some believed that it was weak. If we grant that they 
possessed a revolutionary ideology, then this begs the question: What kind of ideology 
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was it? It was not one of the familiar ideologies that have sparked revolution, such as 
freedom from occupation, democracy, or communism—or even a coherent ideology of 
policies that one could term leftist or rightist. Their shared belief system was that of a 
rebellious mass of aggrieved citizens, victims of an unjust, corrupt regime. They believed 
that they would succeed in their uprising, but many still feared the amply demonstrated 
capabilities of the regime to punish dissent. Even with their fears, they were a united 
group of individuals who had committed to opposition and resistance. The finding that 
their revolutionary ideology rested upon their shared status as a group of protesters 
against an unjust regime, rather than as adherents of a political philosophy, matches 
perfectly with the finding that their protest identity was rooted in their participation in 
groups of similarly aggrieved protesters, rather than as members of formal groups that 
organized or supported the protests. In a sense, then, their revolutionary ideology was 
their shared protest identity, with the specific dynamic of their protest against the regime 
of a nation-state. My conclusions about the types of protest identity and revolutionary 
ideology also help build revolution theory, in that the theory should include specifically 
these types of protest identity and revolutionary ideology among the roster of possible 
identities and ideologies. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 In this conclusion, I will discuss the significance of these findings for revolution 
theory, for some of the processes that comprise revolution theory, and for the common 
ground among theories of revolution, social movements, and neo-patrimonialism. The 
data provide compelling evidence that these interview subjects developed a protest 
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identity and a revolutionary ideology. For fourth-generation revolutionary theory, this 
finding helps explain how cross-class coalitions formed during Tunisia’s Arab Spring 
revolution. The formation of cross-class coalitions is a necessary condition of revolution, 
according to both the third and fourth generations of revolution theory (Beck, 2017; Dix, 
1984; Goldstone, 2001, 2011a, 2011b; Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989). My findings also 
support contemporary revolution theory’s ontological approach to revolution as a 
contingent, emergent process, rather than as a lawlike formula of always-identical 
conditions producing inevitable outcomes (Tilly, 1995). The data lay out an account of 
the construction of protest identity and revolutionary ideology, an account with contours 
and nuances unique to the circumstances of Tunisia in 2010-11, and these details of the 
actions, thoughts, and beliefs of these individuals offer support for revolution theory’s 
assumption that individual revolutionary actors possess agency (Goldstone, 2001; Gurr, 
2000, 2015). My findings build theory for the concepts of protest identity and 
revolutionary ideology. For the former, I show how concepts from framing theory allow 
for the creation of a new prediction flowing from the concept. For the latter, I reveal a 
shortcoming in the definition of revolutionary ideology in terms of beliefs about the 
weakness of a regime. The theory needs to more precisely define the term weakness, and 
I suggest a possible redefinition of weakness that can also be readily deployed in 
research. 
 This dissertation also contributes to understanding the processes of the 
construction of protest identity and revolutionary ideology. This might seem obvious, in 
light of the focus of this dissertation on framing, but the data show that mediated frames, 
deployed and encountered by the organizers and participants in Tunisia’s revolution, 
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played a role in the construction of protest identity and revolutionary ideology. The data 
on resonance support this conclusion, as do the various frames that portrayed the regime 
as unjust, corrupt, brutal, and responsible for the country’s economic problems. To be 
sure, Lynch (2012) argues that Al-Jazeera also strategically deployed mediated frames of 
Arab citizens as aggrieved populations, and many interview subjects reported that the 
frames they encountered on Al-Jazeera, France 24, and elsewhere resonated with them. 
Moreover, legitimate grievances against the unjust, corrupt, and brutal practices of the 
regime predated and existed independently of any mediated framing of these phenomena, 
as interviewees reported in the data. However, it seems implausible on its face that the 
mass of Tunisian citizens could have constructed a protest identity and/or revolutionary 
ideology without incorporating any of the mediated frames that they encountered through 
social media, blogs, email, telephone communication, or interpersonal communication. 
Organizers also reported that they constructed frames that correspond perfectly with the 
attributes of protest identity and revolutionary ideology. For example, five of 25 
organizers said that they deployed frames telling protesters that the revolution would 
succeed if they persisted in the protests; a belief in success is one the three central 
markers of revolutionary ideology. As I discussed in chapter 3, organizers deployed 
frames of the regime as corrupt or a dictatorship, as well as frames of the security forces 
as brutal and/or engaged in a brutal crackdown against protesters, all of which framed the 
regime as unjust. By calling attention to the relationship between framing processes and 
the construction of protest identity and revolutionary ideology, this dissertation suggests 
broad, important areas of further research to build revolution theory. A potentially rich 
research question for scholars is apparent from the previous sentence: What is the 
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relationship between the construction of protest identity and revolutionary ideology and 
the deployment of mediated frames by social-movement actors and by mass media? This 
research question offers several possible sub-questions, for example regarding the 
deployment of mediated frames on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, as well as on 
transnational satellite networks such as Al-Jazeera, France 24, BBC, and CNN. To be 
sure, disentangling the relative importance of various media and various mediated frames 
represents a thorny problem, and there are obstacles to the collection of fresh data during 
a revolution, but this avenue of scholarship offers rich, largely unexplored terrain for 
interrogating these processes. Indeed, the growing focus of the field on the processes of 
revolution only makes these questions more important. 
 Using mediated frames as units of analysis also points to the research interests 
common to revolution theory and social-movement theory, and this overlap comprises 
my final point. In the conclusion, I will build theory based on this overlap, but here I just 
want to point out where the processes of the construction of protest identity and 
revolutionary ideology share important theoretical ground with theories of social 
movements and neo-patrimonialism. As I argued in the preceding paragraph, the framing 
process of social-movement theory is an integral part of the processes of construction of 
protest identity and revolutionary ideology, which are central to revolution theory. These 
latter two constructs are based on beliefs that a regime is unjust, which is a perception 
common among citizens living under a neo-patrimonial regime. The specifics of the 
frames deployed by social-movement actors in Tunisia to construct this unique type of 
injustice—corruption, dictatorship, the brutality of the coercive forces—fit perfectly with 
the theory of neo-patrimonialism. This explanation clarifies the theoretical terrain 
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common to these three fields, and in the conclusion, I will take up the implications of this 
overlap for future scholarship. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: THE CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PARADIGM OF FRAMING 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this concluding chapter, I will offer an answer to the dissertation’s central 
research question, then I will discuss what my findings on the social construction of 
technology mean for the discipline of science and technology studies, and I will end the 
dissertation with a discussion of how this dissertation contributes to knowledge in 
multiple disciplines through a concept—framing—rooted in the discipline of 
communication. 
 
6.2 An Answer to the Research Question 
 Throughout the three chapters of findings and discussion, I addressed the seven 
research questions from chapter 1, and, in this section, I will provide an answer to this 
dissertation’s overarching research question: How did organizers of and participants in 
the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia use media, particularly social media, Al-Jazeera 
and other television stations, telephones, and interpersonal communication? Rather than 
cobble together an agglomeration from the partial answers that I have given to the 
numbered research questions, I want to present a holistic answer as concisely as possible. 
Organizers of and participants in the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia used 
communication media to construct and deploy a wide variety of frames critical of the 
regime, with particular emphasis on the regime’s corruption, the country’s economic 
problems, and the brutality of the regime’s security forces. There was no master frame of 
the revolution, nor did these social-movement actors employ a dominant technique for 
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the construction of their frames or a dominant framing strategy, though many 
interviewees did focus on using visual elements during the framing process. To deploy 
these frames, the revolutionaries used a hybrid network of communication technologies, 
encompassing social media, blogs, telephones, email, and interpersonal communication, 
though they used Facebook somewhat more than any other medium. Through the framing 
process, the revolutionaries were able to construct an alternative narrative of the events of 
the revolution, a narrative almost entirely free from the regime’s customary censorship of 
communication media. These frames resonated with the interview subjects, partly 
because the interviewees viewed the narratives of the regime as illegitimate, and they did 
not always trust the narratives that they encountered in other traditional media. These 
social-movement actors followed multiple framing strategies, frequently varying their 
framing for different audiences and media, and the actors changed their strategies and 
their framing throughout the revolution. Through their frames, the revolutionaries quickly 
and cheaply spread awareness of citizens’ shared grievances against the regime, an 
information cascade that overcame the problem of pluralistic ignorance of these common 
grievances. Through these frames, these social-movement actors also continually 
encouraged their fellow citizens to overcome their fears of the regime and the regime’s 
coercive forces, which had brutally suppressed and punished dissent for decades. 
Through these frames, the revolutionaries helped weakly linked citizens forge a shared 
protest identity based on the citizens’ deeply seated, shared grievances against the 
regime, and the revolutionaries helped construct a revolutionary ideology based on their 
shared protest against a regime perceived as unjust and illegitimate. Some social-
movement actors used Facebook more than any other medium, but they actively used all 
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the nodes of the hybrid network for the tasks mentioned above, though some interviewees 
reported doubts about the accuracy and/or bias of Al Jazeera. They also used the hybrid 
network of communication technologies for the work of organizing, and they used 
interpersonal communication with a significant frequency. Throughout the previous three 
chapters, I have supported these conclusion with evidence and used these conclusions to 
build theory in the fields of framing, social movements, neo-patrimonialism, and 
revolution. In particular, I have crafted in chapter 3 the new concepts of alternative 
narrative and dichotomous legitimacy, which explain and predict the framing process in 
episodes of contentious politics in certain neo-patrimonial regimes. In chapter 5, I used 
these concepts to build new revolution theory. In chapter 4, I constructed the new 
apparatus of authoritarian weakening, which describes how capabilities and beliefs 
among the citizens of neo-patrimonial regimes weaken those regimes. In the final two 
sections of the dissertation, I will bring these various fields together to build theory in the 
discipline of science and technology studies and in the discipline of communication. 
 
6.3 The Social Construction of Technology 
 My interest in technology usage during the Arab Spring was partly spurred by 
misguided journalism claiming that social media had brought down dictators. I will return 
briefly in the following section to the debate about social media and the Arab Spring, but 
here I want to blend the various disciplines within which I have worked throughout this 
dissertation, in order to build theory and praxis about communication technology within 
the discipline of STS.  
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To consider theory, I want to begin with an interrogation of the premise of much 
thinking about social media and the Arab Spring, or about social media or even Facebook 
more generally. Some scholars make a basic error of anthropomorphism, an error that 
attributes active, autonomous capabilities to inanimate objects; in other words, it is a 
category error to pose a question about what Facebook did during the revolution in 
Tunisia (or during any similar event). Facebook did not do anything. Facebook did not 
cause the revolution, nor did it bring people into the streets, nor did it bring down a 
dictator, etc. I am not demolishing a straw man here; for example, Howard et al. (2011) 
write that “the Arab Spring had many causes. One of these sources was social media and 
its power to put a human face on political oppression” (p. 2). In this dissertation, I have 
called on the theory of neo-patrimonialism to provide a parsimonious, compelling 
explanation of the causes of the revolution: The Ben Ali regime was a kleptocracy, a 
corrupt ruling coterie that arrogated to itself the nation’s wealth as the majority of the 
population experienced harsh economic conditions and dim future prospects; political 
power emanated solely from allegiance to the potentate, rather than from any popular 
mandate; to extinguish any opposition or dissent, the regime’s coercive forces harshly 
punished criticism of the regime, and the regime fiercely surveilled society—and 
especially communication technologies—to quash any rumblings of discontent; the 
regime tightly controlled the minimal institutions of civil society, which constricted 
opportunities to build weak ties of association among the populace; and all of these 
regime practices generated and fed broad and deep grievances against the regime. I have 
called on revolution theory to provide a parsimonious, compelling explanation of the 
course of the revolution and the reasons for its success: Once grievances exist, a spark 
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can turn shared grievances into a shared protest identity and a revolutionary ideology, 
under which a cross-class coalition of citizens can coalesce. To be sure, other factors, 
especially relations between the military and the regime (Nepstad, 2013), also have a 
potentially determining influence on the course and outcome of revolutions.  
I have debunked any notion that Facebook might have caused the revolution or 
determined its outcome, but I want to return to the ontological position of Facebook. The 
scholarship in the preceding paragraph should not lead scholars to formulate questions 
about what, then, Facebook did during the Arab Spring, but rather it should upend the 
position that Facebook did or could do anything in any episode of contentious politics. 
Human actors in Tunisia did things on Facebook, just as they did things on their phones 
or in person—or in the streets. The crucial shift in position is that people use technologies 
to take actions. The usage of a technology can clearly cause effects in the material world, 
but it is not the technology that causes changes, but rather what people do with the 
technology, as scholars in science and technology studies have long argued (see Bijker & 
Pinch, 2012, for an overview). This dissertation builds theory in the concept of 
interpretive flexibility, which posits that a technology or an artifact does not arrive with 
predetermined uses, but rather its uses depend on how various social groups construct 
them (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003). My research shows that social-movement actors in 
Tunisia used Facebook as part of a hybrid network of technologies including television, 
telephones, and interpersonal communication, and these actors used this hybrid network 
to construct an alternative narrative of the events of Tunisia’s Arab Spring revolution, to 
construct a shared protest identity, and to construct a revolutionary ideology. As such, the 
revolutionaries actively constructed the meaning of Facebook and other social media, 
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perhaps in a radically different way than the inventors of Facebook intended (Mackay & 
Gillespie, 1992). I should add that Facebook, just as any other communication 
technology, is not constructed solely by its users, but also by the actions of groups such 
as programmers, developers, advertisers, and corporate executives. To improve 
scholarship on technology, scholars should be extremely careful in how they describe 
technologies. Scholars should avoid giving anthropomorphic capabilities to technologies, 
such as saying that a technology caused, determined, or otherwise acted in some social 
field. I do not wish to limit any scholar’s sesquipedalian munitions, but I do suggest 
keeping in mind that technologies can enable, allow, or afford certain uses. In the end, 
this approach of positioning users and other actors as constructing the meanings of a 
technology reflects the constructivist approach that underpins this entire dissertation—not 
only did social-movement actors construct meaning through the framing process by 
posting content to Facebook and communicating through other nodes of the hybrid 
network, but they were also simultaneously constructing the meanings of the technologies 
that they used.  
On a practical level, this conclusion and this ontological position offer some 
direction for those who work with and those who use these technologies. For those who 
produce communication technologies, such as inventors, engineers, and developers, some 
lessons from the Arab Spring are flexibility, awareness of uses for repression, and a 
certain modesty about the projected uses of a technology. Users will co-construct these 
technologies, and they can use these technologies in perhaps entirely unexpected ways. 
Users might even deploy the technology to fight repressive regimes and to gain greater 
independence in their own lives, and in so doing they could use a technology to help 
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increase the autonomy of all the citizens in an entire nation-state. This dissertation shows 
that Tunisian revolutionaries did exactly this through uploading visual imagery, chatting, 
and organizing protests, among other activities, on Facebook and on other social media. 
Other research on the Arab Spring (e.g., Bellin, 2012) shows that oppressive regimes use 
this technology for surveillance, stifling dissent, and spreading disinformation, 
propaganda, and lies, so those who develop these platforms should pay careful attention 
to the capabilities they create for various actors to construct such uses on these 
communication platforms. For social-movement actors, these same findings offer 
practical directives. To increase the chances of success for social movements, these actors 
should seek out communication technologies that allow them to construct their own 
narratives of events, to share visual imagery, to make shared grievances known among a 
population of weakly linked individuals—as a way to overcome pluralistic ignorance—
and to organize events and communicate on a one-to-one and one-to-many basis. 
Moreover, social-movement actors today need high-level technical skills; they should be 
aware of any communication technology’s capabilities for surveillance or vulnerabilities 
to cyberattack, in order to avoid unwanted tracking and defend or preempt any 
cyberattack. Social-movement actors need fellow activists who are skilled in cyberwar.   
One could argue that, in an even larger sense, social-movement actors could draw 
from this dissertation—and from the Arab Spring—the hope that they have the 
technology to overthrow the rule of a seemingly impervious despot. But I’m not so sure; 
as I worked painstakingly to show in the chapters rooted in theories of neo-
patrimonialism and revolution, just using a technology will not conjure an uprising. As 
Bellin (2012) writes, social media’s contribution was “permissive, not deterministic” (p. 
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139). To put this question in historical perspective, some stories of Martin Luther define 
the printing press as revolutionary (see Eisenstein, 1979, for an overview); but, like the 
Church of the Dark Ages selling indulgences, the corrupt Ben Ali regime had for two 
decades stoked grievances in Tunisia. Before Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to a 
wall in Wittenberg, John Huss and John Wycliffe had protested the same corrupt 
practices and demanded reforms. They were killed for their agitation, just as Ben Ali had 
killed, imprisoned, and tortured countless of his critics. Was it the printing press that 
made Luther’s protest into a Reformation? Was it Facebook that made Mohammed 
Bouazizi’s suicide into the Arab Spring? In such stories, Gutenberg and Zuckerberg are 
cast as revolutionaries. No—they were engineers, inventors, techies. Martin Luther was a 
revolutionary. Ali and Lassad Bouazizi are revolutionaries. As does any revolutionary, 
they just needed a technology to communicate their ideas to a wider audience to help 
their revolutions take root. 
 
6.4 Facebook, Framing, and Revolution: Building Communication Theory 
 In this closing section of the dissertation, I want to bring the discussion back to 
the discipline of communication, through a final look at framing and the uses of 
Facebook and other technologies during Tunisia’s Arab Spring. To begin, I want to return 
to the flawed notion of Facebook or any online technology as the cause or even as a 
central element of the revolution, as a way to lead into discussion about the place of 
framing in the discipline of communication. Wael Ghonim, the former engineer at 
Google who helped lead online organizing work during Egypt’s Arab Spring revolution, 
said, “This is not an internet revolution. It would have happened anyway” (Aday et al., 
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2012, p. 7). His unique position as one of the leading online activists of an Arab Spring revolution gives exceptional weight to the potency of his rejection of this inaccurate heuristic of 
an internet revolution. When he says that the revolution would have happened anyway, I read this as an allusion to the critical mass of explosive grievances against the region’s authoritarian 
regimes and as an allusion to the existing network, however tenuous, of opposition and civil-society actors who were ready to handle the organizing responsibilities of large-scale protests. On the 
topic of organizational capabilities, I want to cite my interview with Lina Ben Mhenni, who was one of the best-known online activists during Tunisia’s revolution. Despite her established place in 
the firmament of online personalities, she said: 
Let me say that I can’t talk about a Facebook or internet revolution. Internet or 
Facebook is just a tool. It depends on how we use it. We saw what happened in 
Syria or in Iran even before, in 2009. … The outcome of an internet revolution 
can’t really lead to the departure of a dictator. We need the work on the ground. 
In scholarly terms, Salvatore’s (2013) research on the years of collective organizing work 
by formal and informal civil-society groups in the region “contributes to dissolving the 
myth” that the revolution began or depended on social media (p. 225). He writes: 
… the networks that mattered most in the revolutionary events were not social 
networks like Facebook or Twitter. They were rather universities, mosques, trade 
unions, and, not least, football ultras, which had been active on the street since 
after the first eruptions and fought valiantly and effectively with security forces 
(p. 224). 
In this dissertation, I have presented a preponderance of evidence about both the depth of 
the entrenched grievances against the Ben Ali regime and the years of organizing 
practiced by the interviewees and their networks of fellow activists. I chose to dedicate a 
significant part of the dissertation to the political conditions in Tunisia in the decades 
before the revolution, in order to emphasize the importance of these factors as 
explanations of the causes and course of the revolution. 
 As I move in this section to discuss communication, I am bringing up 
considerations of politics and history as a crucial part of improving scholarship on 
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communication. In this dissertation, I am working to demonstrate how framing is always 
situated in a specific place with its own unique context. Scholars will damage the validity 
of their work—and the credibility of the discipline—if they approach framing solely from 
a communication perspective and if they ignore the history and politics of the episode 
that they examine. When scholars do not know the history and context of the 
circumstances they analyze, they can too easily fall into inaccurate conclusions about 
causes or determinants. To be sure, scholars cannot write only about places where they 
have lived or about places where they speak a local language. But when scholars write 
about places where they do not have lived experience or cannot speak the language, they 
could instead write articles with multiple authors, to let an area specialist, historian, or 
political scientist vet the assumptions and assertions of the scholarship. At the very least, 
communication scholars should cross disciplinary boundaries and let their work be 
confronted by scholars in the above disciplines for critical vetting. This is a polite way of 
saying, without singling out any specific work, that I saw much work on the Arab Spring 
by communication scholars who did not have lived experience of the region and/or 
knowledge of the region’s languages, and their work was often easily refuted by scholars 
who specialized in the region. I believe that this lack of knowledge explains much of the 
overheated rhetoric about Facebook and social media. That rhetoric not only harms 
scholarship, but it also ignores the lived experiences of the people whose lives are being 
examined. Bullet Skan, the co-founder of the online collective Takriz, poignantly 
expressed the danger of such a myopic focus on communication technology:  
What I mean by saying Facebook was a tool is [that] people—and especially 
foreign people, and not, not interested in Tunisian politics from long ago—they 
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tend to call the revolution or what happened as a Facebook revolution, or digital 
revolution, or something like that. And I think that that’s the worst thing that we 
could say, because, if we say this, we are not grateful to the people who gave their 
lives and who suffered and who died in the streets, and people shot with real 
bullets, et cetera. We can maybe say that the contribution of Facebook was more 
important than other sites or ways or tools, but we cannot say it was only about 
Facebook. 
Having explained the importance of political and historical factors in Tunisia’s 
revolution, I want to discuss how my work contributes to the study of framing. My 
interrogation of framing not only builds theory in the field of framing, but my focus on 
process and on framing itself contribute to the field. In chapter 3, I built framing theory 
through defining the concept of the alternative narrative. Though I built theory in other 
areas of framing, the concept of the alternative narrative, in my view, marks a significant 
contribution to understanding how social-movement actors used communication 
technologies during the Arab Spring, because many accounts of technology usage fail to 
encapsulate this important process. For example, Castells (2012) writes that internet-
enabled, wireless communication networks represented “decisive tools for mobilizing, for 
organizing, for deliberating, for coordinating, and for deciding” (p. 229). Regardless of 
the debates about how decisive these tools were or about the importance of various 
organizing methods, it is striking that even such a renowned scholar as Castells, who has 
studied these technologies since their usage became widespread, does not have any 
terminology to encompass the framing processes for which the revolutionaries clearly 
used these technologies. The concept of alternative narrative fills this gap in the 
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scholarship. In my discussion of social-movement theory, I noted how this dissertation 
answers the calls of Snow and Benford (2005) and Ryan (2005) to interrogate the framing 
process instead of individual frames. In the discipline of communication, Borah (2011) 
and Carragee and Roefs (2004) have also called for scholars to conduct interviews with 
social-movement actors, in order to add to the relative paucity of knowledge in the 
discipline about the framing process. My focus on the framing process not only helps fill 
this knowledge gap across disciplines, but my elucidation of the alternative narrative 
represents a conceptual category on which scholars from multiple disciplines can base 
further study of the framing processes and build new theory about framing and 
communication more broadly. 
 I mentioned that my dissertation answers identical calls from scholars across 
disciplines, because I want to emphasize how framing offers a research program that 
brings multiple disciplines together, as Entman (1993) and Reese (2007) have noted. 
Reese (2007) writes, “If the most interesting happens at the edges of disciplines—and in 
the center of policy debates—then framing certainly has the potential to bring 
disciplinary perspectives together in interesting ways” (p. 148). The opening paragraph of 
this concluding chapter articulates not only an answer to the research question animating 
this dissertation, but it also constructs the parameters for a space where the disciplines of 
communication, political science, revolution studies, and science and technology studies 
overlap during the framing process. Throughout the previous three chapters, I have 
repeatedly articulated where the framing process marks out the terrain common across 
disciplines. This overlap creates opportunities for building theory useful across 
disciplines and for opening new communication among scholars from these disciplines, 
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whose scholarship could benefit from cross-pollination with relevant knowledge from 
other disciplines. In addition, my dissertation answers Reese’s (2007) call to bring 
together quantitative and qualitative methodologies and to bring together academic 
theory-building with recommendations for praxis in the material world. By using framing 
as the thread around which to weave new theory that binds together scattered theories 
from multiple disciplines, my dissertation helps cement the standing of communication as 
a “master discipline” that synthesizes related concepts from across academe, as Entman 
(1993) calls for. By constructing coherent theory from the disparate uses of framing in 
multiple disciplines, this dissertation demonstrates how foundational elements of these 
disciplines are all rooted in the processes of communication. 
  253 
REFERENCES 
Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J., Kelly, J., & Zuckerman, E. (2010). Blogs and  
bullets New media in contentious politics. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/events/blogs-bullets-
social-media-and-struggle-political-change  
 
Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J. & Freelon, D. (2012). Blogs and bullets II:  
New media and conflict after the Arab Spring. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace. Retrieved from 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/07/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-
conflict-after-arab-spring  
 
Afify, H. (2011, January 24). Activists hope 25 January protest will be start of  
“something big.” Al Masri Al Youm. Retrieved from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110228080642/http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en
/news/activists-25-january-protest-be-start-something-big 
 
Ahmed, A. (2016). The armed forces and transitions: A comparative analysis of  
Tunisia’s police state and Egypt’s military state. (Doctoral dissertation). 
 
Ajbaili, M. (2011, April 16). One dead in Ahwaz clash. Al-Arabiya. Retrieved from  
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/16/145638.html 
 
Al-Ani, B., Mark, G., Chung, J., & Jones, J. (2012, February). The Egyptian blogosphere:  
A counter-narrative of the revolution. Paper presented at the ACM Conference on 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work, Seattle, WA.  
 
al-Shehabi, O. (2011). Demography and Bahrain’s unrest. Report for the Carnegie  
Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/demography-and-bahrain-s-
unrest/6b7y  
 
Alterman, J. B. (2011). The revolution will not be tweeted. The Washington Quarterly,  
34(4), 103-116. 
 
Anderson, N. (2011, January 14). Tweeting tyrants out of Tunisia: Global internet at its  
best. Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2011/01/tunisia/ 
  
Angrist, M. P. (2013). Understanding the success of mass civic protest in Tunisia. Middle  
East Journal, 67(4), 547-564. 
 
Ayeb, H. (2011). Social and political geography of the Tunisian revolution: The alfa  
grass revolution. Review of African Political Economy, 38(129), 467-479. 
 
Badouard, R., Mabi, C., Mattozzi, A., Schubert, C., Sire, G., & Sorenson, E. (2016). STS  
  254 
and media studies: Alternative paths in different countries. Tecnoscienza, Italian 
Journal of Science & Technology Studies, 7(1), 109-128. 
 
Barany, Z. (2011). The role of the military. Journal of Democracy 22(4), 24-35. 
 
Bateson, G. (1954). A theory of play and fantasy. Psychiatric Research Reports, 2, 39– 
51. 
 
Beck, C. J. (2017). Revolutions: Robust findings, persistent problems, and promising  
frontiers. In M. Stohl, M. Lichbach, & P. Grabosky (Eds.), States and peoples in 
conflict: Transformations of conflict studies (pp. 168-183). New York: Routledge. 
 
Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East:  
Lessons from the Arab Spring. Comparative Politics, 44(2), 127-149. 
 
Ben Gharbia, S. (2010, May 27). Anti-censorship movement in Tunisia: Creativity,  
courage, and hope! Advox Global Voices. Retrieved from 
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2010/05/27/anti-censorship-movement-in-tunisia-
creativity-courage-and-hope/ 
 
Ben Mhenni, L. (2010). Sidi Bouzid is burning. A Tunisian Girl. Retrieved from  
http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.nl/2010/12/sidi-bouzid-is-burning.html 
 
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An  
overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
 
Bennett, W. L., Breunig, C., & Givens, T. (2008). Communication and political  
mobilization: Digital media and the organization of anti-Iraq war demonstrations 
in the U.S. Political communication, 25(3), 269-289. 
 
Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012) The logic of connective action. Information,  
Communication & Society, 15(5), 739-768. 
 
Bhardwaj, M. (2012). Development of conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From  
revolution to civil war. The Washington University International Review, 1, 76-
96. 
 
Bijker, W. E., & Pinch, T. (2012). Preface. In W.E. Bijker, T.P. Hughes, & T. Pinch  
(Eds.), The social construction of technological systems (pp. ix-xxxiii). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,  
 
Bimber, B. (1990). Karl Marx and the three faces of technological determinism. Social  
Studies of Science, 20(2), 333-351. 
 
Blight, G., Pulham, S. & Torpey, P. (2012, January 5). The path of protest. The  
  255 
Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-
interactive-timeline 
 
Boczkowski, P., & Lievrouw, L. A. (2008). Bridging STS and communication studies:  
Scholarship on media and information technologies. In O. Amsterdamska, E. J. 
Hackett, M. Lynch, & J. Wajcman (Eds.), The Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies (pp. 949-977). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Borah, P. (2011). Interactions of news frames and incivility in the political blogosphere:  
Examining perceptual outcomes. Political Communication, 30(3), 456-473. 
 
Bossio, D. (2013). How Al Jazeera reported the Arab Spring: A preliminary comparative  
analysis. Media Asia, 40(4), 333-43. 
 
Brisson, Z., & Krontiris, K. (2012). Tunisia: From revolutions to institutions.  
Washington, DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.infodev.org/en/Document.1141.pdf  
 
Bronner, E. (2011, March 17). Opposition leaders arrested in Bahrain as crackdown  
grows. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/middleeast/18bahrain.html?_r=1 
 
Brooks, R. (2013). Abandoned at the palace: Why the Tunisian military defected from the  
Ben Ali regime in January 2011. Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(2), 205-220. 
 
Brownlee, J. (2002). And yet they persist: Explaining survival and transition in  
neo-patrimonial regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 
37(3), 35-63. 
 
__________. (2007). Authoritarianism in an age of democratization. Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
__________. (2009). Portents of pluralism: How hybrid regimes affect democratic  
transitions. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 515-32. 
 
Brumberg, D. (2002). The trap of liberalized autocracy. Journal of Democracy, 13(4),  
56–68.   
 
__________. (2003). Liberalization versus democracy: Understanding Arab political  
reform. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 
from https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/04/29/liberalization-versus-democracy-
understanding-arab-political-reform-pub-9085 
 
__________. (2011, December 19). Sustaining mechanics of Arab autocracies. Foreign  
  256 
Policy. Retrieved from 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/19/sustaining_mechanics_of_arab
_autocracies 
 
Bumiller, E., & Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2011, March 24). NATO agrees to take command of  
no-fly zone in Libya. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/africa/25libya.html 
 
Breuer, A., Landman, T., & Farquhar, D. (2015). Social media and protest mobilization:  
Evidence from the Tunisian revolution. Democratization, 22(4), 764-792. 
 
Brym, R., Godbout, M., Hoffbauer, A., Menard, G., & Zhang, T. H. (2014). Social media  
in the 2011 Egyptian uprising. The British Journal of Sociology 65(2), 266-292. 
 
Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1),  
5–21.  
 
Carragee, K. M. & Roefs, W. (2004). The neglect of power in recent framing research.  
Journal of Communication, 45(2), 214-233. 
 
Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age.  
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
 
Cavatorta, F. (2010). The convergence of governance: Upgrading authoritarianism in the  
Arab world and downgrading democracy elsewhere? Middle East Critique 19(3), 
217-232. 
 
Chehabi, H. E., & Linz, J. J. (Eds). (1998). Sultanistic regimes. Baltimore: The Johns  
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Chozick, A. For Syria’s Rebel Movement, Skype Is a Useful and Increasingly Dangerous  
Tool. The New York Times, November 30, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-turn-to-
skype-for-communications.html 
 
Coe, A. (2011). Pushing back and stretching: Frame adjustments among reproductive  
rights advocates in Peru. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(4), 495-
512. 
 
Coley, J. S. (2015). Narrative and frame alignment in social movements: Labor problem  
novels and the 1929 Gastonia strike. Social Movement Studies, 14(1), 58–74. 
 
Comunello, F., & Anzera, G. (2012). Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual  
framework for understanding the social media and the Arab Spring. Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations, 23(4), 453-470. 
  257 
 
Cottle, S. (2011). Media and the Arab uprisings of 2011: Research notes. Journalism,  
12(5), 647–659. 
 
Crossley, A. D. (2015). Facebook feminism: Social media, blogs, and new technologies  
of contemporary U.S. feminism. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 20(2), 
253-268. 
 
Dalton, R. (1996). Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced  
industrial democracies. Chatham: Chatham House Daily. 
 
D’Angelo, P. (2002). Studying framing in political communication with an integrative  
approach. American Behavioral Scientist, 56(3), 353–364. 
 
de Vreese, C. H. (2002). Framing Europe: Television news and European integration.  
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Aksant Academic. 
 
Dix, R. H. (1984). Why revolutions succeed and fail. Polity 16, 423-446. 
 
Dowd, M. (2016, April 16). Hillary Is Not Sorry. The New York Times. Retrieved from  
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/hillary-is-not-sorry.html 
 
Eisenstein, E. (1979). The printing press as an agent of change: Communications and  
cultural transformations in early modern Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
El-Issawi, F. (2012). Tunisian media in transition. London, UK: Carnegie Endowment  
for International Peace and London School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
Ellingson, S. (1995). Understanding the dialectic of discourse and collective action:  
Public debate and rioting in antebellum Cincinnati. American Journal of 
Sociology, 101(1), 100-144. 
 
Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of  
Communication, 43, 51–58. 
 
__________. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of  
Communication, 57, 163–173. 
 
__________. (2010). Media framing biases and political power: Explaining slant in news  
of Campaign 2008. Journalism, 11(4), 389–408. 
 
Entman, R.M., Matthes, J., & Pellicano, L. (2009). Nature, sources, and effects of news  
framing. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), The handbook of 
journalism studies (pp. 175-190). New York: Routledge. 
  258 
 
Etling, B., Faris, R., & Palfrey, J. (2010). Political change in the digital age: The fragility  
and promise of online organizing. SAIS Review of International Affairs, 30(2), 37-
49.  
 
Fahim, K., & Saad, H. (2013, February 8). A faceless teenage refugee who helped ignite  
Syria’s war. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-faceless-teenage-
refugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html 
 
Fahim, K., Shadid, A., & Gladstone, R. (2011, October 20). Violent end to an era as  
Qaddafi dies in Libya. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-
forces-take-surt.html 
 
Ferree, M. M. (2003). Resonance and radicalism: Feminist framing in the abortion  
debates of the United States and Germany. The American Journal of Sociology, 
109(2), 304-344. 
 
Filkins, D. (2011, April 11). After the uprising: Can the protestors find a path between  
dictatorship and anarchy? New Yorker. Retrieved from 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/11/after-the-uprising 
 
Fisher, M. (2016, August 26). Syria’s paradox: Why the war only ever seems to get  
worse. The New York Times. Retrieved from  
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/world/middleeast/syria-civil-war-why-get-
worse.html 
 
Freedom House (2011). Tunisia: Freedom of the press 2011. Retrieved from  
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/tunisia 
 
Fuchs, C. (2017). Social media: A critical introduction. London: Sage. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Avon Books. 
 
Gamson, W. A. (1995). Constructing social protest. In H. Johnston & B. Klandermans  
(Eds.), Social movements and culture (pp. 85–106). Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
Gamson, W.A., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). Encounters with Unjust Authority.  
Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. 
 
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. In  
R. G. Braungart & M. M. Braungart (Eds.), Research in political sociology (pp. 
137-177). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
  259 
 
Garon, J. M. (2012). Revolutions and expatriates: Social networking, ubiquitous media  
and the disintermediation of the state. Journal of International Business and Law, 
11(2), 293-310. 
 
Garrett, R. K. (2006). Protest in an information society: A review of literature on social  
movements and new ICTs. Information, Communication, & Society, 9(2), 202- 
224. 
 
Gause, G. (2011). Why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring: The myth of  
authoritarian stability. Foreign Affairs, 90(4), 81-90. 
 
Geertz, C. (1973). Ideology as a cultural system. In C. Geertz, The interpretation of  
cultures. (pp. 193–233). New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gelvin, J. L. (2012). The Arab uprisings: What everyone needs to know. New York:  
Oxford University Press. 
 
Gerbaudo, T. (2012). Tweets and the streets: Social media and contemporary activism.  
London: Pluto Press. 
 
Ghalioun, B. (2004). The persistence of Arab authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy,  
15(4), 126-132. 
 
Ghattas, K. (2011, 24 May 2011) US policy on Syria “depends on success in Libya.”  
BBC News.  
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13529923 
 
Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking  
of the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Gobe, E. (2010). The Gafsa mining basin between riots and a social movement: Meaning  
and significance of a protest movement in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. (Working paper). 
Retrieved from http://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/55/78/26/PDF/Tunisia_The_Gafsa_mining_basin_between_R
iots_and_Social_Movement.pdf 
 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New  
York: Harper & Row. 
 
Goldstone, J. A. (1993). Predicting revolutions: Why we could (and should) have  
foreseen the revolutions of 1989-1991 in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. 
Contentions, 2(2), 127-152. 
 
__________. (2001). Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual  
  260 
Review of Political Science, 4, 139–187. 
 
__________. (2011a). Cross-class coalitions and the making of the Arab revolts of 2011.  
Swiss Political Science Review 17(4), 457–462. 
 
__________. (2011b). Understanding the revolutions of 2011: Weakness and resilience in  
Middle Eastern autocracies. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 8-16. 
 
__________. (2014). Revolutions: A very short introduction. New York: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Goodwin, J., & Skocpol, T. (1989). Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third  
World. Politics & Society, 17, 489-510. 
 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78,  
1360-1380. 
 
__________. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of  
Sociology, 83(6), 1420–1443. 
 
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
________. (2000). Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century.  
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Hale, H. E. (2012). Regime change cascades: What we have learned from the 1848  
revolutions to the 2011 Arab uprisings. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 
331–353. 
 
Haraway, D. (1997). Feminism and Technoscience. New York: Routledge. 
 
Heilbroner, R. L. (1967). Do machines make history? Technology and Culture, 8(3), 335- 
345. 
 
Hempel, J. (2016, January 26). Social media made the Arab Spring, but couldn’t save it.  
Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/2016/01/social-media-made-the-
arab-spring-but-couldnt-save-it/ 
 
Heydemann, S. (2007). Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world. Washington, DC:  
The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10arabworld/10arabworl
d.pdf    
 
Hinnebusch, R. (2006). Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle  
East: An overview and critique. Democratization, 13(3), 373–395.   
  261 
 
__________. (2015). Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings  
–  starting points and divergent trajectories. Democratization, 22(2), 205-217. 
 
__________. (2015). Globalization, democratization, and the Arab uprising: The  
international factor in MENA’s failed democratization. Democratization, 22(2), 
335-357. 
 
Howard, P. N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W., & Mazaid, M. (2011).  
What was the role of social media during the Arab Spring? Project on 
Information Technology & Political Islam. Retrieved from www.pitpi.org  
 
Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2011). The role of digital media. Journal of  
Democracy, 22(3), 35-48. 
 
Hughes, T. P. (1993). Networks of power electrification in Western society 1880-1930.  
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Humphreys, A. (2011, December 21). The Arab awakening: A Bahraini activist struggles  
to keep protest alive. National Post. Retrieved from 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/21/the-arab-awakening-a-bahrainiactivist-
struggles-to-keep-protests-alive 
 
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale  
University Press. 
 
Jenkins, J. C. (1985). The politics of insurgency: The farm worker movement and the  
politics of the 1960s. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Johnson, C. (1966). Revolutionary change. New York: Little, Brown, and Company. 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American  
Psychologist, 39(4), 341–350. 
 
Kamrava, M. (2010). Preserving non-democracies: Leaders and state institutions in the  
Middle East. Middle Eastern Studies, 46(2), 251-70. 
 
Khondker, H. H. (2011). Role of the new media in the Arab Spring. Globalizations, 8(5),  
675-679. 
 
Korotayev, A., & Zinkina, J. (2011). Egyptian Revolution: A demographic structural  
analysis. Entelquia, Revista Interdisciplinar 13, 139-169. 
 
Kranzberg, M. (1986). Technology and history: “Kranzberg’s laws.” Technology and  
Culture, 27(3), 544-560. 
  262 
 
Kuebler, J. (2011). “Overcoming the digital divide: The internet and political  
mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia,” CyberOrient 5(1). Retrieved from 
 http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=6212 
 
Latour, B. (1995). A door must be either open or shut: A little philosophy of techniques.  
In A. Feenberg & A. Hannay, (Eds.), Technology and the politics of knowledge 
(pp. 272-281). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
 
Lerman, N. E., Oldenziel, R., & Mohun, A. (Eds.). (2003). Gender and Technology: A  
Reader. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Levinson, C., Coker, M., & Solomon, J. (2011, February 2). How Cairo, U.S. Were  
Blindsided by Revolution. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870344590457611850281940899
0 
 
Lewis, A. (2011, January 14). Tunisia protests: Cyber war mirrors unrest on streets. BBC.  
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12180954 
 
Lim, M. (2012). Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and oppositional  
movements in Egypt, 2004–2011. Journal of Communication, 62, 231–248. 
 
_______. (2013). Framing Bouazizi: “White lies,” hybrid network, and  
collective/connective action in the 2010-11 Tunisian uprising. Journalism, 14(7), 
921-941. 
 
Lust-Okar, E. (2005). Structuring conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, opponents and  
institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lynch, M. (2006). Voices of the new Arab public: Iraq, Al Jazeera and Middle East  
politics today. New York: Columbia University Press.   
 
_______. (2011a). After Egypt: The promise and limitation of the online challenge to  
the authoritarian Arab state. Perspectives on Politics, 9, 301–310. 
 
_______. (2011b). The big think behind the Arab Spring. Foreign Policy, 190, 46-47. 
 
_______. (2012). The Arab uprising: The unfinished revolutions of the new Middle East.  
New York: Public Affairs. 
 
_______. (2015). How the media trashed the transitions. Journal of Democracy, 26(4),  
90-99. 
 
Mackay, H., & Gillespie, G. (1992). Extending the social shaping of technology  
  263 
approach: Ideology and appropriation. Social Studies of Science, 22(4), 685-716. 
 
Mauritania’s Bouazizi Died Today. (2011, January 23). Dekhnstan. Retrieved from  
https://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2011/01/23/mauritanias-bouazizi-died-today/ 
 
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930– 
1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
__________. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of Freedom Summer.  
The American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64–90.  
 
McAdam, D., & Paulson, R. (1993). Specifying the relationship between social ties and  
activism. American Journal of Sociology, 99, 640-667. 
 
McCammon, H. J., Muse, C. S., Newman, H. D., & Terrell, T. M. (2007). Movement  
framing and discursive opportunity structures: The political successes of the U.S. 
women’s jury movements. American Sociological Review, 72, 725–749. 
 
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements.  
American Journal of Sociology, 82, 1112–1141. 
 
McLauchlin, T. (2010). Loyalty strategies and military defection in rebellion.  
Comparative Politics, 42(3), 333–350. 
 
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The extensions of man. 
 
McQuail, D. (1994). Mass communication theory: An introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA:  
Sage. 
 
Misa, T. J. (1994). Retrieving sociotechnical change from technological determinism. In  
M. R. Smith & L. Marx (Eds.), Does technology drive history: The dilemma of 
technological determinism (pp. 115- 141). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Boston, MA:  
Beacon Press. 
 
Morozov, E. (2011). The net delusion: The dark side of internet freedom. New York:  
Public Affairs. 
 
Morrison, D. R., & Isaac, L. W. (2012). Insurgent images: Genre selection and visual  
frame amplification in IWW cartoon art. Social Movement Studies, 11(1), 61–78. 
 
Nepstad, S. E. (2011). Nonviolent resistance in the Arab Spring: The critical role of  
military-opposition alliances. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(4), 485–491. 
 
  264 
___________. (2013). Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring military  
defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. Journal of Peace Research, 
50(3), 337–349. 
 
Noakes, J. A., & Johnston, H. (2005). Frames of protest: A road map to a perspective. In  
H. Johnston & J. A. Noakes (Eds.), Frames of protest: Social movements and the 
framing perspective (pp. 1-29). Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Nye, D. E. (1997). Shaping communication networks: Telegraph, telephone, computer.  
Social Research, 64(3), 1067-1091. 
 
Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  
Prentice-Hall. 
 
Oliver, P. E., & Johnston, H. (2005). What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social  
movement research. In H. Johnston & J. A. Noakes (Eds.), Frames of protest: 
Social movements and the framing perspective (pp. 185-203). Lanham, MA: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Oudshoorn, N., & T. Pinch (2003). How users matter. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Plant, S. (1998). Zeros and ones: Digital women and the new technoculture. London:  
Fourth Estate. 
 
Political change will come in Egypt: ElBaradei. (2010, October 30). France 24. Retrieved  
from http://www.france24.com/en/20101030-political-change-will-come-egypt-
elbaradei  
 
Polletta, F., Chen, P. C. B., Gardner, B. G., & Motes, A. (2013). Is the internet creating  
new reasons to protest? In J. van Stekelenburg, C. M. Roggeband, & B. 
Klandermans (Eds.), The future of social movement research: Dynamics, 
mechanisms, processes (pp 17-36). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Pollock, J. (2011, August 23). Streetbook: How Egyptian and Tunisian youth hacked the  
Arab Spring. Technology Review. Retrieved from 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425137/streetbook/ 
 
Randeree, B. (2011, January 3). Tunisia president warns protesters: President warns that  
rare display of public defiance over unemployment will be met with “firm” 
punishment. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122823238574209.html 
 
Reese, S. D. (2001). Framing public life: A bridging model for media research. In S. D.  
  265 
Reese, O. Gandy, & A. Grant (Eds.), Framing public life: Perspectives on media 
and our understanding of the social world (pp. 7-31). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
 
_________. (2007). The framing project: A bridging model for media research revisited.  
Journal of Communication, 57, 148–154. 
 
Rinke, E. M., & Roder, M. (2011). Media ecologies, communication culture, and  
temporal-spatial unfolding: Three components in a communication model of the 
Egyptian regime change. International Journal of Communication, 5, 1273–1285. 
 
Rosen, J. (2011, February 13). The “Twitter can’t topple dictators” article. PressThink.  
Retrieved from http://pressthink.org/2011/02/the-twitter-cant-topple-dictators-
article/ 
 
Roth, G. (1968). Personal rulership, patrimonialism, and empire-building in the new  
states. World Politics, 20(2), 194-206. 
 
Russell, A. (2011). Networked: A Contemporary History of News in Transition.  
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Ryan, C. (2005). Successful collaboration: movement building in the media arena. In D.  
Croteau, W. Hoynes, & C. Ryan (Eds.), Rhyming hope and history: Activists, 
academics, and social movement scholarship, (pp. 115-136). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Ryan, Y. (2011, January 6). Tunisia’s bitter cyberwar: Anonymous has joined Tunisian  
activists to call for end to the government's stifling of online dissent. Al Jazeera. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/20111614145839362.html 
 
_______. (2011, January 7). Tunisia arrests bloggers and rapper: Dissidents were arrested  
or “disappeared” in crackdowns against what is being described as a national 
uprising. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111718360234492.html 
 
_______. (2011, January 20). The tragic life of a street vendor: Al Jazeera travels to the  
birthplace of Tunisia’s uprising and speaks to Mohamed Bouazizi’s family. Al 
Jazeera. Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html 
 
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism: Western representations of the Orient. London: Routledge  
and Kegan Paul. 
 
Salem, S. (2015). Creating spaces for dissent: The role of social media in the 2011  
  266 
Egyptian revolution. In D. Trottier & C. Fuchs (Eds.), Social media, politics and 
the state: Protests, revolutions, riots, crime and politics in the age of Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube (pp. 171-188). New York: Routledge. 
 
Salvatore, A. (2013). New media, the “Arab Spring,” and the metamorphosis of the  
public sphere: Beyond Western assumptions on collective agency and democratic 
politics. Constellations, 20(2), 217-228. 
 
Sawani, M. Y. (2012). Post-Qadhafi Libya: Interactive dynamics and the political future.  
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5(1), 1-26. 
 
Scheufele, B. (2004). Framing-effects approach: A theoretical and methodological  
critique. Communications, 29, 401-428. 
 
Scheufele, D.A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication,  
49(1), 103-22. 
 
Shadid, A. (2012, January 30). Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and  
Religion. The New York Times. Retrieved  from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/africa/tunisia-navigates-a-democratic-
path-tinged-with-religion.html 
 
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Smelser, Neil J. (1963). Theory of collective behavior. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 
Snow, D. A. (2004). Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields. In D.A. Snow, et 
al.  
(Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 380-412). Malden, 
MA: Blackwell. 
 
Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant 
mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1, 197–217. 
 
__________.  (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M.  
Mueller (Eds.), Frontiers in social movement theory (pp. 133–155). New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
__________. (2005). Clarifying the relationship between framing and ideology. In H.  
Johnston & J. A. Noakes (Eds.), Frames of protest: Social movements and the 
framing perspective (pp. 205-211). Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
 
Snow, D. A., Benford, R. D., McCammon, H. J., Hewitt, L., & Fitzgerald, S. (2014). The  
  267 
emergence, development, and future of the framing perspective: 25+ years since 
“Frame Alignment.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 19(1), 23-45. 
 
Snow, D.A., et al. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement  
participation. American Sociological Review, 51, 464–481. 
 
Stepan, A., & Linz, J. (2013). Democratization theory and the “Arab Spring.” Journal of  
Democracy 24(2), 15–30. 
 
Stepanova, E. (2011). The role of information communication technologies in the “Arab  
Spring”: Implications beyond the region. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 159,  
37-49. 
 
Tarrow, S. G. (1994). Power in Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
___________. (1998). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tilly, C. (1976). The Vendee. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
______. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
______. (1995). To explain political processes. American Journal of Sociology, 100,  
1594-1610. 
 
______. (2004). Contention and democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. New York and  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
 
Tudoroiu, T. (2014). Social media and revolutionary waves: The case of the Arab Spring.  
New Political Science, 36(3), 346–365. 
 
Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest.  
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Tufekci, Z., & Wilson, C. (2012). Social media and the decision to participate in political  
protest: Observations from Tahrir Square. Journal of Communication, 62, 363–
379. 
 
Ulfelder, J. (2005). Contentious collective action and the breakdown of authoritarian  
regimes. International Political Science Review, 26(3), 311–34. 
 
United Nations Development Program (2002). Arab human development report 2002:  
Creating opportunities for future generations. Retrieved from http://www.arab-
hdr.org/reports/2002/english/ahdr2002e.pdf?download 
 
  268 
United Nations Development Program (2009). Arab human development report 2002:  
Challenges to human security in Arab countries. Retrieved from http://www.arab-
hdr.org/reports/2002/english/ahdr2009e.pdf?download 
 
Valbjorn, M. (2014). Three ways of revisiting the (post-)democratization debate after the  
Arab uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), 157–160. 
 
__________. (2015). Reflections on self-reflections: On framing the analytical  
implications of the Arab uprisings for the study of Arab politics. Democratization, 
22(2), 218-238. 
 
Valbjørn, M., & Bank, A. (2010) Examining the “post” in post-democratization: The  
future of Middle Eastern political rule through lenses of the past. Middle East 
Critique, 19(3), 183–200. 
 
Valbjorn, M., & Volpi, F. (2014). Revisiting theories of Arab politics in the aftermath of  
the Arab uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), 134–136. 
 
Valocchi, S. (2005). Collective action frames in the gay liberation movement. In H.  
Johnston & J. A. Noakes, (Eds.) Frames of protest: Social movements and the 
framing perspective (pp. 53-68). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Van Dam, N. (2011). The struggle for power in Syria: Politics and society under Asad  
and the Ba’th Party. London: IB Tauris. 
 
Wajcman, J., & Jones, P. K. (2012). Border communication: Media sociology and STS.  
Media, Culture & Society, 34(6), 673-690.  
 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Wehrey, F., & Lacher, W. (2014, October 6). Libya’s legitimacy crisis. Foreign Affairs.  
Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/06/libya-s-legitimacy-
crisis/hr9j 
 
Wood, R. M., Kathman, J. D., & Gent, S. E. (2012). Armed intervention and civilian  
victimization in intrastate conflicts. Journal of Peace Research, 49(5), 647-660. 
 
Wolfson, T. (2014). Digital rebellion: The birth of the cyber left. Urbana, IL: University  
of Illinois Press. 
 
Worth, R. F., & Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2011, January 27). Seizing a moment, Al Jazeera  
galvanizes Arab frustration. The New York Times. Retrieved from  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28jazeera.html?_r=0 
 
Wulf, V., Misaki, K., Atam, M., Randall, D., & Rohde, M. (2013, February). “On the  
  269 
ground” in Sidi Bouzid: Investigating social media use during the Tunisian 
revolution. Paper presented at the ACM Conference on Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work, San Antonio, TX.  
 
Youssef, N., & Al-Batati, S. (2016, August 29). Suicide attack kills scores of military  
recruits in Aden, Yemen. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/world/middleeast/yemen-suicide-attack-
aden.html 
 
Zayed, D. (2011, January 21). Al Jazeera TV makes waves with Tunisia coverage.  
Reuters. Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-jazeera-
idUKTRE70K25N20110121 
 
Zuckerman, E. (2013). Cute cats to the rescue? Participatory media and political  
expression. Retrieved from http://ethanzuckerman.com/papers/cutecats2013.pdf.  
 
  270 
APPENDIX A 
TIMELINE OF THE ARAB SPRING REVOLUTION IN TUNISIA 
  271 
2010 
December 17: Mohammed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old fruit vendor, sets fire to himself in 
front of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid, after an official confiscates his 
scales and government representatives refuse to meet with him to resolve the situation. 
Bouazizi dies from his injuries on January 4, 2011. 
 
Locals protest throughout the day in Sidi Bouzid. Bouazizi’s cousin Ali gives an 
interview on Al-Jazeera, and that evening he posts to Facebook an edited, 10-minute 
video of the day’s events. 
 
December 24: Police shoot at protesters in the small town of Menzel Bouziane, killing 
two, as protests begin to spread from the Sidi Bouzid area to other interior towns. 
 
December 25: Demonstrations break out in Kairouan, a holy city in the interior of the 
country, as well as in Sfax, Tunisia’s second-largest city.  
 
December 27: First protest in Tunis takes place, with about 1,000 demonstrators 
expressing solidarity with Sidi Bouzid and calling for jobs.  
 
December 28: Ben Ali visits Bouazizi in the hospital. Bouazizi is covered entirely in 
bandages. That evening, Ben Ali makes his first televised speech since the crisis began; 
he promises firm punishment for demonstrators. 
 
Some 300 lawyers stage a protest near government offices in Tunis; some are arrested. 
 
December 31: Demonstrations are held throughout the country. Lawyers in many major 
cities respond to a call to join demonstrations in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid and to protest 
the arrest of their fellow lawyers. 
 
2011 
January 3: Protests turn violent in Thala, as police use rubber bullets and tear gas against 
demonstrators.  
 
January 4: Tunisian Bar Association calls for a general strike of lawyers. The Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT) declares its support for the demonstrations. 
 
Bouazizi dies. 
 
January 8: Police violently crack down on demonstrations, using live bullets in Thala and 
Kasserine and killing at least 10 protesters. In the ensuing days, there are reports of 
snipers killing more during funerals and during other demonstrations. 
 
January 9: Ben Ali gives his second speech, declaring that he will bring the unrest to an 
end by any means necessary. 
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January 10: Protests begin in poorer, outlying areas of Tunis. 
 
January 11: Protests in Tunis spread. 
 
January 12: Ben Ali deploys the army into the streets of Tunis and elsewhere; he orders 
soldiers to use force to put down the protests. Army Chief of Staff Rachid Ammar refuses 
to comply with the order. 
 
Demonstrators and police clash in downtown Tunis. 
 
January 13: Ben Ali fires Ammar and places him under house arrest. 
 
Ben Ali gives his third and final speech during the rebellion. He promises reforms, such 
as opening all Internet connections and refusing to run for another term. Ben Ali 
supporters demonstrate in downtown Tunis. 
 
January 14: Massive demonstrations take place in the center of Tunis, in front of the 
Interior Ministry. There are clashes between protesters and police, and Ben Ali declares a 
state of emergency and sacks the government. 
 
Ben Ali flees Tunisia. He remains in Saudi Arabia to this day.  
 
(Sources: Ayeb, 2011; Brooks, 2013; Lim, 2013; dissertation interviews) 
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Section 1: Media Use 
A. Internet  
1. Did you use any social media sites? If so, which ones, and how much time did you 
spend with them? 
 
2. Did you use any blogs? If so, which ones, and how much time did you spend with 
them? 
 
3. Did you use any news websites? If so, which ones, and how much time did you spend 
with them? 
 
4. Did you use any other websites relevant to the revolution? If so, which ones, and how 
much time did you spend with them? 
 
5. Did what you saw in this medium fit with your understanding of the situation?  
If yes, how so? If not, why not? 
 
6. Did it fit your beliefs, values, interests, ideology? 
 
B. TV 
7. Which channels did you watch? How much time did you spend with each? 
 
8. Did what you saw in this medium fit with your understanding of the situation?  
If yes, how so? If not, why not? 
 
9. Did it fit your beliefs, values, interests, ideology? 
 
C. Phone 
10. How did you use your phone during the revolution? How much calling, how much 
texting? 
 
11. What did you use it for, and how much did you use it for these purposes? To 
exchange news? To persuade? To encourage? To receive encouragement? To 
communicate fears? 
 
12. Did what you encountered in this medium fit with your understanding of the 
situation?  
If yes, how so? If not, why not? 
 
13. Did it fit your beliefs, values, interests, ideology? 
 
D. Other media (radio, newspapers) 
14. Which radio stations/newspapers/magazines did you use? How much time did you 
spend with them? 
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15. Did what you saw in this medium fit with your understanding of the situation?  
If yes, how so? If not, why not? 
 
16. Did it fit your beliefs, values, interests, ideology? 
 
Section 2: Organizer/Participant 
For organizers: 
17. In your uses of media, what impressions were you trying to convey? About the 
regime? About the opposition? 
 
18. How did you try to create those impressions? 
 
19. Did you use different approaches for different media? If so, what were they? Why did 
you vary them for different media? 
 
20. How did you try to attract newcomers to your group or to the revolution? 
 
21. Why did you become an organizer? Follow-up: What were the influences that led you 
to become an organizer? Why did you decide when you did? 
 
For participants: 
17. How did you find out about the first demonstration that you attended during the 
revolution? Was it through (check as many as apply): 
___ Radio or television 
___ Newspapers (print or online) 
___ Other online media 
___ Online social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) 
___ Advertisement, flyers, and/or posters 
___ Partner and/or family member 
___ Friends and/or acquaintances 
___ People at your school or work 
___ (Fellow) members of an organization or association 
___ Other (please describe: ______________) 
 
How did you find out about later demonstrations or events to attend during the 
revolution? With whom did you attend demonstrations and similar events? 
 
18. Why did you choose to actively participate in the revolution? Follow-up: When did 
you decide? Why did you decide when you did? 
 
19. Was that at all shaped by what you saw in the media? If yes, how so? 
 
20. How did you attempt to construct through (individual medium) a frame for others, a 
way for others to see the situation? 
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21. Did you use different approaches for different media or different people? If so, what 
were the approaches? Why did you vary them? 
 
Section 3: Revolutionary identity 
22. Were you a member of any groups that played a role in the revolution? If so, why did 
you join? (How did it relate to your grievances?) 
 
23. To what extent did you identify with the people present at the demonstrations you 
attended? With the groups organizing the demonstrations? 
 
24. How did it make you feel to be a member of that group? (Did it give you any feeling 
of empowerment or agency?) Did the regime label you as an enemy during the 
revolution? If so, how did that make you feel? 
 
Section 4: Revolutionary ideology/cultural framework/resonance 
25. What did you think about your chances for success? 
 
26. Whom did you blame for the issues that led to the revolution? What did you think 
should be done to address this issue?  
 
27. How did you view the Ben Ali regime? Unjust? Weak? Why? 
 
Section 5: Demographic Information 
Are you male or female? 
 
How old are you? 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper-middle class, middle 
class, working class, lower class, or none of the above? 
 
What is your employment situation? 
 
What is your occupation? 
 
Do you supervise the work of others? If so, how many? 
 
Did you vote in the last election? 
 
For which party did you vote? 
 
Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? 
